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Page 1 of 4 Case CR-2008-0002607 Current Judge R Ted Israel 
Defendant Leclercq, Ton1 M 
State of Idaho vs Ton1 M Leclercq 
Misdemeanor 
Date Judge 
New Case Filed - Misdemeanor R. Ted Israel 
Prosecutor assigned Jim Thomas R. Ted Israel 
Affidav~t Of Probable Cause 
Not~ce of suspenslon/fa~l ev~dentiary test 
Bond Posted - Surety (Amount 2000.00 ) 
R. Ted lsrael 
R. Ted lsrael 
R. Ted lsrael 
Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 09/29/2008 09:OO AM) R. Ted Israel 
Defendant: Leclercq, Toni M Appearance Brian E. Elkins R. Ted Israel 
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 11/03/2008 02:OO PM) R. Ted Israel 
Notice Of Hearing R. Ted Israel 
State's Request for discovery and demand for alibi 
State's Response To Request For Discoverylplaintiff 
R. Ted lsrael 
R. Ted lsrael 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on 11/03/2008 02:OO PM: R. Ted Israel 
Pre-Trial Stipulation and Order 
Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 12/01/2008 10:30 AM) R. Ted Israel 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion in Limine 12/03/2008 02:30 PM) R. Ted Israel 
Motion in Limine 
Subpoena Issued 
R. Ted lsrael 
R. Ted lsrael 
Amended Motion in Limine and/or Motion to Suppress R. Ted Israel 
SUBPOENA: Document Service Issued: on 11/20/2008 to Toni M R. Ted Israel 
Leclercq; Assigned to Returned to Counsel for Service. Service Fee of 
$0.00. 
Hearing result for Sentencing held on 12/01/2008 10:30 AM: Hearing R. Ted Israel 
Vacatedipending determination of Motion in Limine 
Amended Motion in Limine and/or Motion to Suppress R. Ted Israel 
Notice Vacating Sentencing Hearing R. Ted Israel 
Hearing result for Motion in Limine held on 12/03/2008 02:30 PM: Court R. Ted lsrael 
Minutes 
Hearing result for Motion in Limine held on 12/03/2008 02:30 PM: Hearing R. Ted lsrael 
Held 
Defendants Memorandum in Support of Motion in Lime/ Motion to Supress R. Ted lsrael 
States Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Memorandum in Support R. Ted lsrael 
of Motion in LiminelMotion to Suppress 
Reply Memorandum R. Ted Israel 
Memorandum Decision and Order- Motion to Suppress is Denied R. Ted Israel 
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 02/09/2009 02:OO PM) R. Ted Israel 
Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 02/12/2009 09:OO AM) R. Ted Israel 
States First Supplemental Response to Discovery R. Ted Israel 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 02/12/2009 09:OO AM: Hearing R. Ted Israel 
Vacated 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on 02/09/2009 02:OO PM: R. Ted Israel 
Pre-Trial Stipulation and Order 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 02/25/2009 01:30 PM) R. Ted Israel 
Dale 1/12/2010 ,G$2%h Judicial District Court - Blaine County*&y< 
ePZ$fZ 
T~me 08 58 AM > * 9- 412 ROA Report @$$ ~ 
Page 2 of 4 Case CR-2008-0002607 Current Judge R Ted Israel 
Defendant Leclercq, Ton1 M 
State of Idaho vs Ton1 M Leclercq 
User ANDREA 
Date 
Misdemeanor 
Judge 
Hearing result for Status held on 02/25/2009 01:30 PM: Hearing Held R. Ted lsrael 
Hearing result for Status held on 02/25/2009 01:30 PM: Court Minutes R. Ted lsrael 
Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 03/04/2009 01 :30 PM) R. Ted Israel 
Notice Of Hearing R. Ted Israel 
Continued (Sentencing 03/09/2009 10:30 AM) R. Ted Israel 
Motion to Continue Sentencing Hearing and Order R. Ted Israel 
Hearing result for Sentencing held on 03/09/2009 10:30 AM: Court R. Ted Israel 
Minutes 
Court Alcohol School Completed R. Ted Israel 
Rule 11 Plea Agreement R. Ted Israel 
A Plea is entered for charge: - GT (118-8004 {M} Driving Under The R. Ted Israel 
Influence) 
Withheld Judgment Entered (118-8004 {M) Driving Under The Influence) R. Ted lsrael 
Sentenced To Incarceration (118-8004 {M} Driving Under The Influence) R. Ted lsrael 
Confinement terms: Jail: 180 days. Suspended jail: 177 days. Credited 
time: 2 days. 
Probation Ordered (1 18-8004 {M} Driving Under The Influence) Probation R. Ted lsrael 
term: 0 years 18 months 0 days. (Supervised) 
STATUS CHANGED: closed pending clerk action R. Ted Israel 
Surety Bond Exonerated (Amount 2,000.00) R. Ted Israel 
Notification of Penalties for Violation of Driving Under the Influence R. Ted Israel 
Hearing Scheduled (Status 04/20/2009 09:OO AM) appeal filed? R. ~ e d  Israel 
Hearing Scheduled (Status 04/01/2009 09:OO AM) notification of penalties R. Ted lsrael 
provided 
Execution of sentence stayed pending appeal R. Ted Israel 
Hearing result for Status held on 04/01/2009 09:OO AM: Hearing Vacated R. Ted lsrael 
notification of penalties provided 
Appeal Filed In District Court R. Ted Israel 
Notice Of Appeal Robert J. Elgee 
Appeal Filed In District Court Robert J. Elgee 
STATUS CHANGED: Reopened Robert J. Elgee 
STATUS CHANGED: inactive Robert J, Elgee 
Motion to disqualify district judge wlo cause Robert J. Elgee 
Objection to State's motion to disqualify district judge w/o cause Robert J. Elgee 
Order on appeal procedure pursuant to ICR 54 Robert J. Elgee 
Notice Of Hearing RE: Objection to States Motion to Disqualify District Robert J. Elgee 
Judge Without Cause 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/04/2009 10:OO AM) to Disqualify District Robert J. Elgee 
Judge Without Cause 
Date 1/12/2010 NBh Judicial District Court - Blaine County @zi9 q,# 
T ~ m e  08 58 AM -*e ROA Report .*;3d.* 
Page 3 of 4 Case CR-2008-0002607 Current Judge R Ted Israel 
Defendant Leclercq, Ton1 M 
Slate of Idaho vs Ton1 M Leclercq 
Date 
5/4/2009 
Misdemeanor 
Judge 
User ANDREA 
-- - ~ - ~  
Hearing result for Motion held on 05/04/2009 10:OO AM: District Court Robert J. Elgee 
Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Susan lsrael 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: less than 100 
Pages 
WITHDRAWN Order granting motion for alternate judge: ""WITHDRAWN Robert J. Elgee 
BY THE STATEe* 
Court Minutes Robert J. Elgee 
Order denying State's motion to disqualify District Judge without cause Robert J. Elgee 
Hearing Scheduled (Clerk's Status 06/15/2009 04:59 PM) transcript filed? Robert J. Elgee 
then set out 35 days for appellant's brief 
Continued (Clerk's Status 07/13/2009 04:59 PM) appellant's brief filed? Robert J. Elgee 
Transcript of Appeal from Magistrate Division Filed Robert J. Elgee 
Appellant's Brief Robert J. Elgee 
Continued (Clerk's Status 08/10/2009 04:59 PM) respondent's brief filed? Robert J. Elgee 
Respondents Brief Robert J. Elgee 
Continued (Clerk's Status 09/10/2009 04:59 PM) reply brief filed? Robert J. Elgee 
Notice Of Hearing RE: Oral Argument on Appeal Robert J. Elgee 
Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal 10/05/2009 1 1 :00 AM) Robert J. Elgee 
RE: Oral Argument on Appeal Robert J. Elgee 
Appellant's Reply Brief Robert J. Elgee 
Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal held on 10/05/2009 1 1 :00 AM: Robert J. Elgee 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter:Susan lsrael 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing:less 100 
Court Minutes Robert J. Elgee 
Hearing type: Oral Argument on Appeal 
Hearing date: 10/5/2009 
Time: 10:35 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Susan lsrael 
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby 
Tape Number: D l  92 
Defense Attorney: Brian Elkins 
Prosecutor: Jim Thomas 
Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal 10/26/2009 09:OO AM) Robert J. Elgee 
Notice Of Hearing Robert J. Elgee 
Court Minutes Robert J. Elgee 
Hearing type: Oral Argument on Appeal 
Hearing date: 10/26/2009 
Time: 9:40 am 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg 
Court reporter: Susan lsrael 
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby 
Tape Number: D l  9. 
Defense Attorney: Brian Elkins 
Prosecutor: Jim Thomas 
Date 1/12/2010 e!!$7$h Judicial District Court - Blaine County 423 
<@$ @%.;.i Time 08 58 AM ROA Report &-I 
Page 4 of 4 Case CR-2008-0002607 Current Judge R Ted Israel 
Defendant Leclercq, Ton1 M 
State of Idaho vs Ton1 M Leclercq 
Date 
10126/2009 
Misdemeanor 
Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal held on 10/26/2009 09:OO AM: 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter:Susan lsrael 
Estimated Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing: less 100 
Change Assigned Judge 
Remanded 
Order on Appeal (Magistrate affirmed) 
Remittitur 
STATUS CHANGED: closed pending clerk action 
Affidavit and Notice of Failure to Pay - Overdue - Step 1,  Failure to Pay 
Fines and Fees - Charge # 1, Driving Under The Influence Appearance 
date: 1 1/12/2009 
Appellants Objection to Remittur 
Hearing Scheduled (Clerk's Status 1211 012009 0459  PM) appealed? 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 13874 Dated 11/9/2009 for 850.00) 
Notice Of Appeal 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
STATUS CHANGED: Inactive 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 14414 Dated 12/7/2009 for 100.00) 
User ANDREA 
Judge 
Robert J. Elgee 
R. Ted lsrael 
R. Ted lsrael 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
Robert J. Elgee 
R, Ted lsrael 
Robert J. Elgee 
R. Ted lsrael 
R. Ted lsrael 
R. Ted lsrael 
R. Ted lsrael 
R. Ted lsrael 
R. Ted lsrael 
#: 
*? -* 
IN THE DISTRICYCOURT OF THE '"\yz# 
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR 73 
STATE OF IDAHO t71 { COMPLalNi AND SUMMON- 
) 
Middle inlllal 
1 
First Name 
lnftaction Citation 
OR 
GMiademeanor Citation 
Accident Involved 
Date Witnessing Officer Serial #/Address Dept. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT 
You are hereby sl~mmoned to appear before th agistrate's Division of the 
D~strict Court of -...&!I a h-6 - County Idaho, 
3 ki located at on the 
day of i ,20 , (OR) on or after 20 - and on or before ,20 
at o'clock - M h 
I hereby certify service upon the defendant personally on the - day of , 20 - 1 
m 
0 
L 
a, *;r Officer 
NOTICE. See reverse s~de of your copy for PENALTY and COMPLIANCE Instructions. 
!:,-<liT C r P Y  V'OLPTIOPJ $ .I 
D e p m e n a  Report # TO8000842 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE 5th JUDICAL DISTRICT OF THE ! s@ 1 5 2m ! \ 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE : \- -*" 
, : I [,Jf-< 1 . * a i +  . P s  I . .- 
THF2 STATE OF IDAHO, .- .--- 
Plaintiff, 
COURT CASE NUME3ER 
PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT IN SWPORT 
OF ARREST AND/OR REFUSAL TO TAKE TEST 
Defendant. 
DOB:1_Q11111.9'70 
SSN:  
DL#: 
Stale: 
State of Idaho, 
SS 
County of_Blaine 
I, Trooper Travis DeEZie , the undersigned, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say that: 
1. I am a peace officer employed b y m e  
2. The defendant was arrested on September 13,2008 at 2318 0 AM [XI PM for the crime of driving while 
under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating substances pursuant to Section 18-8004 Idaho Code. 
Second or more DUI offense in the last five years? q YE3 [XI NO FELONY MISDEMEANOR 
3. Location of Occurrence: northbound State Highwa y 75 near milepost124 
4 . T d e n t i f i e d t h e . O .  Toni M 
by: (check box) 
nh/lilitary ID O ~ t a t e  ID Card n ~ t u d e n t  ID Card [XI~rivers License n ~ r e d i t  Cards 
D ~ a ~ e r w o r k  found n ~ e r b a l  ID by defendant 
Witness: identified defendant. 
Other: 
5. Actual physical control established by: m~bservation by affiant n~bserva t ion  by Officer 
n ~ d m i s s i o n  of Defendant to: O~tatement  of Witness: mother: 
6. I believe that there is probable cause to believe the defendant committed such crime because of the following 
facts: 
(NOTE: You must state the source of all information provided below. State what you observed and what 
you learned from someone else, identifying that person): 
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR STOP AND T: On September 13,2008, I, Trooper Travis DeBie. At 2318 hours I 
stopped a white 2008 Toyoa % h d e r  wi o plate 5B74551on nohbound State 
ehide for speedq, blmph in a 55mph zone. The driver was identified by a 
, Toni M. Upon conmcm her I could smell the stong odor of an alcoholic b from within the 
er eyes were glassy and extremely bl and her speech was slued. I asked 
any alcohol tonight. She a h t t e d  to one glass of wine. I retumed to my vehicle and contacted the Idaho 
State Police Re&od C o m k a u o n s  Center West (RCCY. I had them run a driver's check on ECLEiRCQ. She was 
found to be valid and clear of arrest waxran&. I had her step outsrde her vehde to perfom the standard held sobriety 
mduations. She failed the evduatlons and was placed in custody at 2332 hours. I checked her mouth for any foreign 
material and asked her if she had an* in her mouth. She stated she did not I began the fifieen-minute observation 
period at 2338 hours. I read the advisory for the Idaho Tmspoation Departments A h m t i v e  License Suspension to 
LECERCQ. I read her the h4ka.nda righrs and asked if she understood them. She stated she did She submitted to the 
offered BrAC Aleo Sensor I11 ( s d #  1047814). She gave the samples of 0.141 and 0.143. She stated, "I can't be over the 
hit, I only had two glasses of wine. I tmnsported LECLEBCQ to the Blaine County Jail. I left her in the custody of 
deputies to be booked on the charge of dmmg under the influence 18-8004. 
D.U. I. NOTES Sobriety Tests - Meets Decision Points? 
Odor of alcoholic beverage [XIyes  NO Gaze Nystagmus m ~ e s  NO 
Admitted drinking alcoholic beverage [XIyes DNO Walk & T m  n ~ e s  [XINO 
Slurred speech [XIyes DNO One Leg Stand [XIyes  NO 
Impaired memory [XIyes  NO 
Classy/bloodshot eyes [XIyes  NO Crash Involved n ~ e s  [XINO 
Other Injury n ~ e s  [XINO 
Drugs Suspected: a y e s   NO Drug Recognition Evaluation Performed a y e s   NO 
Reason Rugs  are Suspected: 
Prior to being offered the test, the defendant was substantially informed of the consequences of refusal and failure 
of the test as required by Section 18-8002 and 18-8002A, Idaho Code. 
Defendant was tested for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances. The test(s) waslwere 
performed in compliance with Sections 18-8003 & 18-8004(4), Idaho Code and the standards and methods adopted 
by the Department of Law Enforcement. 
BACLb41l141 by: [XIBreath Instrument Type: n~ntoxilyzer 5000 [XI~lco Sensor Serial#: 10478 14 
n ~ l o o d  AND/OR n ~ r i n e  Test Results Pending? n ~ e s  [XI No (Attached) 
Name of person administering breath test: Travis D a i e  Date certification expires: June 30.2010 
n ~ e f e n d a n t  refused the test as follows: 
By my s i~amre and in the presence of a person au&orized to a h ~ s t e r  Oaths in .the State of Idaho, I hereby 
solemnly swear that the infbmation contained in this docwent and attached reports and documents that may be 
included herein is true to the best 
Signed: ,'--% 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on /tw D/C 
PERSON AUmOHZED TO 
mMmlSTER 
Title: 
Revised 12-01 -04 
L/ Res~dmg at: 
My Commis 
ITD 3814 (Rev. 03-08) 
supply # O ~ . W . Q O ~ O - ~  E F SUSPENSION for Failtlre of ary Testing I 
dvisory for Sec t ions  18-8002 and  18-8002A,  ode) 
r 
Lest Name F~rst M~ddle 
\ G O ? ?  
Ma~hng Address 
ZC l l f v  fie \32o5&r 
State Cl fa f ion  # 
-- 
to belleve that you were dr~vlng or were In physlcal influence of alcohol. d&s, 1 
- * .  I or other intoxlcatiig substances. 
2. You are required by law to take one or more evidentiary tests to determine the concentration of alcohol or the presence of drugs or other intoxicating 
substances in your body. After submitting to the test(s) you may, when practical, at your own expense, have additional tests made by a person of your 
own choosing. 
3. You do not have the right to talk to a lawyer before &lung any evidentiary tests to determine the alcohol concentration or presence of drugs or other 
intoxicating substances in your body. I 
4. If you refuse to take or complete any ,of the offered tests pursuant to Section 18-8002, Idaho Code: 
A. You are subject to a civil penalvof two hundred fifty dollars ($250). 
B. Your Idaho driver's license or permit will be seized if you have it in your possession, and if it is current and valid you will be issued a temporary 
permit. Non-resident licenses will not be seized and will be valid in Idaho for h r t y  (30) days from the service of this notice of suspension unless 
modified or restricted by the court, provided the license is valid in the issuing state. If you were operating a commercial motor vehicle, any 
temporary permit issued will not provide commercial driving privileges of any kind. 
, I  r 
C. You have a right to submit a written request within seven (7) days to the Magistrate Court of 6 14 ! 4 County for a hearing to show 
cause why you refused to submit to or complete evidentiary testing and why your driver's license should not be suspended. 
D. If you do not request a hearing or do not prevail at the hearing, the court will sustain the civil penalty and your license will be suspended with 
absolutely no dnving privileges for one (1) year if this isTour fust refusal; and two (2) years if this is your second refusal within ten (10) years. 
5 .  If you take and fail the evidentiary test(s) pursuant to Section 18-8002A, Idaho Code: 
A. Your Idaho driver's license or permit will be seized if you have it in your possession, and if it is current and valid you will be issued a temporary 
permit. Non-resident licenses will not be seized and shall be valid in Idaho for thirty (30) days from the service of this notice of suspension, 
provided the license is valid in the issuing state. If you were operating a commercial motor vehicle, any temporary permit issued will not provide 
commercial driving privileges of any kind. 
B. I will serve you with this NOTICE OF SUSPENSION that becomes effective thirty days from the date of service on h s  NOTICE, suspending 
your driver's license or privileges. If this is your fmt failure of an evidentiary test your driver's license or driving privileges will be suspended for 
ninety (90) days, with absolutely no driving privileges during the fust thirty (30) days. You may request restricted driving privileges for the 
remaining sixty (60) days of the suspension. Restricted driving privileges will not allow you to operate a commercial motor vehicie. If this is not 
your first failure of an evidentiary test within the last five (5) years, your driver's license or driving privileges will be suspended for one (1) year 
with absolutely no driving privileges of any kind during that period. 
C. You have the right to an administrative hearing on the suspension before the IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT to show cause why 
you failed the evidentiary test and why your driver's license should not be suspended. The request must be made in writing and be received by the 
department within seven (7) calendar days from the date of service of this NOTICE OF SUSPENSION. You also have the right to judicial review 
of the.Hearing Officer's decision. 
'IBIS SUSPENSION FOR FAILURE OR REFUSAL OF THE EVIDENTIARY TESTW E5 SEPARATE 
I FROM ANY OTHER SUSPENSION ORDERED RY THE COTJRT. I 
NOTICE OF SUSPENSION: If you have failed the  evidentiary test@), y o u r  dr iv ing privileges a r e  r eby  suspended p e r  #5 
above, commencing th i r ty  (30) days  f r o m  the  da te  of service of this notice. If ! 
 ate of.sewice: 7 {/+ 4 0,:g a blood or  unne test was adrmnlstered, the department may serve a Notlce of 
Sus~enslorz upon recelpt of the test results. * 1 
This Section Provides Temporary Driving Privileges. 
(If t he  driver w a s  opera t ing a commercial  vehicle, t h i s  permit will no t  provide commercia l  driving privileges of a n y  kind.) 
If ~ssued,  thls p e m t  grants the same dnvlng restnctions and pnvllegcs as those granted by the Ilcense/pemt selzed (except as indicated 
above), and shall be valld for thlrty (30) days from the date you were served thls Notlce of Suspension for fallure or refusal of the evldentlary 
test(s), unless ~t 1s c eled or restricted by the court. 
Permlt Issued? @Yes 0 No Llcense surrendered? a Yes d o  
ued S u w d e d  Not In Possess~on lnvalld Explred Issued by Another Junsdlctlon Not Llcensed 
SP& -'&D < . - 
Signatuie of Temporary Licensee ( ~ f  you are Issued a Fer IS n& valid until you sign I!) 
Department use only: Fallure [? Breath UI-lne/Blood Refusal 
While Copy ( ~ f  fa~lure) to iTD (to court ~f refusal) Yellow Copy to Law Enforcement Pink Copy to Court ( ~ f  fa~lure) Goldenrod Copy to Dnver 
. 3 z(t-6mj 
Pnnt Name and I D Number of Reporbng Officer (PRINT) Agency Code Telephone Number 
The audio verslon of on advisory subs$ntialiy 
. conforms torthe writt suspension advisory. 
the MagstrfiteC?ourt-m&cated on the faceof thlsnotlce for* keanng trrshow cause 
why you refusad tocubmit e-m complete evldenhary testlng This 1s your opporturuty t o  show cause why you refused to suhmlt or falled to complete 
evldentlary testing andwhy your dnver's license should not be suspended. NOTE. X HE,\HLNC, REQIJEST 4011 RFFUSINC C\/IDENTlAR\, TF.STlhC, 
M[JS r BE SUBMflTFD TfZTHE M&CISTRATE COURT 
LL 
If you fad to request a heanng or do not prevd at the hearmg, you are subject to a $250 clvll penalty and the court will suspend your dnver's hcense and 
pnvlleges with,absolutely no dnvlng pnvlleges for one (1) year for your f i s t  offense, or for two (2) years for your second offense wlthln ten (10) years 
J a. ., 
F0R.F-kARYmMNG - - .  IPURSUANMOSF(: TION ~~*~OO-CODE): 
You have been served tIiis Notice ofSuspension by a ueace officer who hadreasonable mounds to believe that vou were overatme a vehlcle while lntoxlcated 
. . - .  ., 
Sy~??,- l l (  , 8 ~ # ) ? , ~ ~ , ~ ~ , ~ o d c  r cllli -..~(ou-to tikc ,in ev~dentlary test or tests ~IJ demnline your &oh01 con~cnguion .111d/or ~t~':.presenw:.uf'aoydrugs.or other 
r . ,  .. ."*.:- . . 
indx1catirrg;sll%tance8: Atter \ul>~;;i&~'t~.the.test(s);~ou may, when praciicable, h~ve.additioual~trst.$<con'd'uciid (;I[ .your ow",iqjene>?,. - .!?>' :'.?: 
If you take the evldentiary test(s) and the results lndlcate an alcohol concentratlon of 08 or greater ( 02 or greater ~f you are under 21 years of age), or the 
,presence of drugs or other lntoxtcating substances In vlolatlon of the provlslons of Sectlons 18-8004, 18 80042, and 18-8006, Idaho Code, the peace officer 
shall: 
1. A. Seize your driver's license, (unless you are an out-of-state resident). 
B Issue you a temporary dnving permit whlch shall be valid fdr thirty (30) days from the date of servlce lndlcated on the reverse slde of thls Notlce of 
Suspension, ~f you have surrendered a current valld Idaho llcense If you were operatlng a commerclal motor vetucle, any temporary permlt Issued 
will not provlde commerclal dnvlng pr~vlleges of any kind. 
C Serve you wlth thls Nohce of Suspension that becomes effectlve thuty (30) days after the date of servlce mdicated on the reverse slde of ttus notlce 
Fmlun: of an evldentiary test wlll result In a ninety (W)-day suspenslon of dnvwg pnvileges, wlth absolutely no dnvrng pnvileges dunng the fmt  
thuty (30) days of the suspenslon. You may request restricted dnving pnvlleges dunng the final slxty (60) days of the suspenslon. If thls 1s not 
your first failure of an evidentiary test within the last five (5) years, all of your dnving pnvileges will be suspended for one (1) year witH absolutely 
no dnvlng pnvileges of any klnd. 
. + 
' 2. If you were operatlng or inphysical control of a &mmerclal vehcle and the evldentiary testresults lndlcate an alcohol concentratlon of: 
A. .04 to less than .08, your commercial driving privileges will be suspended for ninety (90) days. You will have absolutely no commercial driving 
privileges of any kind. Any temporary permt issued will be for Class D (non-commercial) drivlng pnvileges only. 
B 0 8  or greater (.O2 or greater if you are under 21 years of age), or test results mdicate the presence of drugs or oth& mtoucahng sobstances, all of 
your driving pririvilegd Cvill'be suspended for ninety (90) &ys, with possible Cl?s:D driving privileges for the final sixty (60) days of the 
suspension. You wilLhave absolutely no commercial dnving privileges of any kind during.theful1 ninety (90)-day suspenslon. 
C. If thls 1s not your first failure of an evldenhary test w i h  the last five (5) years, all of your dnvingprivileges wlll'be suspended Tor one (1) year (you 
absolutely~no driving privileges of any land). 
ING REQUEST FOR FAll URF OF WIDENTIARY TEST: 
You have thedghrzo r ~ u a s t  anladministrative hearing on the suspension . t . .  I .  . Your request 
must be madein writing and* received by the iiepartment m h c e  of- . . . .  / . i .  ' The 
request must state the issues intended to be raised a t  the hearing, and must include your name, date of birth, driver's license number, date of arrest, and 
daytimeetelephone numbef-l&iuse tbe'hearing w i ~ k ~ h ' e 1 d ~ ~ ~ ; t e l ~ h o n e .  The burden-of proof, by preponderance of evidence, shall be upon the driver as to 
the issdesraised in the hearing, pursuant to Section 18-8002!4(7), 1daho Code. 
If you request a hearing, ~t shall be held wlthm twenty (20) days of the date the hearing request was recelved by the Idaho Transportation Department. (Sechon 
18-8002A, Idaho Code) If you do  not request an,administrative hearing within &er (7) days of service of this Nofice of Suspension, your right to 
contest the suspension is waived. This suspension is separatrtand apar t  from any suspension that may be ordered by the court as a result of any 
criminal charges that may. be brouat  against you.' , .... .. < ;; : ' ,. 7p: ,. . . . . . -  . I - .  - 
-. . . 
,.,;. . .: ' C . . ; ..;.: .=:. . ;. 
, ".., , .. . . <; , ... -e , . ., .-, . .: .::A -*, . . . . . . . . .;.y.-.,&:c :. - ' .. . . 
- 6 '  .- . . 
, :- ... .. -. -. . ; 2 
.. .-. -. . 
F :,.' . . - . * .- > k -  ?'<' , *- 
$!t!!!!!k,~~~ecisiop of th;!+eanng-Officerby s c e k i n g l u d i n ~ x v ~ e w  & the D s  ecuon ;8-8(02A, Idaho Code) Yourcappal must be 
&led as a civil p+$jnpism~t Court,-pursuaht.to Chapter 52, Title 67,,Idaho Code. 
FSTRICTED DRIVING PFRMIT : 
!your dnvlng privileges are suspend?d for a'period Of nnmty (90) days pursuant to ~ ~ e c f i o n ' l 8 - ~ ~ 2 h ,  rdr7w Code, you may request resmcted dnvmg 
- 
pnvlleges forthe final sixty (60) days of the saqpenslon (IDAPA Rule 39.02.70.) Restricted driving pnvileges wiil not allow you to operate a commerclal 
motor vehcle. .You.may make your wntten request for restricted dnvlng privilege any.hme after the servlce of.thls Notroe of Suspension. 
i 
:
Before belng reinstated on t h s  suspenslon, you wlll be requued topay a relnstatementfee. Any other suspenslon Imposed by the court for thls offense wlll 
requie an additlo@ relnstatement fee. 
- 
.. - 
, - 
- - -- 
. % "  
- - INSTRUME' OPERATIONS LOG 
L o Y ? ~ * ~ Y  - . - . - - INSTRUMENT SERIAL NUMBER: LOT NUMBER: 
LOCATION: d 
COMMENTS 
I 1 I t I I I 
SUBJECT TEST 
RESULTS 
SUBJECT 'S 
NAME DATE TIME 
SIM TEMP 
IN RANGE 
(4 
OPERATOR'S 
NAME 
CALIBRATION CHECK 
RESULTS 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
Toni M Leclercq 
Defendant. 
DOB : 3/8/ 1948 
P$Z":*~ p2+ $&% &&$ 
w?! -&* 
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF B L m E ,  M A G I S W T E  DIVISION 
1 
i 
) PRE-TRIAL STIPULATION and ORDER 
1 
) Case No: CR-2008-0002607 
1 
The above-named parties hereby stipulate and a 
The Defendant will plead guilty as charged to: 
[ 1 The State moves to dismiss the charge(s) of because: 
[ 1 The partles have agreed to the following amendments: 
[ ] COURT TRIAL is set for at 
(By signing this document, all parties expressly agree to waiver of a jury trial.) 
[ 1 JURY PRE-TRIAL is set for at 2:00 p.m. 
with JURY TRIAL set for 
The State recommends the following sentence: 
Toni M Leclercq 
................................................................................... ....................... 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Stipulation of the Parties is: d P r o v e d  [ j Disapproved. 
SENTENCING (if applicable) is SET FOR Decden( \  \ . % at 
48 hours prior to Sentencing, Defendant must provide Court with: [ ] ~ u b s b c e  abuse evaluation 
Copies hand-delivered to: [x] Prosecuting Attorney f$ Defense Attorney [ 1 Defendant 
4 
Attorney at Law 
208 Spruce Avenue North 
P. 0. Box 766 
Ketchurn, Idaho 83340 
Telephone (208) 726-4338 
Facsimile (208) 726-9328 
E-mail: beelkins@cox.net 
IS33 No. 3 150 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF "l3-E FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) Case No. CR-2008-0002607 
Plaintiff, ) 
) MOTION IN LIMNE 
v. 1 
) 
TONI M. LeCLERCQ 1 
) 
Defendant. ) 
The above named Defendant, Toni M. LeClercq, by and through her attorney of record, 
Brian E. Elkins, moves t h s  Court for an order, in limine, or, in the alternative, to suppress from 
evidence pursuant to I.C.R. 12(b)(3) the Defendant's breath test results for failure of the police 
officer involved in the arrest to comply with the 15-minute waiting period as required by the 
Standard Operating Procedures Manual for the breath testing device used in this case. 
Idaho Code 9 18-8004(4) requires that evidentiary tests be performed by a "laboratory" 
approved by the Idaho State Police "under the provisions of approval and certification standards 
to be set by that department . . . ." According to the Standard Operating Procedure - Breath 
Alcohol Testing, Idaho State Police Forensic Services (Revised 2/08) (hereinafter referred to as 
MOTION IN LIMINE - I 
the "Mmml") under the heading of Testing Procedure, page 12, paragraph 3.1, prior to 
submitting to a breath test, the driver "must be monitored for 15 minutes." 
According to Officer DeBie's Probable Cause Affidavit, he effected a motor vehicle stop 
on a vehicle being driven by the Defendant at 23: 18 on September 13, 2008. The officer states in 
his Probable Cause Affidavit that the Defendant was arrested at 23:32 and that he began the 15- 
minute observation period at 23:38. However, according to the Instrument Operations Log for 
the breath test machine in question, attached hereto as Defendant's E h b i t  1, the Defendant 
submitted to the breath test at 23:38, the same time the officer purports to start the 15-minute 
observation period. 
The admissibility of a breath test result pursuant to Idaho Code 9 18-8004(4) requires 
"adequate foundation evidence consisting either of expert testimony or a showing that the test 
was administered in conformity with the applicable test procedure." State v. Bell, 1 15 Idaho 36, 
39,764 P.2d 113, 116 (Ct. App. 1988). 'Whether a proper foundation has been laid is a 
preliminary question of admissibility to be decided by the court. State v. Utz, 125 Idaho 127,857 
P.2d 1001 (Ct. App. 1993). In Utz, the Court of Appeals held that the officer's failure to comply 
with the 15-minute observation period was fatal to the admissibility of the results of the breath 
test. 
According to the Manual, Section 3.2.3.2.1, the operation log sheet becomes the legal 
record for the test results "if there is no printout." 
The Defendant requests an evidentiary hearing and argument in support of the motion. 
DATED this f 3 day of November, 2008. 
CERTFICAE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of November, 2008, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing docment to be delivered to the following in the method marked 
herein: 
Mailed 
Hand-Delivered 
Faxed to 788-5554 
and mailed 
Angela Nelson 
Blaine County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
201 2nd Avenue South, Suite 100 
Hailey, ID 83333 
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BRlAN E. ELKINS, P.C. 
Attorney at Law 
208 Spruce Avenue North 
P. 0 .  Box 766 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Telephone (208) 726-4338 
Facsimile (208) 726-9328 
E-mail: beelkins@cox.net 
ISB No. 3 150 
- -- 
Attorney for Defendant 
J3T THE DISTNCT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTNCT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATEi OF IDAHO, ) 
) Case No. CR-2008-0002607 
Plaintiff, ) 
) AMENDED MOTION IN LIMRVE 
v. ) AND/OR MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
In a motion dated November 13,2008 the Defendant previously filed a Motion In Limine 
requesting that the Court prohibit the State fiorn offering into evidence the Defendant's breath 
test results obtained fiom an Alco-Sensor breath testing machine utilized by the arresting officer 
in this matter. The basis of the motion was that the documentary evidence thus far supplied to 
the Defendant shows that the arresting officer failed to comply with the 15-minute waiting 
period. 
Based upon a review of the video recording, the Defendant submits two additional 
theories to suppress evidence in this matter: 
TONI M. LeCLERCQ 
) 
Defendant. ) 
AMENDED MOTION IN LIMINE AND/OR MOTION TO SUPPRESS -- I 
( I )  That all evidence be suppressed from the moment the mesting officer seized the 
keys to her motor vehicle which was done shortly after the initial contact was 
made between the arresting officer and the Defendant. The seizure of the 
Defendant's keys to her motor vehicle constituted a greater seizure than what was 
justified by an investigatory stop which was based on speeding 61 in a 55 mph. 
The expansion of the Defendant's seizure, by seizing her car keys, was done 
without sufficient legal cause and was a defacto arrest which lacked probable 
cause at that point in time for an arrest. 
This motion to suppress evidence is based upon the applicable statues in 
the Idaho Code, the Fourth hendmen t  to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution, 
(2) The Defendant also seeks suppression andlor an order in limine preventing the 
State's use of the Defendant's breath test results based upon the officer's threats 
to the Defendant that if she refused to submit to a breath test, she would be taken 
to a hospital where blood would be drawn. Those threats made by the arresting 
officer were made during the time of the application of Idaho's Implied Consent 
statute, Idaho Code S; 18-8002 and Idaho Code S; 18-8002A and there does not 
exist a statutory authorization to make such threats before a suspected driver 
either agrees to take the breath test or refuses. The actions by the arresting officer 
amounted to not only a violation of Idaho's Implied Consent law, but also 
unlawfklly coerced the Defendant to submit to the breath test when she could have 
refused. 
This motion is based upon not only the violation of the statutory rights under Idaho's 
Implied Consent law, but also the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States 
and Idaho constitutions. 
DATED this day of November, 2008. 
A 
AMENDED MOTION IN WMZNE AND/OR MOTION TO SUPPRESS - 21 
CERTIFICATE OF SEWICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of November, 2008, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing docment to be delivered to the following in the method marked 
herein: 
Mailed Angela Nelson 
2 and-Def ivered Blaine County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Faxed to 788-5554 20 1 2nd Avenue South, Suite 100 
Hailey, ID 83333 
AMENDED MOTION IN LIMINE AND/OR MOTION TO SUPPRESS -3 
BNAN E. E L m S ,  P.C. 
Attorney at Law 
208 Spruce Avenue North 
P. 0 .  Box 766 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Telephone (208) 726-4338 
Facsimile (208) 726-9328 
E-mail: beelkins@cox.net 
ISl3 No. 3 150 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
S T A E  OF IDAHO, ) 
) Case No. CR-2008-0002607 
Plaintiff, ) 
) NOTICE VACATING 
v. ) SENTENCING HEARING 
) 
TONI M. LeCLERCQ ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
TO: CLERK OF THE COURT and - --- ---- -.- 
BLAINE COUNTY DEPUTY PROSECUTOR, ANGELA NELSON. 
At the pretrial conference in the above referenced matter on November 3,2008 the 
Plaintiff made its standard first-offense sentencing recommendations on a first-offense DUI and 
the matter was set for a sentencing hearing for December 1,2008 at 10:30 a.m. After the pretrial 
conference, counsel for the Defendant requested further information fiom the State relative to the 
arresting officer's compliance with the 15-minute waiting period. Also, since the pretrial, 
NOTICE VACATING SENTENCING HEARING -( 
counsel fbr the Defendmt has reviewed the video obtained by the: mesting officer and additional 
issues have now been presented. ' 
The Defendant filed a Motion In Lirnine with respect to the issue raised by the 15-minute 
waiting period and set the matter for a hearing for December 3,2008. An Pmended Motion In 
Lirnine andlor Motion to Suppress has now been filed and therefore gives sotice that the 
sentencing hearing should be vacated so that the issues raised in the Defendant's Axnended 
Motion In Lirnine and/or Motion to Suppress and be considered by the Court on December 3, 
2008. 
DATED this 7 day of November, 2008. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the / 7 day of November, 2008,I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be delivered to the following in the method marked 
herein: 
Mailed 
Hand-Delivered 
J/~axed to 788-5554 
Angela Nelson 
Blaine County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
201 2nd Avenue South, Suite 100 
Hailey, ID 83333 
lThe first DVD received fiom the State in its Response to Discovery concerning the digital 
video recording could not be opened and viewed by counsel. The copy that was made for the 
Defendant could be opened and counsel for the Defendant reviewed that on November 14,2008. 
NOTICE VACATING SENTENCING HEARING - 9 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff. 
vs . 
Fifth Judtcial District Court, State of ldaho 
In and For the County of Blaine 
201 2nd Avenue South, Suite 106 
Halley, ldaho 83333 
Toni M Ledercq 
10042 Main St. Apt 503 
Bellevue, WA 98004 
Defendant. 
DOB: 3/8/1948 
DL or SSN: LECLETM525DH WA 
Case No: CR-2008-0002607 
C l  Jim Thomas, County P.A. 
)( Angela Nelson, County P .A. 
Cl Matt Fredback, County P.A. 
Cl Frederick Allington, City P.A. 
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IN THE D~STR~CT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
Case No. CR-2008-0002607 
Plaintiff, 1 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN 
v. 1 SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIM11VE/ 
1 MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
OF THE 
I 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
In Limine dated November 13,2008 and her Amended Motion In 
dated November 19,2008, the Defendant, Toni M. LeClercq 
be examined at the evidentiary hearing held on December 3, 
at the hearing, through the testimony of Officer DeBie 
concedes that DeBie apparently complied with 
DEFENDANT'S MEM RANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIWE;/MOTION TO SUPPRESS Page 1 P 
the 15-minute obsejation period'. LeClercq relied upon the times entered on Defendant's 
Exhibit 1, and the times noted in DeBie's Probable Cause Affidavit (Defendant's 
Exhibit 3) as a basis that the 15-minute observation period was not satisfied. In any event, 
LeClercq issue concerning the 15-minute waiting period. 
which are raised in LeClercq's Amended Motion In Limine and/or 
19,2008. Th.ese two issues, which will be more fully 
framed below, basic(ll1y involve questions about the consequences of DeBie's seizure of 
LeClercq's car keys shortly after initial contact and the implications of the threat of a forced I 
blood draw during the implied consent advisory stage of the investigation. 
I 
II. FACTS. 
avis DeBie ("DeBie") was working on a DUI enforcement grant in Blaine 
3,2008.' In that capacity, at approximately 1 1 : 18 p.m., while traveling 
ghway 75 near Milepost 1243, he observed a vehicle, operated by 
ound at a speed which DeBie visually estimated at 65 mph. DeBie 
sual estimate and apparently the radar reading was either 61 or 63 
mph. At f ~ s t  minor difference of two miles per hour may appear to be a minor 
position that it takes on greater importance when examining the 
in this case. DeBie wrote in his Probable Cause Affidavit, 
a sworn affidavit, that he stopped LeClercq's vehicle for 
speeding 61 in a 55 mph zone. In his narrative report, however, Defendant's Exhibit 4, DeBie 
wrote, and then testi red at the evidentiary hearing, that he stopped her for 63 in a 55 mph zone. k- 
'This issue i a s  raised by LeClercq in her Motion In Limine dated November 19,2008. 
I 
2DeBie's dudies in Blaine County were the result of a grant from the Idaho ~rans~ortat ion 
Department. 
DEFENDANT'S MEM RANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE;/MOTION TO SUPPRESS Page 2 P 
I 3Counsel forlLeClercq, after reviewing State's Exhibit 1, and reviewing the scene, submits 
that the correct mile h, arker is 123-not 124. Again, a minor mistake by DeBie but, as a whole, there 
are numerous errors made by DeBie. 
i 
I 
In prepsation for the hearing, DeBie stated that he reviewed his narrative report, but not 
his Probable Cause hffidavit, and thus did not discover the discrepancy. But there were other 
differences and disc epancies between DeBie's Probable Cause Affidavit and his narrative report. 
These discrepancies become important in analyzing the appropriateness of DeBie's seizure of r i 
LeClercq's car he testified at the evidentiary hearing that at the time he seized her 
keys, DeBie LeClercq was DUI. That statement must be viewed as being 
sufficient facts to form that opinion. 
evidentiary hearing that once he observed LeClercq's vehicle 
speeding (at a mini urn of six miles over the speed limit and at a maximum of eight miles over 4 
the speed limit) he hkd to turn around to proceed northbound on Highway 75 and then testified 
I 
that LeClercq9s vehikle crossed the double yellow center line, was not able to maintain her lane 
I 
of travel and took ad inordinate amount of time to pull over her vehicle. However, those facts " 
I 
were not recited by DeBie in his Probable Cause Affidavit. In fact, there were a number of 
statements made in e LeClercq Probable Cause Affidavit that were also used in another k 
Probable Cause ~f f@vi t ,  Defendant's Exhibit 5, which was a DUI arrest on Jason Bell that 
occurred ely two hours before the LeClercq incident. We find "boilerplate" 
by DeBie in both cases such as ". . . I  could smell the strong odor of an 
from within the vehicle" and that both Bell and LeClercq had 
"glassy" eyes and t k t  their "speech was slurred." However, in DeBie's narrative report and in 
I his testimony at the earing, he described LeClercq's speech as being "extremely" slurred but that descriptive wor is not found in his Probable Cause Affidavit. Rather, he inserts it before 
describing her eyes I, being bloodshot. In both Bell and LeClercq, DeBie wrote in his affidavits 
I 
that they both ~~faileb the evaluations and [were] placed in custody . . ." However, DeBie fails to 
detail the results of the field tests in his Probable Cause Affidavit for LeClercq. At the 
evidentiary hearing testified that he actually did not administer the walk-and-turn test on 
~ e ~ l e r c ~  because o knee and numb foot. 
affidavits authored by DeBie, under oath, it is surprising to see v <  
but yet a "strong odor of alcohol" was coming fi-om his car and 
DEFENDANT'S MEM RANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE/MOTION TO SUPPRESS Page 3 I 
Also, in LeClercq 's case, DeSie testified that when asked, LeClercq appropriately 
delivered her driver' license, proof of insmmce and registration but that was not mentioned in Is 
his reports since no ' roblems were noted. DeBie agreed that in his DUI training that those are 7 
factors that he consi ers when deciding whether to request that a driver perform field tests. t 
Before seizi g LeClercq's keys, DeBie asked her how much she had to drink that eveni,~g 1 
and her response wa "not much, I don't drink that much." DeBie testified at the evidentiary I 
hearing that when h& seized her keys, he had a suspicion that she was DUI based upon what he 
had observed and wkh her admissions. 
is fairly aggressive with how he investigates these types of cases: 
miles over the speed limit seizing car keys, quickly sounding 
where to pull over. See, State's Exhibit 1. 
contact with LeClercq, DeBie returned to his patrol car where he ran a f't 
and then returned to have LeClercq perform field tests. Based on her 
one-leg balance field tests, DeBie requested LeClercq to submit to 
a breath test on hi ile Also-Sensor III. Following procedure, DeBie read the information 
contained in Defe s Exhibit 6 ("NOS Form") and during the 15-minute waiting period- 
submitted to the breath test-LeClercq asked DeBie the consequences of 
test. As shown on State's Exhibit 1, the DVD recording of this 
LeClercq, a number of times, that if she did not take the breath test, sfie 
would be taken to t e hospital and her blood would be forcibly drawn. For example, DeBie 
advises LeClercq th t if she refuses "we can take you to the hospital and forcibly draw blood.'" 
Then at 32:20 DeBi tells her that "you can say no [to the breath test] but I'll take you to the 
hospital to draw blo d. It will be a refusal and you will lose your license for one year."Not I 
surprisingly, LeClerbq agreed to submit to the breath test and her results were reported at .14. 
DEFENDANT'S MEM RANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINEMOTION TO SUPPRESS Page 4 P I 
4See, State's Exhibit 1, Media Player clock at 26:50. 
XI1 ARGUMENT 
A. SEIZ~TREOFKEYS. 
In he/ Amended Motion In Limine and/or Motion to Suppress, paragraph (I), 
I 
vidence be suppressed h m  the moment the arresting officer seized the 
le which was done shortly after the initial contact. The seizure of 
Defendant's keys to er motor vehicle constituted a greater seizure than what was justified by &A 
investigatory stop t t was based on speeding 6 1 in a 55 mph. The expansion of the Defendant's 
seizure was done wi out sufficient legal cause and was a defacto arrest which lacked probable 
cause at that point ! time. 
c stop must be based upon a reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify 
stop has been compared to an investigatory detention as was analyzed in 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 4 . s .  1 ,  88 S.Ct. 1868,20 L.Ed. 2d 889 (1968). In a Terry stop the police 
officer lacks probable cause to arrest but is permitted to conduct an investigatory detention based 
I 
upon the lesser standard of reasonable articulable suspicion. Although not specifically on point, 
these concepts were discussed in State v. Myers, 1 18 Idaho 608,798 P.2d 453 (Ct. App. 1990) on 
what it meant to be in custody" for purposes of Miranda warnings. Relying on Berkemer v. 
McCarty, 468 U.S. 20,440, 104 S.Ct 3 138,3 150, 8 1 L.Ed 3 17 (1 984) in custody, for purposes I 
of Miranda was applicable as soon as suspect's freedom of action was curtailed to a degree 
associated with fordal arrest. Again, routine motor vehicle stops do not equate to a formal arrest 
unless there are add factors that create a "police dominated" setting. 
stop was not ordinary once DeBie seized the keys to LeClercq's 
vehicle. Her freedo of movement, certainly, was curtailed in a dramatic fashion when DeBie i. 
seized her keys. It be recognized, as well, seizing her keys placed a more profound tone, or 
atmosphere, over and was yet another technique by DeBie to place LeClercq in 
a more submissive omfort level. LeClercq submits that that act by DeBie constitutes an arrest. ci An arrest must be based upon probable cause; i.e., information that would lead a person of 
reasonable caution t entertain a strongpresumption ofguilt. This standard is objective, taking b 
into account the and experience of the police officer, based upon the totality of the 
circumstances. 1 4 1 Idaho 277 (Ct. App. 2005). 
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This issue w s raised in State v. Thomas, 1 16 Idaho 848,780 P.2d 599 (Ct. App. 1989) 1 
but was deemed inadPosite as, in that case, the encounter was initiated by a Sun Valley Company 
I 
security guard and d e  court found that the driver "voluntarily" backed his car to have a 
I 
discussion with the {ecurity guard. But, for example, in State v. Pannell, 901 P.2d 132 1, the 
court found that the se of handcuffs to restrain a suspect exceeded the bounds of an I 
investigatory detente n and was deemed to be an arrest absent a showing by the State that the use t of handcuffs was a r asonable precaution for officer's safety. In determining if a detention 
becomes unreason , the Court is to consider: (1) the duration of the invasion imposed by the 
additional restricti d (2) the law enforcement purposes served. Id. 
osition that at the moment the keys were seized, DeBie did not have 
ed the taking. Nor were there any other law enforcement purposes and 
may be a policy of Region IV ISP does not make it an exception to the 
is there anythmg in the record to suggest that LeClercq was a flight risk 
officer's safety. 
not seriously consider any argument being made by the State that 
LeClercq's keys since it took her longer than the "normal 
motoring public" to bspond to the overheads and pull over. It was interesting to listen to 
DeBie's testimony &d then compare it to the DVD, State's Exhibit 1, where it took LeClercq all 
I 
of to pull over and respond to DeBie's overheads. In fact, when 
northbound on Highway 75, LeClercq immediately applied her 
her speed, whether it be 63 or 61 mph a person 
within the normal toring- public could have reasonable inferred that the officer was pursuing" nio 
someone else. The se of his siren and spotlight would have to be one of the more rambunctious + 
procedures for stop ing a vehicle. 
Another Id o case that examined the taking of car keys is In the Matter of Clayton, 11 3 
1d&o 817,748 P.2 401 (1 988) which analyzed the issue in the alternative by first finding the 
officer's actions we e justified under the community caretaking function. See, 1 13 Idaho at 8 18, 
In the alternative, 1 der a Fourth Amendment analysis, the Idaho Supreme Court also found that 
I 
there was sufficient robable cause to seize Clayton's keys in that case. F 
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Based upon a review of the DVD during the initial contact between LeClercq and DeBie, 
I 
we believe that ~eE3ie did not have probable cause to seize the keys. LeClercq submits that there 
are numerous inco tencies and errors not only in DeBie's reports that he prepared, but also in 
his testimony vis what is seen on the DVD. It is apparent that DeBie exaggerates a number 
of the factors that orts to observe in LeClercq which appeared to be boilerplate 
observations whe d with the earlier DUI stop and Probable Cause Affidavit prepared in 
I 
the Jason Bell case. See, Defendant's Exhibit 5. But the most outlandish statement made by 
DeBie at the evidenkari hearing was that LeClercq's speech was the most slurred that he had ' 
observed in a whole year of DUI stops. However, upon a review of the State's Exhibit 1 
LeClercq appears to do just fine and respond appropriately to DeBie's questions and remarks. 
LeClercq res onded appropriately to DeBie's overhead lights and pulled over and it does s 
not look like she crdssed a double yellow centerline. She may have had difficulty rolling down 
I 
the passenger wind*, but she states on the DVD that it was a new car and the window may have 
been inoperable due to a childproof lock. DeBie's comments about observing glassy, bloodshoot 
eyes and slurred spe ch are not reliable or credible. DeBie fails to mention in his reports or his. ie 
testimony until bro t out on cross that LeClercq appropriately presented her driver's license, i" 
proof of insurance d registration. i
Even if the ourt chooses to find that LeClercq's eyes were glassy and bloodshot, that her (4 
speech was slurred &d that an odor of alcohol came from within her vehicle, when combined 
I 
with the cause for d e  stop and her lack of an errant driving behavior, it did not rise to a level of 
I 
probable cause to selze her keys in this case. Even DeBie admitted that he only had a suspicion 
that LeClercq was ~ U I  which does not rise to a level of probable cause to arrest. 
violation of ~e~ le rc$ ' s  Fourth Amendment rights. Everythng subsequent to that seizure should 
Thus, the 
be suppressed. 1 
seizure of LeClercq's keys was done without probable cause and, thus, in 
This gument is based upon the theory that Idaho's implied consent laws, found k 
B. L E C L E R C ~ ~ S  BRAC RESULTS SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BASED UPON 
D ~ B ~ E ' S  COERCIVE THREAT TO FORCIBLY DRAW BLOOD DURING 
in Idaho Code $8 181-8002 and 18-8002A, do not include an advisory that if a driver refuses, they 
b 1. DEFENDANT'S MEM RANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINmOTION TO SUPPRESS Page 7 l 
THE IMPLIED CONSENT STAGE OF THE INVESTIGATION. 
can be talcen to the spital and blood forcibly drawn. It is true that the police may be pemitted 
to do that, based suflicient legal cause a f i r  the implied consent proceedings have been 
completed, but not &ng the implied consent advisory stage. That bracket of time is controlled 
Idaho Code 18-8002A(2) provides, in part: B 
by I. C. $$ 18-8002 
submit to or if you fail to complete and pass evidentiary 
coho1 or other intoxicating substances: 
e officer will seize your driver's license and issue a notice of 
d a temporary permit to you, but no peace officer will issue you 
ving permit if your driver's license or permit has already been 
d or revoked. No peace officer shall issue a temporary driving 
a driver of a commercial vehicle who refuses to submit to or fails to 
and pass an evidentiary test; 
and 18-8002A. 
(b) You have the right to request a hearing within seven (7) days of the notice 
of suspedsion of your driver3 s license to show cause why you refuse to submit 
to or to c mplete and pass evidentiary testing and why your driver's license 
should n t be suspended; I
fused or failed to complete evidentiary testing and do not request 
re the court or do not prevail at the hearing, your license will be 
e suspension will be for one year if this is your first refusal. 
will be for two (2) years if this is your second refusal within 
ten (10) rears. You will not be able to obtain a temporary restricted license 
during period; and 
plete evidentiary testing and fail the testing and do not request 
re the department or do not prevail at the hearing, your driver's 
uspended. This suspension will be for ninety (90) days if this 
lure of evidentiary testing, but you may request restricted 
vehicle driving privileges after the first thirty (30) days, The 
suspensidtn will be for one (1) year if this is your second failure of evidentiary 
testing +in five (5) years. 
You wil not be able to obtain a temporary restricted license during that 
period; I 
(e) Mtej submitting to evidentiary testing you may, when practicable, at your 
own expense, have additional tests made by a person of your own choosing. 
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t permit a police oEcer, during the implied consent phase, to advise a 
, their blood will be forcibly drawn. Quite simply, Idaho Code $9 18- 
8002 and 18-8002 not provide the statutory authority to pass along such information. It is 
f a  police o s c e r  does that, then the breath test is obtained in violation of 
the statute, the su due process rights, and is obtained through coercion. 
est to be employed is the officer's choosing. Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 
829, 833,41 P.3d 247,261 (2002). In LeClercq's case, Officer DeBie elected that LeClercq 
submit to a breath t+t-not a blood draw. LeClercq9s implied consent, then, is strictly limited to 
a breath test. It is o ly under Idaho Code 9 18-8002(10) that if a person submits to a breath tesi 
they may also be re uested to submit to a second evidentiary test for blood or urine but certain 
conditions must be et by the police officer before the second evidentiary test for blood or urine 
is proper; i.e., the p 1 ce officer must have reasonable cause to believe that a person was DUI for 
a drug or intoxicatih substance, or combination thereof, with alcohol and the peace officer must 
state those facts in ]IPS report upon which that belief is based. That exception does not apply to 
LeClercq. I 
raised by LeClercq is different than the situation that was analyzed in 
300, 160 P.3d 739 (2007, reh 'g denied) where although Diaz initially 
refused to submit to a breath test, the police officer told him that if he continued to refuse he 
would be taken to e hospital for a blood draw. Diaz continued to refuse to submit to the breath 
"i 
test whereupon he Mias taken to the hospital for a blood draw. In LeClercq's situation, she did 
not refuse to subm a breath test: she took it. LeClercq was only asking DeBie during the 
ion about her understanding that a person could refuse to submit to a 
t raise the precise issue being raised by LeClercq. 
ose questions, even before DeBie started reading the NOS Form, 
LeClercq made a stdtement, in the form of a question, wondering whether a person could say no 
to a breath test.$ At 25: 14 DeBie finished reading the NOS Form and at 26:35 DeBie states that 
it has been five min tes and we need to wait another ten minutes. At 26:49 the Defendant states: Y 
5See, timer media player at 2 1 :00. 4. 
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9 
refuse?' At 26:53 DeBie states: "You can refuse but I would take you to 
d do aforced blood draw."At 26~56 DeBie states: "Idaho State Law we 
blood if you do not submit a sample." Then at 32:20, before the expiration 
of the 15-minute ng period, LeClercq once again states: "1 thought you could say no I'm not 
onds with: "YOU h o w  what, you can say no but we will take you to the 
e blood from you." At 32:25 DeBie states: "But yeah, you can say no but 
it's counted as a and your license will be suspended for a year - that's your decision." At 
37:40 LeClercq subbts  to the breath test. 
ear that Idaho has addressed who bears the burden of proving, and to what 
at a driver's implied consent became involuntary based upon the e 
y a police officer. In Erdman v. State of Texas, 861 S.W.2d 890 
'g denied) a concurring judge wrote that: "In cases where the defendant 
e the intoxilyzer was involuntary, the state bears the burden of 
proving, by clear convincing evidence, that the consent was voluntary." Id 861 S.W.2d 895. 
In a recent Idaho that examined the voluntariness of a consent to search a residence, some 
general in that case may be helpfui. See, State v. Ballou, 145 Idaho 840, 186 
In Ballou, the Idaho Court of Appeals found that the state has the 
C 
burden of demonstr ting consent by a preponderance of the evidence for the search of a 4 
residence. Id. The tate must show that the consent was not the result of duress or coercion, 
either direct or imp1 ed. Id. The voluntarhess of an individual's consent is evaluated in light of 
all the circumstance . Id. Whether consent was granted voluntarily, or was the product of 
coercion, is a questi n of fact to be determined by all of the surrounding circumstances. Id 
An argumen similar to LeClercq's was analyzed by the Colorado Supreme Court in 
Turbyne v. State of olorado, 15 1 P.3d 563 (2007) (reh 'g denied). The Colorado statute is a I 
little different, not in name where it is called an express consent law: but the driver has th3 
choice of either a test or a blood draw. In Colorado, if a blood test is requested by the 
driver, a blood be obtained within two hours. 
6Colorado h previously referred to it as an implied consent law. C 
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driver requested a blood draw but due to the unavailability of a 
conditions, the arresting oEcer was idomed by dispatch that they 
a blood draw within two hours. So the police officer requested th3t 
Turbyne continued to insist on a blood test. The arresting officer 
a breath test but Turbyne refused. When the officer told 
Turbyne that he co lose his license if he did not submit to a breath test, Turbyne agreed to take 
the breath test. 
motion with the county court to suppress the results of the breath test and 
r vehicle license revocation hearing that the revocation proceeding should 
e police ofXicer did not have good cause for not complying with 
e blood test. The hearing officer agreed and dismissed the revocation 
proceeding. 
At the trial c urt, Turbyne also requested at the evidentiary hearing for a dismissal of the I 
court agreed to do for the same reason that the hearing officer had 
dismissed because ice officer lacked suEcient cause for not complying with Turbyne's 
selection of a bloo n appeal before the Colorado Supreme Court, they reversed the order 
of dismissal but a the breath test results should be suppressed "because they resulted 
from an invalid c earch, due to the arresting officer's erroneous and coercive advice tp 
is license by not submitting to a chemical test he had not selected." 
e Court reviewed a number of cases7 which held that a trial court 
may dismiss a case appropriate situations where a police officer failed to comply with the 
express consent The Colorado Supreme Court, however, recognized that sanctions must be 
tailored to remedy police conduct which may include not only a dismissal but also 
suppression of other circ~mstances.~ 
court, "A valid consent to search must be voluntary rather than 
or deception." [Citations omitted.] "The court must first ' 
7People v. G'llette, 629 P.2d 613 (1981) and Riley v. People, 104 P.3d 21 8 (2004). I 
%'ee, Dike v. People, 30 P.3d 197 (2001) (stating that a driver is not permitted to change his 
or her initial electio of a chemical test) and People v. Shinault, 940 P.2d 380 (1997). I 
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deternine whether there is "bjective evidence of coercion, duress, deception, promises, threats, 
I 
intsusive conduct o ther undue influence by the police, which critically impaired the 
defendant's judgrn .' " (Citations omitted.) 
more on point, was decided in 1993 by the Court of Criminal Appeals of' 
d Erdman v. State of Texas, 861 S.W.2d 890. Erdman was arrested for 
n to suppress the results of a breath test which was denied by the trial 
court. Erdman pled 1 ilty but reserved the right to appeal the suppression question which first 
went through the C b:: of Appeals which a f imed the trial court but then, en banc, the panel 
I 
granted Erdman's p tition for discretionary review and reversed. t 
After being ested for DW, Erdman was advised of the Texas implied consent law.9 
However, in additio to that the trooper went beyond the bounds of the Texas implied consent I statute and also told Erdman that if he failed the test he would be charged with a DWI but also "warned" appellant at if he refused to take the test, then (1) evidence of his refusal would be 
I 
admissible against hkm in a subsequent prosecution, (2) his driver's license would be suspended 
for 90 days, (3) D. .I. charges would be filed against him and (4) he would be placed in jail that 
night. 
on the motion to suppress before the trial court, defense counsel argued 
that Erdman's cons t to the intoxilyzer test was involuntary because it was psychologically + 
coerced. The state untered that the defendant made the decision to take the breath test withost + 
coercion from the p$lice and the police officer simply stated the facts. In the trial court's ruling 
i on the suppression otion it stated, "I do not think that [the trooper's warning] was coercive in nature. I think that it] was explanatory and reasonably accurate in light of the situation here . . . . I will not suppres the breath test." Erdman's ar w e n t  to the en bane Criminal Court of Appeals was that the Texas implied 
civil statutes, Article 6 107 2-5, ;5 2. 
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consent statute as 
be suspended for 90 
prosecuted. The 
ptnishment for refusing, only provided that a motorist's driver's license would 
days and that his refusal could be admitted into evidence if subsequently 
appellant also argued that the statue "implicitly prohibits peace officers from 
'threaten[ing] motorists with sanctions . . . not permined by the statute,' " and that the trooper's 
misstatement of the hirect consequences of refusing rendered Erdman's previously given implied I 
consent, as being in o l m m .  i 
Here is som pertinent language fiom the Erdman decision: ei 
's decision to submit to a breath test must truly be her own, made 
with a correct understanding of the actual statutory consequences 
. To be "v01untary"and thus consistent with the statutory scheme, 
decision to submit must not be the result of physical or 
1 pressures brought to bear by law enforcement officials. Forte 
S.W.2d 128, 138 (Tex.Cr.App. 1988) (consent to breath test 
if induced by physical force); Hall v. State, 649 S. W.2d 627,628 
1983) (consent to breath test involuntarily if induced by 
of direct statxtory consequences arising fiom refusal). If law 
officials were permitted to "warn" D. W .I. suspects-even 
at a refusal to submit would result in consequences not 
++ 
ed by Article 6701 1-5, $2 ,  then suspects could easily be coerced 
ssion, and the protection afforded by this statutory section would be 
lant consented to the intoxilyzer test only after the trDoper gave 
gs, both contemplated and not contemplated by Article 6701 1-5, 
the consequences of refusal. The non-statutory information 
appellant (that he would be jailed and charged with D.W.I.) was 
at would normally result in considerable psychological pressure 
. suspect to consent to the taking of a breath sample. Given the 
ence of any record evidence showing that this non-statutory 
ven to appellant had no bearing on his decision to consent, no - 
er could conclude that the State carried its burden of showing 
s consent was voluntary. Thus, appellant's consent to the 
t was obtained in violation of Article 6701 1-5, $ 2, and, 
est results were inadmissible under Article 38.23. The trial 
discretion in refusing to suppress those test results. 
We ar holding only that law enforcement officials must take care to warn 
D.W.I. ! suspects correctly about the actual, direct, statutory consequences of 
refusalj Any other information conveyed to D.W.I. suspects may have the 
ither intended or unintended, of undermining their resolve and 
coercing them to consent. 
Id., 861 S.W.2d at 8 3-894. I 
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ie's statements to LeClercq that he would take LeClercq to the hospital and 
forcibly draw blood bere not accompanied with physical violence or verbal harassment, that 
I 
level is not required /for the Court to find that LeClercq was coerced through deception and 
intimidation. Howe er, as highlighted by DeBie's statements, noted above, and with the ii 
incorrect statement at if she refused she would lose her driving privileges for one year,'' and + 
she agreed to submi to the test. 1 
a N. CONCL USION. Based upon e foregoing, LeClercq respectfully submits that when DeBie took the keys 
to her vehicle, she 'as seized without probable cause equating to an unlawful arrest. Also, at her 4 
breath test results b suppressed based upon DeBie's erroneous and coercive misstatements of ei 
Idaho's implied con ent law. 
DATED t h i i  1 day of December, 2008. 
I CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
that on the // day of December, 2008, I caused a true and correct 
to be delivered to the following in the method marked herein: 
Mail Angela Nelson 
Blaine County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
201 2nd Avenue South, Suite I00 k 
Hailey, ID 83 33 
AN E. ELKINS 
that LeClercq would lose her license for one year was absolute and was 
by the statute, that she was nevertheless entitled to a show cause hearing 
have refused to submit to the test which, in this case, LeClercq would 
since she had a Washington driver's license. See, In the ~atier 
(this Court's ruling that the NOS Form is ambiguous 
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Jim J. Thomas, ISBN 441 5 
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney 
201 2nd Avenue S., Suite 100 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, I Case No. CR-2008-0002607 
Plaintiff, 
VS . 
TONI M. LeCLERCQ, 
Defendant. 
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION IN LlMlNElMOTlON TO 
SUPPRESS 
Plaintiff State of ldaho submits its memorandum in opposition to the Defendant's 
Memorandum In Support of Motion In Limine andlor Motion to Suppress filed by 
Defendant Toni M. LeClercq. 
FACTUAL SUMMARY 
On September 13, 2008 Trooper Travis DeBie (DeBie) was working in Blaine 
County on a DUI enforcement grant. At approximately 11 : I  8 p.m. DeBie was traveling 
southbound on State Highway 75 when he visually estimated the speed of the 
Defendant's vehicle at sixty five miles per hour in a fifty five mile per hour zone. DeBie 
confirmed the Defendant's speed on radar at sixty three miles per hour whereupon 
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DeBie turned his patrol vehicle around and began traveling northbound on State 
Highway 75. After DeBie turned his patrol vehicle around, he activated his overhead 
lights and then observed the Defendant's vehicle cross over the double yellow 
centerline. DeBie responded by activating his siren and the Defendant's vehicle 
eventually came to a stop after traveling a longer distance than the normal motoring 
public. ' When the Defendant's vehicle came to a stop, DeBie approached the front 
passenger door of the Defendant's vehicle and the Defendant failed to notice DeBie so 
he knocked on the window to get the Defendant's attention. At this point, DeBie 
testified that the Defendant appeared to be disoriented and was unable to locate the 
button to roll down the passenger side window. Consequently, DeBie had to open the 
front passenger door so that he could talk to the Defendant and upon opening the front 
passenger door DeBie noticed to strong odor of alcoholic beverage coming from inside 
of the vehicle and he noticed the Defendant's eyes were glassy and bloodshot and her 
speech was slurred. DeBie then asked the Defendant if she had anything to drink 
tonight and the Defendant responded "not much, I don't drink that much." 
Subsequently, DeBie asked the Defendant for her keys, which is in accordance with 
DeBie's training and region practice to ensure that persons suspected of DUI do not 
' Defendant's raises the issue that DeBie did not include certain facts in his probable cause affidavit that 
were included in DeBie's incident report and that DeBie's probable cause affidavit in this case and a 
probable cause affidavit DeBie prepared for Jason Bell's DUI were striking similar. It is not surprising nor 
unusual that an officer's incident report contains more detailed information than the officer's probable 
cause affidavit; after all officer's are trained to write their probable cause affidavits without a lot of 
extraneous details so that only the essential facts that support the elements of the crime are contained 
within the affidavit. Additionally, it is not surprising that there are similarities between the language 
contained in the Defendant's probable cause affidavit and Jason Bell's probable cause affidavit; both of 
these cases involve DUI charges and officers are trained to look for certain signs of intoxication such as 
glassy, bloodshot eyes and slurred speech, which are signs officers generally document in all DUI cases. 
And, simply because some of the same signs of intoxication were documented in both probable cause 
affidavits does not mean that DeBie's testimony or statements are not credible or reliable. 
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leave the scene. And when DeBie asked the Defendant for her keys, the Defendant 
turned off her vehicle and handed the keys to DeBie. DeBie then took possession of 
the Defendant's keys, returned to his patrol vehicle to run a driver's check on the 
Defendant, and then returned to the Defendant's vehicle to have her perform some field 
sobriety tests. 
After the Defendant completed and failed two out of the three standardized field 
sobriety tests, DeBie placed the Defendant under arrest for DUI. DeBie then began the 
fifteen minute observation period and before DeBie began reading the NOS form to the 
Defendant, the Defendant asked "can't a person say no to this?" State's Exhibit 1, 
23:30:14. DeBie responded by stating let me read this so that you understand any 
penalties and then he began reading the NOS form. During the reading, DeBie states 
let me finish and then I will answer your questions. Id. at 23:33. DeBie then finished 
reading the form to the Defendant and approximately 3 minutes thereafter, the 
Defendant states she thought people could refuse. Id. at 23:36:04. DeBie simply 
responded, without raising his voice, you can refuse, but if you do I will take you to do a 
forced blood draw; under Idaho State law we can forcibly take your blood if you do not 
provide a sampie. Id. Then approximately five minutes later the Defendant again states 
I thought you could say no, to which DeBie responds again, without raising his voice, 
you can but I will take you to the hospital for a blood draw, which will be counted as a 
refusal and your license will be suspended for one year; it's "your decision." Id. at 
23:41:31. Thereafter, the fifteen minute observation period concluded and the 
Defendant provided two breath samples that were recorded as .14. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED TO CONCLUDE DeE3IEFS 
POSSESSION OF THE DEFENDANTS KEYS WAS REASONABLE UNDER 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
"The presence or absence of probable cause is determined by a court upon the 
objective evidence in the case, not upon an officer's subjective impression." St. of fd. v. 
Ambnrster, 117 ldaho 19, 20 (Idaho App. 1989). In that case, in making a 
determination that probable cause existed to arrest Ambmster and request him to take 
a blood-alcohol test, the court concluded that probable cause for arrest and the request 
to take a blood-alcohol test may be established without considering the results of any 
field sobriety tests. Id. For example, the court found that probable cause existed due to 
glazed, bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, odor of alcohol, admission to drinking three 
beers, and crossing the fog line twice. Id. 
Likewise, so long as an officer has a sufficient and objective basis to further 
investigate a suspect for a possible DUI violation, an officer's removal of keys is 
permissible. In the Mafter of Clayton, 113 ldaho 817, 819 (Idaho 1988). In that case, 
an officer saw a vehicle parked next to a bar in the early morning hours. Id. at 81 8. The 
vehicle's motor was running and Clayton was sitting in the driver's seat with his head 
slumped forward. Id. ' The officer approached the vehicle to determine if Clayton was 
asleep, intoxicated or in need of medical attention. Id. Upon arriving at the vehicle, the 
officer opened the driver's side door, reached into the vehicle, turned the motor off, and 
took possession of the keys. Id. After several minutes the officer was able to wake 
Clayton and based upon the vehicle's location, time, and Clayton's incoherent speech 
the officer suspected Clayton was intoxicated. Id. A short time later, Clayton exited the 
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vehicle, the officer noticed the odor of alcoholic beverage for the first time, and 
thereafter Clayton was placed under arrest for DUI. fd. 
In determining whether the ofCicerls conduct during his investigation complied 
with Clayton's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures, the court first concluded that the officer's conduct fell within the community 
caretaking function. Id. Alternatively, the court concluded that even if the officer's 
actions amounted to a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, such 
seizure was supported by sufficient probable cause to conclude that removal of 
Clayton's keys was reasonable under the circumstances. Id. In reaching this 
conclusion, the court outlined the following standards for permissible seizures: 
It is true that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his 
freedom to walk away-even briefly-the officer has 'seized' that person. Id. at 819. 
However, such a 'seizure' is permissible under the Fourth Amendment if it is 
reasonable. Id. An investigatory stop, such as occurred here, in order to be 
reasonable and permissible, 'must be justified by some objective manifestation 
that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.' Id. 
The sufficiency of cause justifying the investigatory stop depends upon the 
totality of the circumstances. Id. Based on the 'whole picture,' the detaining 
officer must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person 
stopped of criminal activity. Id. 
Additionally, the court concluded that a "brief stop of a suspicious individual in order to 
determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more 
information may be reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time. Id. 
In this case, just as in Ambnrster, DeBie had probable cause to take possession 
of the Defendant's keys based upon the objective evidence observed during DeBiels 
encounter with the Defendant which includes: (1) the Defendant traveling in excess of 
the posted speed limit, (2) the Defendant's driving pattern, which consists of the 
Defendant driving over the double yellow centerline as well as traveling a longer 
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distance before stopping than the normal motoring public, (3) the Defendant's failure to 
notice DeBie after he walked up to the passenger side window; (4) DeBie's observation 
that the Defendant appeared to be disoriented after he knocked on the front passenger 
window; the Defendant was unable to locate the button to roll down the window, and (5) 
DeBie's observations of the strong odor of alcoholic beverage coming from within the 
Defendant's vehicle, the Defendant's glassy, bloodshot eyes, slurred speech and 
admission to drinking. 
Furthermore, as compared to Clayton, whereby the court found the officer's 
removal of the keys was permissible based upon the vehicle's location, time, and 
Clayton's position in the driver's seat with his head slumped forward, there is 
substantially more evidence in this case, as illustrated above, to support a finding that 
sufficient probable cause existed to justify DeBie taking possession of the Defendant's 
keys. 
Additionally, the removal of the Defendant's keys did not prolong the duration of 
the encounter between the Defendant and DeBie; at the time when the Defendant 
removed the keys and handed them to DeBie, DeBie was still in the process of 
performing regular activities that are associated with traffic stops or investigatory 
detentions. And, DeBie's possession of the keys was a reasonable intrusion limited in 
scope to the extent necessary to maintain the status quo momentarily while DeBie 
completed his investigation. Consequently, DeBie had probable cause to take 
possession of the keys based upon the objective evidence observed during DeBie's 
encounter with the Defendant. Therefore, the Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights 
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were not violated and any evidence obtained after DeBie took possession of the 
Defendant's keys should not be suppressed. 
II. BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT HAD NO LEGAL RIGHT TO RESIST OR 
REFUSE EVIDENTIARY TESTING AND DeBIE MERELY INFORMED THE 
DEFENDANT WHAT HE INTENDED TO DO IF THE DEFENDANT REFUSED 
TO PROVIDE A BREATH SAMPLE, WITHOUT RAISING HIS VOICE OR 
PROVOKING ANY RESPONSE FROM THE DEFENDANT THAT SHE WAS 
FEARFUL OF NEEDLES OR BLOOD DMWS, DEBIE'S COMMENTS ABOUT 
TAKING THE DEFENDANT f 0 THE HOSPITAL FOR A BLOOD DRAW WERE 
NOT COERCIVE THREATS AND THEREFORE, THE DEFENDANT'S 
BREATH-ALCOHOL SAMPLES SHOULD NOT BE SUPPRESSED. 
ldaho Code 18-8002A(2), which is entirely devoted to the administrative or civil 
suspension of a driver's license rather than any criminal offenses related to driving 
under the influence, states: 
At the time of evidentiary testing for concentration of alcohol, or for the presence 
of drugs or other intoxicating substances is requested, the person shall be 
informed that if the person refuses to submit to or fails to complete evidentiary 
testing, or if the person submits to and completes evidentiary testing and the test 
results indicate an alcohol concentration or the presence of drugs or other 
intoxicating substances in violation of section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, 
ldaho Code, the person shall be informed substantially as follows (but need not 
be informed verbatim): 
If you refuse to submit to or if you fail to complete and pass evidentiary testing for 
alcohol or other intoxicating substances: 
(a) The peace officer will seize your driver's license and issue a notice of 
suspension and a temporary driving permit to you, but no peace officer will issue 
you a temporary driving permit if your driver's license or permit has already been 
and is suspended or revoked. No peace officer shall issue a temporary driving 
permit to a driver of a commercial vehicle who refuses to submit to or fails to 
complete and pass an evidentiary test; 
(b) You have the right to request a hearing within seven (7) days of the notice of 
suspension of your driver's license to show cause why you refused to submit to 
or to complete and pass evidentiary testing and why your driver's license should 
not be suspended; 
(c) If you refused or failed to complete evidentiary testing and do not request a 
hearing before the court or do not prevail at the hearing, your driver's license will 
be suspended. The suspension will be for one year if this is your first refusal. The 
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suspension will be for two (2) years if this is your second refusal within ten (10) 
years. You will not be able to obtain a temporary restricted license during that 
period; and 
(d) If you complete evidentiary testing and fail the testing and do not request a 
hearing before the department or do not prevail at the hearing, your driver's 
license will be suspended. This suspension will be for ninety (90) days if this is 
your first failure of evidentiary testing, but you may request restricted 
noncommercial vehicle driving privileges after the first thirty (30) days. The 
suspension will be for one (1) year if this is your second failure of evidentiary 
testing within five (5) years. 
You will not be able to obtain a temporary restricted license during that period; 
(e) After submitting to evidentiary testing you may, when practicable, at your own 
expense, have additional tests made by a person of your own choosing. ldaho 
Code $j 18-8002A(2)(2008). 
Furthermore, under Idaho's implied consent statute anyone driving on ldaho 
roads impliedly consents to evidentiary testing for alcohol concentration or drugs when 
an officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving under the 
influence. St. of Id. v. DeWitf, 145 ldaho 709,712 (Idaho App. 2008). "In other words . . 
. 'anyone who accepts the privilege of operating a motor vehicle upon Idaho's highways 
has consented in advance to submit to a BAC test."' Id. DeWitt further explained that: 
a drunken driver has no legal right to resist or refuse evidentiary testing . . . in 
recognition of the driver's physical ability to refuse to submit . . . the legislature 
provided for the administrative revocation of the license of an individual who 
refuses to comply with this previously given consent. Id. Such legislative 
acknowledgement was not meant to hamstring the ability of law enforcement to 
properly investigate and obtain evidence of serious crimes committed by those 
individuals who have chosen to drink and then drive . . . Informing a suspect 
about the consequences of refusing an evidentiary test is not intended to be an 
opportunity for a defendant to withdraw his consent; rather, it is an administrative 
tool designed to increase the likelihood that the suspect will peaceably submit to 
testing that he has no legal right to refuse. Id. at 713-714. 
Furthermore, the DeWitt court found that the officer, rather than suspect, has the 
authority to choose which evidentiary test will be given and that "implied consent to 
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evidentiary testing is not limited to a breathalyzer test, but may also include testing the 
suspect's blood or urine. Id. at 71 2-71 3. 
Similarly, nothing in ldaho Code 18-8002 limits an officer's authority to require a 
suspect to submit to a blood draw, even if that suspect previously refused a less 
intrusive evidentiary test such as a breathalyzer test. Sf. v. Diaz, 144 ldaho 300, 303 
(Idaho 2007). In that case, Diaz was stopped for erratic driving whereupon the officer 
noticed Diaz's eyes were bloodshot and glassy and his speech was slurred. Id. at 301. 
Diaz was later arrested, transported to jail, and although Diaz agreed to perform several 
field sobriety tests at the jail, he refused to take the breathalyzer test offered by the 
officer. Id. at 301-302. When Diaz refused the breathalyzer test, the officer informed 
Diaz that if he continued to refuse he would be taken to the hospital for a blood draw. 
Id. Diaz then agreed to give a breath sample, but later refused to cooperate so Diaz 
was taken to the hospital for a blood draw. Id. The Diaz court concluded that "a plain 
reading of ldaho Code § 18-8002(6) shows that an officer may always request hospital 
personnel to draw a suspect's blood upon suspicion for DUI but may only compel a 
blood draw under certain circumstances" such as when an officer has probable cause to 
believe the suspect has committed the crime of aggravated DUI or vehicular 
manslaughter. Id. at 304. 
As illustrated above, Idaho's implied consent statute only indicates that a person 
must be informed of the information contained in ldaho Code § 18-8002A(2). And, 
The implied consent statute does not reference or define the term "implied consent phase" as 
referenced in the Defendant's memorandum. What constitutes an "implied consent phase" or implied 
consent proceeding is unclear; when does the phase or proceeding begin and end? And, even if such a 
phase exists, it should be limited to the time required to inform the suspect about the information 
contained in ldaho Code § 18-8002A(2) rather than the entire fifteen minute observation period, which is 
mandated in the Standard Operating Procedure for Breath Alcohol Testing. 
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after reviewing State's Exhibit 1, it is clear that BeBie completely informed the 
Defendant about the information contained in 18-8002A(2) by reading the NOS form to 
the Defendant in its entirety. Additionally, before DeBie answered any of the 
Defendant's questions that were posed before, during, and after the reading of the NOS 
form, DeBie finished reading the entire NOS form to the Defendant. For example, 
before DeBie began reading the NOS form, the Defendant asked "can't a person say no 
to this?" State's Exhibit 1, 23:30:14. DeBie responded by stating let me read this so 
that you understand any penalties. Id. DeBie then began reading the NOS form to the 
Defendant and during the reading DeBie states let me finish and then I will answer your 
questions. Id. at 23:33. DeBie then finished reading the form to the Defendant and 
approximately 3 minutes thereafter, the Defendant states that she thought people could 
refuse. Id. at 23:36:04. DeBie simply responded, without raising his voice, you can 
refuse, but if you do I will take you to do a forced blood draw; under Idaho State law we 
can forcibly take your blood if you do not provide a sample. Id. Then approximately five 
minutes later the Defendant once again states I thought you could say no to this, to 
which DeBie responds, without raising his voice, you can but I will take you to the 
hospital for a blood draw, which will be counted as a refusal and your license will be 
suspended for one year; it's "your decision." Id. at 23:41:31. Furthermore, DeBie never 
told the Defendant during the reading of the NOS form that he was going to take her to 
the hospital for a blood draw if she refused the breath test. 
In addition, during DeBie's encounter with the Defendant she never states once 
that she is afraid of needles or having blood drawn. In fact, the Defendant's primary 
concern during her encounter with DeBie centers around herself and getting a little 
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"compassion" from DeBie as opposed to any recognizable fear precipitated by DeBie's 
so called coercive threats. In addition, when the Defendant questioned DeBie about 
being able to refuse the breath test, DeBie merely told her what he intended to do if she 
refused to provide a breath sample; DeBie, according to his own testimony, was not 
trying to coerce or force the Defendant into providing any breath samples. And, DeBie's 
comments that he would take the Defendant to the hospital for a blood draw if she 
refused the breath test is conduct that is permitted under ldaho case law as illustrated in 
DeWitf and Diaz. For example, under DeWitt and Diaz even if the Defendant refused to 
submit to the breath test chosen and offered by DeBie, noting in the ldaho Code or 
ldaho case law prevents DeBie from choosing a different evidentiary test such as a 
blood draw. Lastly, according to DeWitt, when the Defendant accepted the privilege of 
operating a motor vehicle upon Idaho's highways, she consented in advance to submit 
to a BAC test and she had no legal right to resist or refuse evidentiary testing. 
Consequently, the Defendant's consent to submit to a breath test could not be 
involuntary given that she had no legal right to resist or refuse evidentiary testing. 
Therefore, the Defendant's breath test results should not be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Because sufficient probable cause existed to conclude DeBie's possession of the 
Defendant's keys was reasonable under the circumstances the Defendant's Fourth 
Amendment rights were not violated, therefore, any evidence obtained after DeBie took 
possession of the keys should not be suppressed. Additionally, because the Defendant 
had no legal right to resist or refuse evidentiary testing and DeBie merely informed the 
Defendant about what he intended to do if she refused to provide a breath sample, 
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without raising his voice or provoking any kind of a response from the Defendant that 
might indicate she had a fear of needles or blood draws, DeBie's comments about 
taking the Defendant to the hospital for a blood draw if she refused to provide a breath 
sample were not coercive threats and therefore, the Defendant's breath test results 
should not be suppressed. Consequently, the State respectfully requests that the Court 
deny the Defendant's motion in limine andlor motion to suppress. 
DATED this 
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LlMlNE/MOTlON TO SUPPRESS - Page 12 
u?- 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this Jqe day of December, 2008, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Brian E. Elkins , Esq. - U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Attorney at Law - Hand Delivered 
208 Spruce Avenue North - Overnight Mail 
P.0. Box 766 - d e l e c o p y  
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LlMlNElMOTION TO SUPPRESS - Page 13 ug 
JAN-US-LUUM RUN UL: $1 t'tl K U l i t K  GKISl/tlKIAN kLKI& PAX NU, 12Utl126413%8 
p*T f&/+ 
.gg,: v5+5 
'*A* 4 
BRIAN R. HLKrNS, P.C. 
Attorney at Law 
208 S prwe Avcnue North 
13. 0. nox 766 
Kdchum, T&llo 83340 
'f'clcphonc (208) 7264338 
I'acsimilo (208) 726-9328 
I!-mail: tt%Ikins@rox.nct 
IS13 No. 3150 
Attorney for ncfcndant 
1N TI,IiS DfST1ZIC'f COUKI OF RE FIFTlI JUnTCTNL DTSTNCT COURT 
OF TI.JE: S'I;(\TE OP IDAIfO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY Of: BI,AWE 
1 Cas~ NO. CR-2008-0002607 
PIaintiff, 1 
1 REPLY M G M O W D W  
v. 1 
TONI M. T,cClaERCQ 1 1 
Dcfcnd;uzt. 
1 
) 
f,eC.'l'lcrcq submits her rcply mctnornnduau in response to ff ~e Slate's mcmormdum 
subnlilled in oppwition to the Defendant's Motion h LimineAvloliou to Suppress, 
SEIZURE OI;'KEYS 
In thu Stato's memorandum, i t  lists the following factors (ha( support. in iQ vicw, 
justiliation for sck~wc of LeClcrcq'~ kcys: 
"(I )  'J'lie DeLndiu~t ~nvcling in oxcehs of lhe posted spced limit, (2) the Dcfcndant's 
driving pattern, which consists of n e f h t  driving over thc double ycllaw c c n h  linc 
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(3) thc Ucrendimt's failure to notice DcBic after he walked up to tho passenger side 
window; (4) DcBie's obaorvalion &fit thc nefmdant appeared to be disoriented nftcr 
hc knocked on thc front pilsscngcr window; the k f c n h t  was unable to locate the 
button lo mll down the window culd (5 )  D(?Rie's obsemtion of Ute strong odor of 
alcr~hoiic bcvcr~gr, coming frorn within the Dcrendsnt's vohicle, thc Defc~idant's 
gli~rsy, bloodshot eycs, slimed spccch and admission to drinking.'? 
It  is indeed mazing to rcvicw State's Exhibit I now, aRcr r o v i m g  tlic memora~ldumn 
submitted by the parties, and evaluating tho testimony of JIeBic at the evidentiary hearing. The 
first four Pictors listed ubovc by the Statc c;m actualIy be discdcd by thc Court- It is LaClercq's 
belief thkl Qc 1I)VI.l shows that LoCIorcq did not cross a double yctlow center line. And thougil 
1 ,e{:)ercq udmib that she was pmbably tmvoling in cxccss of the postcci sped limit, hat issue is 
irt diuputc. nal by LcCler~q's creation, but by the testimony of DcBio and thc rcpurts that he 
preparc4 dong with sworil affidavit. Ihe spccd litnit a c t i o n  is a de mfnlmus fact in 
assessing thc totaIily of thc circumstanms wliccn analyzing whether there was jusii6mtion for the 
scizutc: InClercq was either traveling Gl or 63 in R 55 mph. So that can bc thmwn out by the 
Court. 
'Ilhc statement by DeBic in liizis report, followed up by his tcstirnony i11 court, and now 
pnnroicd by tho SULe in its memomudurn that LeClcrcq's stop took '% longer distilncc for 
stopping t b  the n o d  motoring public" is almost hughablc whon compared egainqt State's 
1:xhibit 1 As DeDic was cffxting ri u-turn to start his pursuit of I,eClcrcq, one cau soe 
J,r.Clercq'rs vehicio pms perpcndiculsu to DeBic's patrol oar whiIe she passed in front uCF)cUio, 
ilcr hrakc liyhis go on immcdiatcly, As pointed out in her o p i n g  b k f ,  the normal motoring 
public, at that point, traveling six or eight miles over the spccd limit may havc jristifiiibly 
wondered whether thw were cvcn the target of thc stop. Thc DVD shows that LeClercq 
appropriately responds to and pulls ovcr in response to thc overhead lights, sirevr and spotlight. 
'rhc xl~anmr of Debie's stop wo~licl have to bc classifid as onc of the more aggressive stops than 
whnt wc normnlly ser ill clthcr cases. 
'I'ho Suite also picked up ofi Dcl3icYs tatenlents h a t  LcClercq ''appeaed to be 
disoriented" apct knocking on the front passenger window and lists that as a fitdo!: justifying 
scizurt of iltc keys. Again, in most cascs we see the police ofiict!r approach on tbc drivcr's side 
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to talk to Ole drivcr md it is nor the norm for a polim officer to amacf i  011 the pssMnger side - 
at least in Blaine County. Also it was dark and LeClcrcq's attention may haw been direclcd . 
towards her window waiting for Del3ie to ~pproacl~, Then, coz~pted with the overi-toarjs being 
activated, i t  is ltarrnnt for a driver to bo in u bit of shock in any velljclc slop. Listming to 
~,c(:lcmq's rcqonses to DeRie during t l~c  initial contact, them docs not appcar to bc any 
cviclcnce that I.cClcrcq was fQisorionted." 
Also, it is apparent froin iistcning to tko DVI) fhat T,eClcq explained ihat sbc was in n 
tlcw vel-ticit md thut t11ct-o may havc been a window lock atgagcd lhet would not allow 1,eCiercq 
to roll down tlte pwsmwr window. 
7%at leavcs strong odor or alcohol c o w  from within the vchicle end LcClercq's alleged 
ginay, blwdsl~at cyts, s1u~tx.i spcch and hcr hdmission to d r i m  with a rcspotrsc that it was 
ilot much. rfllnt is thc bascline dzat we me in my DUI casc ntxd certainly t h t  sllould not condonc 
seinln: ctl' keys. 
'lbc Slate rclias otz Irr the Mufter ofClayton, 1 I3 Idaho 8 1 7, which pointcd out carlicr by 
I &lcrcq is a community carcWcing wsc, Furthor, the Cow's discussions about a Foudr 
Alnclicln~cnt maly~is isdicta but may providc some guidance in thnl the scidng of kcys can bc 
app~)priatc in certain silualions, incluciilll: a cornunity carctaking contact. IIowever, Clcry~~~n 
-, 
ww i~ fir more cgrcgious situation lhan LeClercq whore thc policc offiurr obscrvcd Claytoll 
sitting in his vehidc, with the cngine running, lights on, parkod next to a bar in ihe early morning 
hours und llis haid slumped forward. Tbosc observations obviously watrilllted conlact by the 
police cficcr and thc seizure of keys was justified under thc cir~umstanccs, 
'laofice officers can bo nggressivc in lzow lhcy perform their duties. '1%~ problcm that must 
hc. monitored by thc courts is when thcy exaggmle and make .rtabnent$ that are not supprtcd 
by w11at is scen on thc DVD and all of the mistakes made by DcBic ill his vatiotls reports. Thosc 
prohloms, thcn, must bc considczd when dwiding whether the seizuro of thc keys was justificc! 
with probable causc? b wrest. Wc submit that it does not. 
' 1 % ~  State makes rrnothw intcrcsiing argument ihat tlic scixwc of the keys did not 
uni~ccc.ssilrily prolong the duration oC the cncountcr. Neithcr would I~mdcuffing I,e,eClcrcq, Tllc 
Slate stigfia~ts i110t arky u~-tlawl:uI vci>icle stop would be justified wi* a prolongd dotention. 
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Prom a pofiq stnndyoint, the much larger isstie in this casc is DeBic's statm~cnts lo ' 
t,eClcrctf rfttring the 25-minute waiting period. Ida110 docs no1 havc any cascs an the precise 
issiic fxirly ruivcd by 1,cClcrcq. And, what is strikingly absent in the Stale's memorandum, is 
airy rcsponsc or di9(;wsiou on the cescs cited by LeClcrcq from Color& and Taus which do 
discuss thr: issue. As it appears that Ulo- Statc does not undersfand tho a p r n Q a  being asswted by 
At the bt.@nning af i& discussion regarding this issue, on page 7 of i ~ s  memnomdrun in 
opposilios, tllc Stale citcn Id;&ho's ALS stw~tc. Tdaho Coda 4 18-8002A(2) and abservcs &at it io 
1 
"wtirofy devoted tct the ndministrativc or civil suspension of o drivcr's license rathcr than any 
crinlincll oEcnscs . . . ." LoClcroq's issue docs not involve thc ALS statuto. Tt is bas& on 
Iduho's intptird comcnt statute and thc Due Process CClnuscs, Jdaho Code $ 18-8002(1) provides: 
Any porscm who drives or is in actual physical control of n motor vchiclc in this 
s1rtte shdl be h o d  to haw given his consent lo cvidentiary tcsting for 
conccnttation of alcohol as daliaed in $18-8004, Idaho Code, and to havc given 
his consent to cvidentiary lcstuy for the presence of drugs or other intoxicating 
suhskilnces, provided that such testing is administcrrsd at the request of a peace 
otliccr having reasonable gxoundst to bcfievt that person has bcen driving or in 
izc;trral physical control of a motor vchicle in violation of the provisions of fi IS- . 
8004, Idaho Code or $18-8006, ldaho Code. 
Cottnscl for LeClcrq refcrs to that podion of a DUI investigation a$ sm in~plied consent 
procwiting wllcn Ihe police officer is required to cot~vcy the Xomation not only contained in 
Idaho Cudr: $ i 8-8002 but dso $ 18-8002A as more filly dcscribcd in Derendaut's Exhibit 6. 'It 
is npprcnt tlmt the Statc hns troublo grasping that siaiement. Sea, Pootnoic 2, State's 
Mciuonndum In Opposition. Iior oxamplo, the State wondms what consiitutcs "an implied 
consent phase" or implied consent proceeding. The Statc asks thc t11etorical question “when does 
T. 
~ h c  ph;isc of  proceeding begiu and end?" The answer to those questions dcpa~ds on the 
l~atintlur cilsc. But at a minimum, and it appears that the Statc agrees with this concept, it is 
during the 15-minute wiiting period up until tho suspect take$ or rckscs thc quested Lest. And 
fbr (hu purposcs of  T.cClcrcq's casc, chat is tho critical implied ccmsent phase. 
i;or examplo, in othcr cases, tbc implied consent plmse would conclude so rhat the suspect 
could have an opportunity to put to usc ldnba Codc 18-8002(3)(t) which says, "Aficr 
st~hmilting to evirlctitinty testing he may, when pmctiabfc, at his own cxlxnsc, have aciditionat 
tcgs ~~litdc by a person of his owi choosing," A~iothcr examplo wotttd bs that during the implied 
conscn t pl?me, the stlspect is nut enkilled to a Iawycr. Mailer of M c N e ~ 4 ,  119 ldaho 182,804 
P,2d 91 1 (C:L,App. 1991, rev. denied) ('Il'te McNeely Court described the implied consent phasc 
:LS :In "cvidevtlicuy procedure"). Whcii the rig& to a lawyt~ altachcs, after the imylicd conse~lt 
pl~usc, arc situations that we controlled by Stale v. Carr, 128 Idaho 181,911 P.2d 774 (Ct. App. 
1935, rev. denkttf) ["The issue pmscnted ill this w e ,  however, is whethcr Can's conslirutiotrill 
rights wcrt: viofatcrJ when the Stato denied hcr wquest 10 telephone her attorneyfiIIu3ving tho 
adnlinisimtion aT tIrc Stata's I3AC test" Id ai Idaho 182, (cmphsis in original)]; State v. 
Mrrrld~n, 127 Maho 894,908 P.2d 587 (Ct, App. 1995). 
Based on this authority, and by analogy, LeClemq subnits that ihc implied consent phasc 
concludes onec thc BAC test has been administcrd or thc suspect rcrusts to submit to a brat 
&St. T.eClctcq's argummt is h t  during this implid wnscilt phasc from a logal standpoint, and 
fionl a puhlic pllicy standpoint, the police sho~~ld not be allowed to threaten a forcible blood 
chw if a breath tcst has been rcquestcd by the offlew: it is not pcrrnitbii by the statutes. If a 
st~spcct asks questions about her option to rcfuse, or tho rumificaiions of a refusal, fhc only 
itifonnation that c;an be given, by law, is tIut contained in Idaho Codc Q 18-8002(2)-(3) and 
Tdaho Code $ 18-8002A(2)(si)-(c). To reiterate, and ns pointcd out by I,&lcrcq in llcr opening 
brief, tllc sautes do not pcrmit a poiice officer to throaten a forcible blood draw i f  thc swpect 
hil.q bccn requested to st1 btnil to a breath tcst ri~zfil the ~uspcct refuses. 
Stating with State v. Gri-fliihs (In Kc. Grfllhs}, 113 Idaho 364,368,744 P.2d 92,9G 
(1987) it is  clcar that Idaho law rquirts strict adhcmnct to tho stahltory langua&t of Idaho Codc 
$ 1 8-8002(3) and strict cc~mplinnce with Ihe information to be conveyed to the suspect, Virgil v. 
SICI~L! (10 Re Virgil), 126 ldsho 946,947,895 P.2d 182, 183 (Ct. App. 1995) (cmphsiis added); 
sec, n h .  &am v. Stole f i  Ke fieem), 11 9 Idoho 289,292,805 P.2d 435,498 (Ct. App. 1991). 
The didinctio~k being made by LcClercq, nnd not being ackwwlcdged by the State, is that 
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ihc police mny be pnuitted to go Eofcibly draw bloodder thc suspect rtlriiu~es' but the Stale 
s110t11d he prohibitctf from advising a suspcct of hat fact liefore the suspcct dtcidcs to submit to EL 
brcatlx kst?  
'J'hc? obviorrs mtnificaiions, and consequence, of DcRie's stafemcnts to forcibly draw ' 
blood is that LcClcrcq wm coerced into tnki~lg the brcath test. The prosecutor, in its 
mcmoranilum. in 0~43sitian makes note, ntmerous h e $ ,  tlmt Dc?nit did not raise his voice whcu 
hc tnadc the stitatcments to LcCltrcq. Ttut sl~ould bc of no consequence itt the Court's analysis. 
As poii~icd out by LcGlercq in her opcning brief thcrc am a numbor of cascs cited, including 
mlnc from Idaho, bit  in @icdnrkrdnm v. Slate of Z'PXQS, 861 SI'W.2d 890, which do not 
rcquiw the mising of voice. Yelling or raiising one's voice is not a requirement for a court to find 
coercion, dcccptim or intimidation. Certainly, LcCIercq was intimidata in her submission to 
tlic brcilh test when t l~c  loud of a Illreat of going to the hospital to "forcibly" draw blood from 
I1t.r hurtg vvcr the sene of tlw incident3 
corn USION, 
'flic issuc with respect to the slatcmcnts of a forciblc blood d r m  being raised by 
lAs zillowcd by State v, Dim, 144 Idaho 300,160 P.3d 739. Tho policc oficcr it1 Diaz did 
not mnke the tlwiit b go to a hospital to draw blood until (vier Diaz refused to submit to the t&l, 
Thus, 11% facts in Diaz, and the issues miscd in that opinion, art: different b a  lhc present claim by 
1,cClcrcq; to-wit, ff c issues in Dfnz wee: (1) whelhcr an involturtary blood draw violates lidera1 or 
stiitc constitutionlll protections in cases whem no death or sctious bodiiy injury is involved, anct (2) 
wllculrr idaho Codc $ 18-80@(6)(d) prohibits involuntary BAC testing in eases where no death or 
serious hodi ly iltj ury is itrvolvcd. 
2Tl~cre arc a numhor of things that ihc parties qrca on in their briefs such as thc officer, 
mthcr than the su~pcct, 2ws ihe authority to choose which type of ovjdcntiary tcst will bo given to a 
suspect wl~cthtr it bc a breath test, blood draw or urinalysis. But once UYC officer chooses ~1 brcath 
test, then that is tjlc one that is implimed in the implid consent phase up until the tinlo the suspcct 
cilhcr takes or rcruscs to submit to the tcst. If a blood dmw is inltidiy rcqucstcd by tho policc 
aoiccr, lhcn that is a diffotent situation aid is  uol relevant to these procccdil~gs. 
31 lhis a ties into 1,cC:lcrcq's ottler issuc regarding ihc suimc of the keys but certainly the 
psycf~otogical irnpact of krlowing that Ihct polico officer hid I~cr kcys 11d to add to n submissive 
dmosphcrc. 
LcCSlcrcq is far different than the issuc and holding iu Stare v. Dim, 'l'hose: typcs of st~trments 
during tlxc implied wirsent pllase: woxlid certainly htimidute someonc into submifting to a brcafh 
tcsk. t,cCfercq was also dccoived when Dcl3ic rofd hcr dditiontll infomution that is not within 
tlbc pammtrtms of Idaho's implied consent law. Uhdar the holdi~~gs &om Grui~hs, VirgiI and . 
jjcrrtl tkcrc hils to ho strict &ercficc lo thc infonnirtion given to a suspect under and p~trsunnt o 
tllo confines of Idaho Codc $ 1.8-8002(2)-(3). 'When viewed in thosc tcms, LcClercq's awumcnt 
is not novcl nor gromdbrcnking. She is simply rcquesljng that thc Court strictly edorce what the 
law mmrdates. l f i t docs, then hcr bnatll test results rshould be suppressed. 
Finally, I,ef'lorcq submits that DcBic did not have safficimt probable wst: to seix hcr 
keys shortly o k r  thc slap was made. 
IIKTED this day of January, 2009, 
I l lRRl WY CEIU'IFY that on the -. 5 day of January. 2009, I cowed a true ~ n d  
corrcct copy of the fowoing document to be dclivcd to the following in ihc mell~od marked 
11cmi11: 
. --- Moiled 
- Flmd-Deiivcrcd J- Faxed to 788-5554 
-.. -- 
--. Fwcd ad mailcd 
Angcfa Nclson 
Blaine County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
201 2nd Avenue South, Suilc 100 
Tidiey, ID 83333 
IN THE DISTWCT COURT OF THE FIFTH WDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, A- + ) CASE NO. CR-2008-2607 1 J d p n  Dntge, Ckrk O ~ ~ t d d  
1 B Court Blaine Cwnfy, Idaho - - 
VS. ) MEMORANDUM DECISION and ORDER 
TONI M. LECLERCQ, 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion in 
LimineMotion to Suppress. Both parties are represented by counsel. 
The Defendant was arrested and charged with Driving Under the Influence on September 
14,2008. According to Trooper Travis DeBie of the Idaho State Police, the Defendant was 
speeding on Highway 75, north of Hailey in Blaine County, Idaho at approximately 1 1 : 18 p.m. 
Trooper DeBie asserts that the Defendant did not pull over immediately and that she crossed a 
double yellow line and only stopped after he used his siren. 
Trooper DeBie approached the vehicle. He has testified that the Defendant did not 
immediately notice him and that he had to tap on the window to get her attention. He has also 
testified that she initially seemed disoriented and could not roll down the window. Trooper 
DeBie had to ask the Defendant to open the door. When she opened it, he could smell a strong 
odor of alcohol from inside the vehicle. The Defendant was the only occupant. 
When the door was opened, the vehicle was still running. Trooper DeBie asked for the 
keys. The Defendant complied and gave him the keys. Though it is not in his probable cause 
&davit, Trooper DeBie asserts that the Defendant's speech was "extremely" slurred and that 
she had glassy and bloodshot eyes, A h r  doing a license check, Trooper DeBie asked the 
Defendturl to submit to field sobriety testing. The Defendant complied. During th~.s entire 
encomter, Trooper DeBie kept the keys in his pocket. 
Trooper DeBie could smell the odor of alcohol on the Defendant's person during the 
FST's. According to Trooper DeBie, the Defendant failed the HGN test and the one-leg stand. 
He did not perform the walk and turn test because the Defendant indicated a leg injury that may 
interfere with the test. The Defendant was arrested for DUI, 
Trooper DeBie was equipped with an Alco Sensor in his vehicle. He read the Defendant 
the standard advisory form. The Defendant does not dispute that he waited 15 minutes before 
administering the test. However, during this time, the Defendant asked about her ability to 
refuse the test. Trooper DeBie advised the Defendant that if she did not submit to a breath test, 
he would take her to the hospital for a blood draw. The Defendant submitted to the breath test. 
The results exceed the legal limit. 
There is a DVD of this incident. It begins just as Trooper DeBie notes that the Defendant 
is exceeding the speed limit. Though it cannot disclose the odor of intoxicants, it is clear fi-om 
the DVD that the Defendant is alternately confused, apologetic, argumentative and unable to find 
the appropriate information for the officer. She initially admits to "not much" wine, later 
admitting to two glasses. The FST's are not visible on the tape (they were done in fi-ont of her 
car and out of range for safety reasons), but again the discussion indicates that the Defendant is 
rambling and unable to follow instructions. The DVD also reveals that Trooper DeBie asked for 
the keys to the vehicle after the Defendant had been slow to respond to him at the window of the 
vehicle, had discussed her speed, kept apologizing, couldn't find information and admitted to 
drinking. 
After the Defendmt was mested, the DVD shows that Trooper DeSie had her spit out 
, checked her for other substances and, afier she burped, explained that he had a portable 
breath machine that he would use to test her after 15 minutes. It was during this time that the 
Defendant asked thee times if she could refuse the test. The first time, Trooper DeBie told her 
to first listen to the advisory form. The second time he told her "You can refuse, but I would 
take you to the hospital and we would do a forced blood draw" and went on to explain that Idaho 
state law said he could forcibly take her blood if she did not submit to the breath sample because 
of the implied consent law. The third time, he again stated that he would take her to the hospital 
for blood; that she would receive a refusal; and that her license would be lost for one year. 
The Defendant challenges two aspects of this traffic stop. She first asserts that the 
seizure of her keys "constituted a greater seizure than what was justified by an investigatory stop 
based on speeding 61 in a 55 mph." Memorandum at p. 5. The Defendant argues that such an 
action constitutes an mest and must be based on probable cause. She M e r  asserts that 
Trooper DeBie lacked probable cause under the circumstances. 
Both parties refer the Court to Matter of Clayton, 113 ID 817 (1988). In Clayton, a 
police officer found the defendant passed out in a running vehicle outside a bar at 1:30 in the 
morning. The officer reached into the vehicle, turned off the motor and took possession of the 
keys. As a general rule, the Idaho Supreme Court found this to be a valid exercise of the 
officer's community caretaking function. The Court based its conclusion on "practical 
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable persons act," Clayton at p. 818. The Court 
also found that the seizure, if any, was justified by probable cause because the officer had a 
"wfEcient and objective basis" to investigate the defendant for DUI, justifying removal of the 
keys. The Court relied on a case from North Dakota where the court found that determining 
whether or not a driver was intoxicated outweighed that driver's Fourth h e n h e n t  interest in 
being left alone. 
The Defendant in the present case makes much of certain discrepancies between what is 
noted on the DVD and the testimony of the police officer. Indeed, there may be some 
differences. However, the DVD speaks for itself on many of the circumstances surrounding this 
stop. At the time he seized the keys, Officer DeBie had evidence that the Defendant was 
exceeding the speed limit, a fact he notes on the DVD. While her speech may not have been 
particularly slurred, it is clear horn the DVD that the Defendant is alternately apologetic and 
unable to find information before he asks for the keys. She admits to consuming alcohol. All of 
this is consistent with Trooper DeBie's testimony that he observed glassy and bloodshot eyes and 
the odor of intoxicants coming &om the vehicle. 
At that point in time, Trooper DeBie, regardless of whether or not his additional 
testimony was true, had a reasonable suspicion that the Defendant was driving under the 
influence. Removing the keys until he dispelled or confirmed his suspicion was likewise 
reasonable under the circumstances, did not unnecessarily interfere with the Defendant's rights 
under the Fourth Amendment, did not unnecessarily delay the Defendant's right to leave if she 
was not under the influence and was clearly done in an effort to protect the public until a 
determination could be made as to whether or not the Defendant was safe to drive. As a result, 
there is not a basis to suppress evidence as a result of the stop and subsequent investigation of the 
Defendant's conduct. 
The circumstances surrounding procurement of the breath test are a bit more difficult. 
I.C. 5 18-8002(1) states that a person who drives a vehicle in Idaho is deemed to have consented 
to evidentiary testing for alcohol concentra~on. The remainder of I.C. 9 18-8002 provides a 
procedure to impose civil penalties on the person who nevedeless refuses to take such a test. 
In Sme v. Dim, 144 ID 300 (2007), the Idaho Supreme Court addressed two issues 
necessary to the resolution of .this case. The first is "whether an involuntary blood draw violates 
federal or state constimtional protections in cases where no death or serious bodily injury is 
involved." D i m  at p. 302. 
In Diuz, the defendant, after his arrest in a case of suspected driving under the influence, 
was told that if he refused breathalyzer testing, "he would be taken to a hospital and his blood 
would be drawn." Diaz at p. 302. After being so informed, Diaz continued to protest, but did 
not resist a blood draw. The Idaho Supreme Court noted that the testing constituted a search and 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment; that such searches were presumptively unreasonable; and 
that the State had to show that the search fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement and was reasonable under the circumstances. Dim at p. 302. The Court determined 
that the implied consent law provided a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement 
and that under the totality of the circumstances, the blood draw was constitutional. 
The Defendant asserts that because she took the breath test in the present case, i.e. the 
first offered test, her circumstances are different than those of Dim. To reach this conclusion, 
the Court would have to determine that if you are given a choice of two tests and you take the 
first, the evidence is suppressible, but if you take the second, it is not suppressible. Logically, 
either both are suppressible or neither is suppressible. Consistent with Dim, neither is 
suppressible. 
The Defendant cites cases from other jurisdictions. Unfortunately, her citation to E h a n  
v. State, 861 SW2d 890 (Tx. Cr. App. 1993) omits an important fact, i.e. that while Texas had a 
so-called implied consent law, that law specifically indicated that if a person refused an 
evidentiary test, "'none shall be taken.""Erdman at p. 893. If Idaho had such a statutory 
scheme, the issue of consent would be relevant to determine if a defendant had waived a 
statutory right. .An Idaho driver has no such right. 
Likewise, the statutory scheme in Colorado limits the applicability of Turbyne v. People. 
151 P3d 563 (2007) to the Court's analysis of the present case. CoIorado had a law that 
essentially required a person to choose between a breath test or a blood test. In Turbyne, the 
defendant chose a blood test, only to be told by the police officer that he had to submit to a 
breath test or lose his license. Turbyne took the breath test. On appeal, the Colorado Supreme 
Court suppressed the result of the breath test because the defendant complied with the statute by 
choosing a test and the police officer erroneously informed him that he could lose his license if 
he did not take the breath test. 
Idaho law gives a police officer the right to choose the evidentiary test. Diaz at p. 302, 
citing Iialen v. State, 136 ID 829 (2002). Moreover, like Erdman, Colorado law gave people 
suspected of driving under the influence additional rights that do not exist under the Idaho 
statutory scheme. In Idaho, consent is not an issue because a driver has already given his 
implied consent. Idaho, unlike Texas and Colorado, has not provided any applicable exceptions 
to that consent. 
The Court is troubled in the present case by the officer's use of the word "force" in 
describing what would occur if the Defendant refused the breath test. However, the second part 
of Diaz addresses the issue of whether or not Idaho has a law prohibiting "involuntary" BAC 
testing. Diaz at p. 303. Involuntary and force essentially mean the same thing. Diaz indicates 
that a police officer, under I.C. 5 18-8002(6)(b) may request or order hospital personnel to take 
blood from a person suspected of DUI and that the taking of blood by hospital personnel upon 
order or request '5s permissible under our sa,t;utory scheme." Dim at p. 304. As a result, using 
the word "force" to describe the result of failing to submit to the breath test cannot be considered 
misleading or otherwise wrongful. Under the totality of the circumstances, the actions of 
Trooper DeBie were permissible. 
The Motion in LiminelMotion to Suppress is DENIED. The matter is SET FOR PRE- 
TRIAL CONFEmNCE on February 9,2008 at 2:00 p.m. with TRIAL SET FOR February 
12,2009 at 9100 a.m. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED January tq ,2009. 
R. TED ISRAEL 
FIFTH DISTRlCT MAGISTRATE JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a copy of this Memorandum Decision and Order was mailed, faxed 
and/or hand-delivered to the following, on j.,q-(yj ,2009 
to wit: 
Angela Nelson 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
201 2nd Ave. South, Ste 100 
Hailey, ID 83333 
Brian Elkins 
Attorney At Law 
PO Box 766 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
Toni M Leclereq 
Defendmt. 
DOB : 3/8/ 1 948 
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF B L M ,  M A G I S T U E  DIVISION !. i 
.:oiyRn Drage, Cle14 ,. .,rr,c2 
C O U ~ ~  Blame Coon1 . J:i7s 
. ,- - 
1 ) PIE-TTU4.L STLPULATXON and ORDER 
1 
) Case No. CR-2008-0002607 
1 
1 
The above-named parties hereby stipulate and agree as follows: 
The Defendant will plead guilty as charged to: 
The State moves to dismiss the charge(s) of because 
The parties have agreed to the following amendments: 
[ ] COURT TRLAL is set for at 
(By signing this document, all parties expressiy agree to waiver of a jury trial.) 
[ ] JURY PRE-TRIAL is set for at 2:00 p.m. 
with JURY TRIAL set for at 9:00 a.m. 
[ 1 The State recommends the following sentence: 
TT63 QiAgt J6 9pPG+*JA~~ -7 L& V / ' W r q C  Wr OLL W(EStge 
THE DEFENDANT IS NOTIFI D that: IM Q& 1 J Y A A ~ ~ ~  SjE.rensw. 
I .  If you fail to appear at any time noted herein, any bond posted may be forfeited and a warrant may be issued for your arrest. 
2. In agreeing to plead guilty, you waive all statutory and consti 
legal counsel. 
3. Sentencing recommendations are not binding on the court un 
DATED: 
t 
Ton1 M Leclercq 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Stipulation of the Parties is: [ ] Approved [ j Disapproved. 
Copies hand-delivered to: [x] Prosecuting Attorney [vf~efense Attorney [ ] Defendant 
By: 
~ a ~ y s t r a t e  Clerk 
Toni M Leclercq 
10042 Main St. Apt 503 
Bellewe, WA 98004 
Defendant. 
Fifth Judicial District Court, State of Idaho 
In and For the County of Blaine 
201 2nd Avenue South, Suite 106 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Case No: CR-2008-0002607 
d ~ n g e l a  Nelson, County P.A. 
Cl Matt Fredback, County P.A. 
Cl Frederick Aflington, City P.A. 
mefense Attorney: 8 ~ -  k$k& 
C1 Defendant 
C1 Interpreter 
Date: 3 3 SC. Counter: J : 5 L + CD: 94 
Charge: i 
D Hearing Type 
Fifth Judicial District Court, State of ldaho 
In and For the County of Blaine 
201 2nd Avenue South. Suite 106 
Hailey, ldaho 33333 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff. 
) 
) 
vs . ) Case No: CR-2008-0002607 
Toni M Leclercq 
10042 Main St. Apt 503 
Bellevue, WA 98004 
1 
) ORDEWNOTICE OF HEARING 
1 
) 
1 
Defendant, 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Sentencing Wednesday, March 04, 2009 01:30 PM 
Judge: R. Ted Israel 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and 
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Friday, 
February 27, 2009. 
Defendant: Toni M Leclercq 
Mailed / Hand Delivered 
Private Counsel: Mailed J Hand Delivered 
Brian E. Elkins 
P.O. Box 766 
Ketchurn ID 83340 
Prosecutor: Jim Thomas Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney 
Mailed Hand Delivered 
FAILURE TO APPEAR FOR THIS SCHEDULED HEARING MAY RESULT IN THE ISSUANCE OF A BENCH 
WARRANT. 
Dated: Friday, Februarv 27, 2009 
By: 
Judge 
DOC22 7/96 
MAR-04-2009 WED 1 1  :28 AM R&$R CRISTflRTAN ELKINS FM NO, 
8 4-3 
P, 02 
'?8/ 
BRIAN E. ELKINS, P. C. 
Allornoy at LBW 
208 Spruco Avcnw North 
P. 0, Box 766 
Ket~l~om, I'D 83340 
Tclqhonc: (208) 726-4338 
I+acsirnilc: (208) 726-9328 
E-mail: beclkins@cox.net 
Ictid~o Stotc Bar No. 31 SO 
Attorney Tor Defendant 
IN '1'HEi DISTRICT COURT OF TIIki FIF'TH JUDLClAL ISTSTRTCT 
C)'F TliE S'fA'K'E OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR TfJG COUNTY 01: BLAINE 
THE? STATE OF TDAHO, 1 
Plainliff, 1 Casc No. CR 08-2607 
) 
V. 1 MOTION TO CONTlNUIl 
1 SENTENCING HL3ARWG AND ORDER 
TONI M. LcGLERCQ, 1 
1 
. Dcfidant, 1 
Dtfcndmt, Toni M. LtClercq, by and through hm attorncy of record, Brian E. Elkins, 
nlovos t11is:C'oot-t for an Order continuing tho scntcncing hsaring sct for March 4,2009, at 1:30 
p . ~ u  lo Monday, March 9,2009 at 10:30 a.m. for additional t h c  to obtain Defcndant's signatm 
on a Rule 1 1 Agreement. Tho DcScndant has been residing in Scdttlo Washington surd her 
caunscl has llot had sufficicnl time to have her sign a revised Rule 11 Agrccrnmt which was 
discussud wit11 the Court st a status confcrcnce on February 25,2009. 
AL &pproxitnatcly 9:00 a.m. on Mmh 4 2003, Blaiac County Deputy Proscctttor Angela 
I 
Ncleoa, prosecutor Tor thc State, was conlaclcd by cmail to scc if the Stdc would agree to change 
thc sct~tencing hewing, but no rosponsc. 
BAR-04-2009 WED 1 1  : 28 AH $g$R CRIST/BRIAN ELKINS FAX NO. 12BV69328 P, 03 
*&d t&*2 
DATED this 4" day of March, 2003. 
Attorney for the Defendant 
Bascd upon the foregoing Motion aad good cause appcaing therefor; 
11" 'IS WRRRBY ORDERED that the Dcfmdant's hcaring schcdulcd for Mmh 
4,2009 at 1 :30 o'clock p.m. be vacated a ~ 1  will be rewt ,2009 at 
10: -.-. , 36 .- .*.. ., 4 " .m. 
DATED this day of Mmb, 2009. 
R Td Israel 
Ma~stmte Judge 
CII(:RTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 4* day of March, 2009, I causcd a true and corroct copy 
oTlhc foregoing documat to be dclivcrcd to the following in the method markcd hcrcin: 
Mail cd Blaine County Prosecutor's Ofice 
201 2"Ave, S,, Suite 100 
Hand-Ddivercd Nailcy, ID 83333 
Faxed and mailcd 
+' 
MOTION TO CCINI'PRJF, HEARING AND OWDR -2 
HAR-04-2008 WED 1 1 ! 28 Afl RPJR CRISTARI AN ELK INS FAX NO. 12081268328 
$&$ 4<%4 *Qg&p 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the , 4 day of March, 2009, I eauscd a lme and correct 
copy of the fmgoing docummt to bc dclivcrcd to the following in the ~ncthod makd hcrcin: 
Mailed 
- Angala Nelson 
Blaine County Deputy Proeccuting Atlorney 
J" I land-Dclivtrcd 
---
203. 2""ve, S., Suite loo 
fiailey, UD 83333 
Faxcd to 788-5554 
-- 
Fax& and mailed 
-. .. . Mailed Brian E. Elkins 
Attorney at Law 
Hand-Deli vered 
---- P. 0. Box 766 
Kctchum, 83340 
L/ _Faxed to 726-9328 
--.. 
.-- Faxed and Mailcd 
MO'I'ION '1'0 CONTINUE ZJEARINO AND ORDER -3 
IN DISmCT COURT OF FlFT'H m I C W  DISmCT OF TEE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TI333 COUNTY OF BLADE 
M A G I S r n E  DMSION 
STATE OF IDAt-10 
Plaintiff, 
1 
vs . 
) 
) Case No: CR-2008-0002607 
Toni M Leclercq 
10042 Main St. Apt 503 
1 
) CRllUlNAl MINUTE ENTRY 
Bellevue, WA 98004 
Defendant. 
1 
1 
1 
) 
~ r r # k  CHARGE: 118-8004 M LC. Drivinr Under The Inflaenec GT;~ - p , ~  // 
Judge: WR Ted Israel Clerk [ I Kate Riiq 
[ I  w A - & P =  [&Heidi Schiers 
[ ] Robert J. Elgee [ I  Other: [ ] Jason D. Walker [ I  hWm: [ I  other: 
Prosecuting Attorney: Jim Thoma8 9 (4 J&.)L 
Defense: 
[ I  No Attorney: 
[ I  Defendaat appeared. 
[ Detbndant did not appear. 
[ ] Bond revokedlwan:ant issued wl new bond $ [ I  Stategiven21daystoact. d Deb Attorney: Brian E. EUdnt 
Procedure: Charge Amended to: 
[ 1 Court reviews Plea Agreement 
[ 1 Satisfied with counsel. 
[ 1 Denies threats or force or under the influence. 
[ 1 Reads and undmtmk [ ]English [ ]Spanish [ I= today 
[ 1 Waives rightshas read, understood and signed Acknowiedgment of Rightr form. 
[ 1 Understands padies ,  bluding -&signed N&ic&on of SubsaqW Rights 
form. 
[ 1 Understands that a guilty pldwnviction may impact ability to remain in the UniM 
States if not a citizen, 
[ 1 Understands Court not bound by recommendations. 
Admits elements of offense (facauil basis). 
.. .* 
[ ] Evaluation presented 
COUNT I 
[ 1 Sentence imposed [ ] Judgment of Conviction entered E+j%Mheld Judgment entered 
Hours f [ I  starting: ih l i a  
Fines imposed $ fb5 0 with$ 
Restitution S 
f15 
May apply for early nleasc after 
Probation Conditions: 
[ . f i i o b  no laws; 
motif$ Court of address change; 
[ ]Make payment amngements with wlnt clerk; 
[ ] days of Driver's License Suspension an Suspended; 
[ ]Attend Crime Victim Panel; 
[ IAttcnd Court Alcohol School; 
[ d o  BAC refbds; 
EcFo alcohol or controlled substances while driving; 
[Wust have car insurance and valid DL; 
[ ]Restricted DL pmnit as per probation officn; 
COUNT D: 
[ ] Sentence imposed. [ ] Judgment of Conviction entered [ ] Withheld Judgment entered 
Days in Jail starting: [ ]Community Snvice Horn 
Days suspended [ 1sw-R 
Fines imposed: $ with $ suspended []wmwstr ,  
Driver's License Suspended: days with days absolute 
Probation: months [ ]supervised [ ] supervision fees 
[ ]  Concurrent sentences [lunsuptrvM [ ] Consecutive sentences 
[ I  Other: 
!w& Mtn* - 
B 
Attorney at Law 
208 Spruce Avenue North 
P. 0. Box 766 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Telephone: (208) 726-4338 
Facsimile: (208) 726-9328 
E-mail: beelkins@cox.net 
Idaho State Bar No. 3150 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN TEE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, ) Case No. CR 08-2607 
v. 1 RULE 11 AGREEMENT 
) 
TONI M. LeCLERCQ, 
Defendant. ) 
The above named Plaintiff, State of Idaho, by and through Blaine County Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney, Angela Nelson, hereby stipulates and agrees with the Defendant, Toni M. 
LeClercq, by and through h a  attorney, Brian E. Elkins, that the criminal action now pending 
against the Defendant, captioned and numbered above, shall be compromised and finalized as 
follows: 
1. The Citation filed in this matter, no. 1320361, charges the Defendant in violation 
number I, with Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol, a misdemeanor, in violation of 
Idaho Code Section 18-8004 (First Offense). 
2. Based upon the State's agreement as outlined herein, and pursuant to Idaho Criminal 
RULE 1 1 AGREEMENT - 1 
Rule 1 I (a)(2), the Defendant will enter a Conditional Guilty Plea thereby res&g the right to 
appeal the Magistrate's Memorandm Decision, filed January 14,2009, denying the Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress. The Defendant's conditional guilty plea will be to the charge of Driving 
%%le Under the Influence of Alcohol, a first offense, in violation of Idaho Code Sections 18- 
8004 and 18-8005 (1). 
If the Defendant prevails on appeal, the Defendant shall be allowed to withdraw her 
conditional guilty plea enter pursuant hereto. Pursuant to MCR 6 (d), the Defendant, by 
executing this Rule 1 1 Agreement enters a conditional guilty plea to the charge of Driving While 
Under the Influence of Alcohol, first offense, I.C. $5 18-8004 & 8005 (a)(l). 
The Parties agree that the court can accept the Defendant's Conditional Guilty Plea, 
impose sentence, but that the imposition thereof be stayed. 
3. The Defendant hereby acknowledges the following: 
a. She has been represented by counsel throughout this matter and has specifically 
reviewed and thoroughly discussed this Rule 11 Agreement and its ramifications with her 
attorney. 
b. The conditional plea of guilty entered in this matter is in all respects the free 
and voluntary act of the Defendant and is not the result of any coercive influence, whether 
implicitly or explicitly or the result of any promises. 
c. The Defendant has been fully informed by her counsel of the consequences of 
the conditional plea of guilty, including the minimum and maximum punishments therefor, in the 
event sentence is imposed, and all other direct and indirect consequences which may apply. 
d. The Defendant has been advised by counsel that by entering a conditional 
RULE 1 I AGREEMENT - 2 
guilty plea, and in the event she does not prevail on appeal, sentence would be imposed by the 
court, whether it be a judpent  of conviction or a withheld judgment thereby waiving her right 
against compulsory self-incrimination, provided the Defendant may invoke the right to remain 
silent about other crimes or about any idormation that might tend to increase the punishment for 
the crime to which she is pleading guilty, her right to a trial by jury, her right to confront 
wiwesses against her, the right of the presumption of innocence and that the State must prove her 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, her right that a guilty verdict, or a not guilty verdict, must be 
based upon the unanimous decision of the fact finder, and she waives any and all defenses that 
she may have. The Defendant also understands that she waives rights which otherwise could 
have been raised at trial, including the right to challenge the admissibility of evidence upon 
which the State might have relied. 
e. The Defendant has been thoroughly informed of the nature of the charges to 
which she will enter her conditional plea of guilty. 
f. The conditional plea entered in this matter is in fact a result of a plea 
agreement. The Defendant understands that this Rule 11 Agreement concerning sentencing is not 
binding on the on the Court and in the event the Court rejects the sentencing recommendations, 
the Defendant would be unable to withdraw her conditional plea of guilty and she could be 
sentenced to the maximum allowed by law which, for DUI is: six (6) months in the county jail 
and fined in an amount not to exceed $1000, or both, driving privileges suspended for 180 days 
(with the first 30 days being absolute with no driving privileges whatsoever) and other direct and 
indirect consequences which may apply. 
g. The Defendant has been advised that if she is on probation or parole for 
RULE I 1 AGREEMENT - 3 
a n o ~ e r  oEense, this conditional plea of guilty may constitute a violation of said probation or 
parole and may subject the Defendant to additiond penalties; 
h. The Defendant has been advised that if she is not a citizen of the United States, 
her guilty plea may lead to depomtion or removal from the United States or may prevent her 
fi-om obtaining legal status or citizenship in the United States; the Defendant has been advised 
that if she does not speak the English language, including any handicap, the court will appoint a 
qualified interpreter to assist; 
i. If appropriate, the Defendant may be required to make restitution to any victims 
of this incident and/or reimburse the state for certain costs of investigation and prosecution; 
4. This Stipulation shall be construed in conformance with Idaho Criminal Rule 11 
(f)f 1)P). 
5. At the time of sentencing, the State agrees to make the following sentencing 
recommendations : 
a. the Defendant save 180 days in jail with 177 days suspended and the Defendant be 
placed on an eighteen month period of probation subject to the following terms and conditions; 
b. pay a fine in the mount of $1,000 with $400.00 suspended plus court costs, for a total 
due at the time of sentencing in the amount of $690.50; 
c. The Defendant receive a withheld judgment; 
d. the Defendant's driving privileges be suspended for 120 days but that she be given 
credit for 25 days of absolute suspension for the ALS suspension (October 13,2008 through 
November 7,2008) before it was vacated by ALS hearing officer Dave Bauman; 
e. Obtain an alcohol evaluation and follow the recommendations. 
RULE 1 I AGREEMENT - 4 
6. The parties agree the Defendmt shall be fkee to argue for any appropriate sentence. 
DATED this q day of Mf i&  ,2009. 
Toni M. LeClercq, ~ e f e n d a n t ~  
mAJl0l-f 
DATED this q day of FMxuq, 2009. 
q day of DATED this 
Bl ine ounty D uty rosecuting Attorney 
",f 
ORDER ACCEPTING PLEA AGREEMENT 
Based upon the foregoing, the entire record in this matter and pursuant to I.C.R. l l(Q(3); 
The Court accepts the plea agreement and IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the Court will 
implement the disposition provided herein. 5bk& b -k C-&'\ &\ LL- % to'-?%%%- 
DATED this q day of lzelwznny, 2009. 
R. Ted lsrael 
Magistrate Judge 
RULE I 1 AGREEMENT - 5 
CERTIHCATE OF SERWCE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 4 dayof ,2009, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be delivered to the following in the method marked 
herein: 
Mailed Angela Nelson 
" /' Blaine County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Hand-Delivered 201 2nd Avenue South, Suite 100 
Hailey, El 83333 
Faxed to 788-5554 
Faxed and mailed n 
RULE 1 I AGREEhENT - 6 
@$?f$ 
:*-%- 
a* In and Far the CawQ of 
S @ N #  W SDH 
DO& 3i8iE93s kGXP4GI: IDAHO STkTrii POLICE DTirPT 
CME t CR-ZOII&001)2607 CKATION* 132QTdt BY DEPUTY C L E ~ E  
CEUZGX: 118-881)4 IM, I lrMn~ Under The Intlueuce 
AMENDED: - 
DEmNDANT'S RIGHTS: [ 1 explained by Court d p l a i n e d  by cou$ [ ] a d v e \  ribr roceeding 
[ ] waived ~ P R E S E ~ D  BY: q+-.\ b.. 
aived right to jury trial; confrontlcross-examine/subpen.d witnesses; agaiGst self-incrimination. 
e d  
3. M i s e d  of maximum and minimum penalties, including possible enhancements. 
PROCEDURE: milty Plea [ I Jury Trial - Guilty Verdict [ ] Court Trial - Guilty Verdict 
JUDGMENT: a d 1 t h h e 1 d ,  m h t i n g :  i % \- * [ 1 Judgment of Conviction 
MONIES DUE: ff6 Fixed Penalty $ \-Q A [Wuspended $ Y@b 
&rt Costs 5 [ 1 Bond Forfeit $ 
[ 1 Public Defender $ [ I Other $ 
[ J Restitution per attached Order or if requested by State within d a y s .  
[ H a y m e n  Arrangements to be made with Clerk's Office. 
C O M m T Y  SERVICE: hours or days. (Additional fees may apply) 
JAIL: days; days suspended: 2 days credit for time served: Other: 
- days may be served on Sheriff's Work Program. Must be completed within 60 days of this Judgment. w \  
Defendant shall not report for said incarceration with any trace of alcohol andlor drugs in hisher bloodstream or body system. 
Report: [ 1 today [ 1 
DRIVING PRIVILEGES SUSPENDED: @days, commencing: [ ] 
[ ] driving privileges permitted. [@6&tricted permit after 30 days 
[ P &days of suspension is suspended. 
PROBATION: & months. [ Court costs of supervision. 
Defendant may apply to probation 
[XI Comply with all terms of this Judgment. 
[x] If supervised, contact the probation department within 5 days of 
[x] Commit no misdemeanor or felony. 
Keep Clerk or probation officer adv ed of yo r c nt a ress. ' 
DO not drive without insurance. 4 d cf\n \ # Abstain from [ ] alcohol andlor 1 1 controlbd substances not prescribed by a physician. 
5(1 Submit to testing for @alcohol and/or [ ] controlled substances when requested by a police officer, probation officer or [ 1 counselor at your expense. 
No actual physical control of a motor vehicle after having consumed any alcohol or 
Enroll in the following program within - days and complete with - 
IT IS SO ORDERED this 
Copies: [ ] Probation [ ] Alcohol School 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FLFTH SUT)ICIA.L DISTRICT COURT 
OF TEE STATE OF W O ,  EdAND FOR TEE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) Case No. CR-2008-2607 
1 
v. ) ORDER STAYING 
1 EX£?CUTION OF SENTENCE 
TONI M. LeCLERCQ, 1 PENDING APPEAL 
) 
Defendant. ) 
This matter came before the Court on the q day of March, 2009 with the State of 
Idaho, being represented by Angela Nelson, Blaine County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, and the 
Defendant, Toni M. LeClercq, being represented by and through her attorney, Brian E. Elkins. 
The matter before the Court is the Defendant's conditional guilty plea as allowed in Idaho 
Criminal Rule 1 1 (a)(2) to the charge of driving while under the influence of alcohol, and 
reserving the right to appeal the Magistrate's Memorandum Decision, filed January 14,2009, 
denying the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
The record in t h s  matter reflects that a Rule 1 1 Agreement was entered between the 
parties which provides, inter adlia, that the Defendant may enter a conditional guilty plea but that 
execution of sentence be stayed pending appeal. 
ORDER STAYING EXECUTION OF SENTENCE PENDING APPEAL -- \ 
Based upon the contents of the Rule 1 I Agreement, and the aclmowledgment of the 
Waiver of Rights set forth therein, the Court finds that the information required in LC.R. 1 l(c) 
has been satisfied and the Court therefore accepts the Defendant's conditional pil ty plea with 
sentence imposed but execution thereof stayed pending appeal. 
Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 54.5(a) and the Rule 11 Agreement, the execution of 
sentence shall be stayed pending the appeal to be taken by the Defendant. 
In the event the Defendant prevails on appeal, the Defendant shall be allowed to withdraw 
her conditional guilty plea. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
0\ day of March, 2009. DATED this 
R. Ted Israel 
Magistrate Judge 
ORDER STAYING EXECUTION OF SENTENCE PENDING APPEAL - - -  
I HEmBY CERTIFY that on the day of 2009, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be delivered to the following in the method marked 
herein: 
Angela Nelson 
%ad"-",elivered Blaine County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Faxed to 208-788-5554 201 2nd Avenue South, Suite 100 
and mailed Hailey, DD 83333 
&ailed Brian E. Elkins 
Rand-Delivered Attorney at Law 
Faxed to 726-9328 P. 0. Box 766 
Faxed and mailed Ketchum, ID 83340 
ORDER STAYING EXECUTION OF SENTENCE PENDING APPEAL-3 
B E, E L r n S ,  P.C. 
Attorney at Law 
208 Spruce Avenue North 
P. 0 .  Box 766 
Ketcham, Id&o 83340 
Telephone (208) 726-4338 
Facsimile (208) 726-9328 
E-mail: bee~ns@cox.net 
ISB No. 3 150 
Attorney for DefendantlAppellant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLADE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) Case No. CR-08-2607 
) 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TONI M. LeCLERCQ, ) 
) 
Defmdantl Appellant. ) 
TO: The Respondent, State of Idaho and its attorney, Jim J. Thomas, Blaine County 
Prosecuting Attorney, 201 Avenue South, Suite 100, Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Blaine County Clerk of the Court 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The title of the action is as above indicated; to-wit, State of Idaho v. Toni M. LeClercq. 
2. The title of the court which heard the proceedings appealed fkom and the name of the 
presiding magistrate: Blaine County Magistrate Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, Honorable R. Ted Israel presiding. 
3. The number assigned to the action by the trial court: Blaine County Case No. CR 08- 
2607. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -1 
4. The title of the court to which the appeal is taken: Blaine County District Court 
5. The appeal is taken upon matters of law and fact. 
6. The proceedings on the hearing were recorded andlor reported. The identification of 
the method of recording is a digital recording kept by the Blaine County Clerk of the Court and 
there exists an audio recording of the evidentiary hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
heard on December 3,2008, at 2:30 p.m. at the Blaine County Courthouse and is on file herein. 
7. A certificate that the Notice of Appeal has been served on the Respondent is attached 
hereto. 
8. The Appellant, Toni M. LeClercq, by and through her attorney, Brian E. Elkins, 
appeals against the Respondent to the Blaine County District Court pursuant to Idaho Criminal 
Rule 54 and the Order Staying Execution of Sentence Pending Appeal filed March 9,2009. 
Appellant seeks a review of the Magistrate's Memorandum Decision filed January 14, 2009, 
denying Defendant/Appellant's Motion in Limine andlor Motion to Suppress. 
9. The issues on appeal which the Appellant intends to assert: 
a. Whether a police officer can threaten a forcible blood draw, after requesting a 
DUI suspect to submit to a breath test, during Idaho's Implied Consent proceedings? 
b. Whether Appellant's breath test results should be suppressed from evidence. 
DATED this /q day of April, 2009, 
Attorney for Appellant Toni M. LeClercq 
NOTICE OF APPEAL --& 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Lf day of April, 2009, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be delivered to the following in the method marked herein: 
I/ Mailed 
Hand-Delivered 
Blaine County Prosecutor's Office 
201 2nd Ave. S., Suite 100 
Hailey, ID 83333 
Faxed to 788-5554 
- 
Faxed and mailed 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -3 
Jim J. Thomas, ISBN 4415 
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney 
201 znd Avenue S. Suite 100 
Hailey, ID 83333 
Telephone: (208) 788-5545 
Fax: (208) 788-5554 
1 FILED 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, I Case No. CR-08-2607 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
TONI M. LECLERCQ, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY DISTRICT 
JUDGE WITHOUT CAUSE 
COMES NOW Plaintiff State of ldaho pursuant to ldaho Criminal Rule 25, by and 
through the Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney's Office and hereby moves the Court for 
its order disqualifying District Judge Robert Elgee as the presiding judge in the above 
referenced case. 
Plaintiff, State of ldaho hereby moves this court for the appointment of an alternate 
district judge to preside over all proceedings in the above referenced case. 
DATED this /6 day of April. 2009 
mas, ISBN 4415 
nty Prosecuting Attorney 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY DISTRICT JUDGE WITHOUT CAUSE - Page 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /be day of April, 2009,l caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Brian E. Elkins 
Attorney at Law 
P.Q. Box "76 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
- U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
- 
Hand Delivered 
- 
Overnight Mail 
J- Telecopy 
-
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY DISTRICT JUDGE WITHOUT CAUSE - Page 2 
DltIA?? F.. ELKLNS, P.C. 
Atlomcy at [,nw 
208 ~ p i c c  Avenue North 
13, 0. Box 766 
Ketchrrrrt, Idaho 83340 
'I'clcphom (208) 726-4338 
Iqnrtsimile (208) 726-9328 
&innil: bmlkin~@cox,nct 
ISR No. 3 150 
Altorncy for I)t?fr!nht 
IN THE DIS'I*NCT COIJRT OF -rm TFTII JunlclnL M S ~ C T  COURT 
OL; TIIE STATE OP UAIIO, IN ANIl FOR '11E GOU??TY OF BLAINE 
S'I'A'lR C)E' IDAHO, 1 
1 Cas~ No. CR-2008-0002607 
Plai~ltia<espondent, 1 
1 OUJECTION TO STATE'S 
v. ) MOTION TO DISQUAI-IFY DISTRICT 
1 JUDGE WIWOUT CAUSE 
TONI M, t,oCLERC!Q, 1 
) 
DcfcndirntlAflllant. ) 
On April 16,2009 coxtrci for the abovc-named DefendanVAppllant rcccivcd, via 
fxsirnila, scrvicc of a Motion lo nisqudifjl District Judge WiUlnuf Cause which miits on Idaho 
Critninal Rule 25 sceking to disqt~alify District Judge Robert Elgce as the presiding judge. The 
Slt~tc's Mation to llisqualify docs not cite 3,C,R, 2S(a)(1), Ilor is it stated in the body ofthe 
motion that the State sccks to disqusli& the district jt~dgo without cause, but thc title or the 
molion so indicirtcs. 'l'hc Statc also served on counscl at thc same time a proposed Order 
Granting Motion for Alternate Judge, calling for tho signsturc of Robe~t J. Elgee, District Judge. 
This ciiuc: lms bccu pcr~ding in the Magistrate's Division md it has colnc before the 
13iutrict Courl pursuanl lo the D c f ~ ~ d a r ~ ~ A p p e l l ~ ~ t ~ s  Notice of Apped. Thus, this mat& is 
013Ji5C'l'lON 'TO YI'A'I'B'S MOTION TO DlSQUA1,IFY DISTRICT JUUGli WI'IZIOUT CAUSE P8gc 1 
prcscntly before the DistGd Court on appeal pursuant ta X.C.R. 54. 
Accordingly, under T.C.R. 25 thc State is not entitled lo 8 disqudification Mhout cause 
utider 1.G.R. 2S(a)(c)Xi). The Rule reds: 
(9) Rxccptionfi, N o t ~ b m d i r y  the above pmvisiom, tfiG right to om (1) 
disqualificaeon without causa s M l  not apply to; (i) ii judge: when nctiq 
in a12 uppellute cw~cip, unless rho appml iS a trial de novo; (Emphsisfs 
ddcd.) 
'l'hc Llistrict Court is "acting in an appellate capacity" and tho Statc can scck to disqualify 
only i i'the a p p l  is hmdIed as a trial dc? novo, At thc present t h e ,  however, anti1 an Ordw on 
Appcal is c~ltcrcd by the Appcllatc Court, thc Sate's motion is without basis and the Appelht 
enters her obicctlon to the Sate's Motion to Diqt~dify Without Gausc. Indeed, it is prettumed, 
initially that the czlsc will be heard an qpellatc procccdillg and it is only aRer fiather ordm 
thal1lic case cotrld possibly bc hmdlod as a trial de novo. IGR 54.6 (a) provides that "~lnless 
otl~crwisc ardcrcd by the rtjstn'ct judge, a tmcript shall bc prcpared as provided ix? Ride 54,7 
and the 111pd slmll bo h c d  as an ttppelfilte proceeding." Only undcr iCR 54.6 (b), as an 
~~tern3its rnefhi>d, could ihc mattcr bc hard as n trial de ~ O V O .  'Illat went has not occurred nor is 
it cxpmtcd. 
Oral aryumcnt is rcqucsted. lhis motion is b a d  upon thc mrtirc record in this matter 
and tho nilcs citd herein. 
DA1'EI) this .!k day af April, 2009. 
I HERERY CERTIFY that on the /k day OF April, 2009, T wused a true and comet 
copy of the roregoing document to be delivered to the folfoMg in the method rnmkcd hcrcin: 
-,. . .. . .. . Maiicd Jim J. 7'hornltr 
Hmd-Del t vered RIzline Cou~lry Ra~cuting Aaomw 
-*?- . .. .- Pnwcd to 788-5554 201 2nd Avcnuo South, Suite 190 
Fwd and mailed IIailcy, ID 83333 
C)BJACTION TO STATE'S MOTION '1'0 DISQUALIFY DlSTRfCT JUDGE WI'I'HOUT CAUSE Page 3 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEROME 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) Case No. CR2008-2607 
PlaintiRiRespondent, 1 
1 ORDER ON APPEAL 
) PROCEDURE PURSUANT TO I.C.R. 54 
TONI M. LECLERCQ, ) 
1 
Defendant/Appellant. 1 
WHEREAS, a Notice of Appeal was filed in the above-entitled case by Brian E. 
Elkins, on behaff of Toni M. LeClercq, on April 16, 2009; and pursuant to I.C.R. 54, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. That the appeal and cross appeal, if any, shall be determined upon the record and 
not as a trial de novo. 
2. That factual issues exist and a transcript of the record is necessary for disposition 
of the appeal. The Appellant shall pay to the Court Reporter the estimated transcript fee 
of TWO HUNDRED DOLLARS ($200.00) within fourteen (14) days from the date of this 
Order. 
3. That appellant's opening brief shall be filed within thirty-five (35) days after the 
transcript has been settled pursuant to I.C.R. 54.15. Should the requirement of a 
transcript be waived pursuant to paragraph 2, appellant's opening brief shall be filed 
within thirty-five (35) days after the entry of such stipulation or Court Order waiving such 
requirement. 
ORDER ON APPEAL PROCEDURE PURSUANT TO ICR 54 - 1 - 
4. That respondent's brief in reply, or upon cross-appeal shall be filed within twenty- 
eight (28) days after the filing of appellant's brief. 
5. That appellant's rebuttal brief shall be filed within twenty-one (21) days after 
respondent's reply brief. 
6. That, within thirty (30) days after the filing of all briefs the matter shall either be 
submitted to the Court for decision upon written stipulation or shall be brought on for 
hearing by either party at a regular law and motion day and in the same manner as a 
motion made pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b). &G( d A * 71, d k 4  @L 
7. That failure to comply with any of the terms of this Order, or any additional 
requirements of I.C.R. 54, shall constitute grounds for automatic dismissal of the appeal 
pursuant to I.C.R. 54.1 3. 
8. The Clerk of the District Court shall serve copies of this Order upon all parties or 
their attorneys and upon the trial court transcriber. 
DATED this ( day of April, 2009. 
Robert J. ~ lgee ,  bistrict Judge 
ORDER ON APPEAL PROCEDURE PURSUANT TO ICR 54 - 2 - 
Certificate of Service 
True and correct copies of the foregoing Order on Appeal Procedure Pursuant to 
I.C.R. 54 were served as noted below: 
Angela Nelson 
Blaine County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney hand delivered-courthouse mail box 
Brian E. Elkins 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 766 
Ketchurn ID 83340 
Susan Israel 
Court Reporter 
regular mail 
hand delivered-courthouse mail box 
Dated this & day of April, 2009. 
A ,, 
Deputy Clerk Y 
ORDER ON APPEAL PROCEDURE PURSUANT TO ICR 54 - 3 - 
Date: 51412009 Fifth Judicial District Caurt - Blaine County User: PAGE 
Time: 09: 18 AM Minutes Report 
Page 1 of 1 Case: CR-200&0002607 
Defendant: Leclercq, Toni M 
Selected Items 
Hearing type: Motion to Disqualify Judge Wlout Cause Minutes date: 05/04/2009 
Assigned judge: Robert J. Elgee 
Court reporter: Susan Israel 
Minutes clerk: Paige Trautwein 
Prosecutor: Matthew E Fredback 
Defense attorney: Brian E. Efkins 
Start time: 09: 19 AM 
End time: 09:20 AM 
Audio tape number. D l  77 
Tape Counter. 919 This cause came regularly before the Court this day for a Motion to Disqualify District 
Court Judge Without Cause. Present was Matthew Fredback for the State. 
Tape Counter: 920 
The Court introduced this matter. 
The State withdrew their Motion to DisqualifL; So Ordered. 
adjourn 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, I Case No. CR-08-2607 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
TONI M. LECLERCQ, 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
FOR ALTERNATE J DGE 
CN\WWNY 
Defendant. 
The Court, having considered the State's Motion to Disqualify the District Judge 
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 25 hereby enters this order granting the State's Motion 
for Disqualification and for Appointment of an Alternate Judge and requests that the 
Administrative Judge of the Fifth Judicial District appoint an alternate judge to oversee 
all district court proceedings in the above referenced case. 
DATED this day of April, 2009. 
Robert J. Elgee 
District Judge 
ORD R GRANTING MOTION FOR ALTERNATE JUDGE - PAGE 1 
I W \ ~ N J  
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE , 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of& 2009, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document by the method 
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Blaine County Prosecuting - U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF T m  FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAIIO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE: OF IDAHO, 1 
1 Case No. CR-2008-0002607 
PlaintiffRespondent, 1 
) 
v. 1 ORDER DIZNWNG STATE'S 
1 MOTION TO DISQUALIFY DISTRICT 
TONI M. LeCLERCQ 1 JUDGE WITHOUT CAUSE 
1 
Defendanb'Appellant. ) 
The record in this matter reflects that on the 1 6 ~  day of April, 2009 a Notice of Appeal 
was filed by the DefendantlAppellant appealing the magistrate's denial of the Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress. On that same day, the State filed a Motion to Disqualifl District Judge 
Without Cause whereupon the Defendant objected to the State's motion. On April 17,2009, the 
District Court, in its appellate capacity, filed its Order on Appeal Procedure Pursuant to I.C.R. 54 
specrfying, inter alia, that the appeal will be determined on the record and not as a trial de nova. 
The Defendant's objection to State's Motion to Disqualify Distfict Judge Without Cause 
was set for hearing for the 4~ day of May, 2009 at 10:OU a.m. Prior to the hearing counsel for the 
Defendant informed the Court in correspondence dated May 4,2009 that he had been advised 
that the State intended to withdraw the motion for disqualification, apparently conceding that the 
ORDER DENYING STATE'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY DISTRICT JUDGE WITHOUT CAUSE Page 1 
Defendant's motion was valid. Blaine County Deputy Prosecutor M a a e w  Fredback also 
informed the Court, without Mr. Elkins present, that the State was conceding the Defendant's 
Based upon the foregoing, the State's Motion to DisqdifL District Judge 'Without Cause, 
filed April 15,2009, shall be withdrawn and said motion shall be deemed denied. 
DATED this 1 day of May, 2009. 
Disb5ct Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 Case No. CR-2008-0002607 
PlaintifE/Respondent, 1 
1 
v. 1 
1 
TONI M. LeCLERCQ, 1 
1 
DefendantlAppellant . 1 
Brian E. Elkins 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0 .  Box 766 
Ketchm, ID 83340 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the Magistrate Court of the 
Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Blaine 
HONORABLE R. TED ISRAEL 
Magistrate Judge 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
Jim J. Thomas 
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney 
20 1 2nd Avenue S., Suite 100 
Hailey, ID 83333 
Attorney for PlaintifURespondent 
I. STA TEMENCT OF THE CASE. 
This is a DUI case and the primary issue is whether a police officer can threaten a forcible 
blood draw during the implied consent proceeding when the arresting officer has chosen a breath 
test for blood alcohol concentration ("BAC") testing under the statute. 
B. THE COURSE OF 1T%IE PROCEEDINGS IN THE T ' L  COURT 
RND 17TS DISPOSRION. 
The DefendantlAppellant ("'LeClercq") was issued a Uniform Citation by Idaho State 
Police Officer Travis DeBie for driving while under the influence of alcohol ("DUI") on 
September 13,2008, LeClercq filed an Amended Motion In Limine andlor Motion to Suppress 
dated November 19,2008 setting forth the basis for the primary issue on appeal: 
The Defendant also seeks suppression andlor an order in timine preventing 
the State's use of the Defendant's breath test results based upon the officer's 
threats to the Defendant that if she refused to submit to a breath test, she 
would be taken to a hospital where blood would be drawn. Those threats 
made by the arresting officer were made during the time of the application of 
Idaho's Implied Consent Statute, Idaho Code $ 5  18-8002 and 18-8002A and 
there does not exist a statutory authorization to make such threats before a 
suspected driver either agrees to take the breath test or refuses. The actions 
by the arresting officer amounted to not only a violation of Idaho's Implied 
Consent law, but also unlawfblly coerced the Defendant to submit to the 
breath test when she could have refused. 
This motion is based upon not only the violation of the statutory rights under 
Idaho's Implied Consent law, but also the due process and equal protection 
clauses of the United States and Idaho constitutions. 
See, LeClercq's Amended Motion In Limine and/or Motion to Suppress dated November 12, 
2008, p. 2. 
APPELLANT' S BRIEF - & 
An evidentiary bearing was held on December 3,2008 befbre The Honorable R. Ted 
Israel, Blaine County Magistrate Judge, and a transcript of the hearing has been prepared and 
filed with the Court. A briefing schedule was organized by the Magistrate and on January 14, 
2009 the Magiskate filed its Memorandum Decision and Order denying LeClercq7s motion. 
A Rule 11 Agreement was entered into whereby LeClercq entered a conditional guilty 
plea, reserving the right to appeal the Magistrate's Memorandum Decision filed January 14, 
2009. The Magistrate entered an Order Withholding Judgment filed March 9,2009 and the 
execution of the sentence was stayed pending appeal. 
LeClercq timely filed her Notice of Appeal bringing the matter before this Court. 
Once this matter came before the District Court, the State filed a Motion to Disqualifl 
District Judge Without Cause and LeClercq filed an objection whereupon an Order Denying 
State's Motion to Disqualifl District Judge Without Cause was filed on May 7,2009. 
C. STATEMENT OF 2"WL FACTS. 
On September 13, 2008, ISP Officer Travis DeBie was on special enforcement in Blaine 
County, Idaho when, at 1 1 : 18 p.m., Officer DeBie was traveling southbound on Highway 75 and 
made a visual estimate on a vehicle traveling northbound that the vehicle was speeding.' Officer 
DeBie was on duty driving a marked patrol unit with overhead  light^.^ The police officer 
checked the speed with radar at 63 mph in a 55 mph zone.3 The officer effected a stop by 
activating his overheads and LeClercq responded by pulling over and stopping her vehicle in the 
vicinity of milepost 123 on Highway 75: The officer made contact with LeClercq where he 
noted the odor of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, slurred speech and observations that suggested that 
LeClercq did not know how to roll d o m  the passenger window of her vehicle.' 
ISee, Transcript, Appeal from Magistrate Division, December 3,2008 (hereinafter referred 
to as "Tr."), p. 8, Ls.1-3, Ls. 14-17; p. 8, Ls.1-8. 
2~r . ,"p. l l ,  Ls. 2-12; p. 12, Ls. 2-3, 14-15. 
3Tr.,p. 12, Ls. 14-15; p. 13, Ls. 16-17. 
=Tr., p. 20, Ls. 13-1 7. 
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LeClercq appropriately produced her driver's license, proof of insurance and registration" 
Officer DeBie then asked LeClercq for the keys to her vehicle and Officer DeBie returned to his 
patrol car to run a license check. 
When asked, LeClercq admitted to drinlcing some wine but "not that much" and she was 
asked to submit to roadside tests. Based upon her pedormance of those tests, she was taken into 
custody, handcuffed and placed in DeBie's patrol car.7 Officer DeBie's patrol car was equipped 
with a mobile Alco Sensor 111 breath testing device8. Officer DeBie then started proceedings 
under Idaho's implied consent law with the reading of the Notice of Suspension Form which was 
admitted as Defendant's Exhibit 6.9 
While the officer was reading the Notice of Suspension Form and at various times 
throughout the 15-minute waiting period, LeClercq asked whether she could refuse to submit to 
the breath test. 
On State's Exhibit 1, the DVD recording of this incident, Officer DeBie informed 
LeClercq, a number of times, that if she did not take the breath test she would be taken to the 
hospital and her blood would be forcibly drawn. For example, Officer DeBie told LeClercq that 
if she r e b e d  "we can take you to the hospital and forcibly draw bl~od." '~  About six minutes 
later Officer DeBie informed LeClercq that "you can say no [to the breath test] but I'll take you 
to the hospital to draw blood. It will be a refksal and you will lose your license for one year."" 
It came as no surprise that LeClercq ultimately agreed to submit to the breath test and her 
results were over the legal limit. 
'jTr., p. 17, Ls. 14-16; p. 18, Ls. 5-15. 
'Tr., p. 27, Ls. 19-23. 
'Tr., p. 27, Ls. 24-25; p. 28, Ls. 1-6. 
9Tr., p. 28, Ls. 6-21. 
losee, State's Exhibit 1, Media Player Timer at 26:50. 
''See, State's Exhibit 1, Media Player Timer at 32:20. 
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II. A RCUMEm. 
LeCLERCQ'S B M C  mSULTS SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BASED UPON THE 
POLICE OFFICER 'S COERCIVE THREAT TO FORCIBLY D M  W BLOOD DURNG 
THE IMPLIED CONSEfl  STAGE OF THE INVESTIGATION. 
This argument is based upon the theory that Idaho's implied consent laws, found in Idaho 
Code $5 18-8002 and 18-8002A do not include an advisory that if a driver refuses to submit to a 
breath test - or even if the driver has questions about the consequences of refusing to submit to a 
breath test - the police officer is not permitted to make a threat that blood will be forcibly drawn. 
It may be permissible that the police can seek to draw blood, based upon sufficient legal cause 
after the implied consent proceedings have been satisfied, but not during the implied consent 
phase. That bracket of time is controlled by Idaho Code $5  18-8002 and 18-8002A. Idaho Code 
5 18-8002(1) provides: 
Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this 
state shall be deemed to have given his consent to evidentiary testing for 
concentration of alcohol as defined in 5 18-8004, Idaho Code, and to have given 
his consent to evidentiary testing for the presence of drugs or other intoxicating 
substances, provided that such testing is administered at the request of a peace 
officer having reasonable grounds to believe that person has been driving or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of the provisions of 5 18- 
8004, Idaho Code or 5 18-8006, Idaho Code. 
The information that is required to be given to a driver during the implied consent phase 
is set forth in Idaho Code 5 18-8002(3). That provision reads: 
At the time evidentiary testing for concentration of alcohol, or for the presence of 
drugs or other intoxicating substances is requested, the person shall be informed 
that if he refuses to submit to or fails to complete, evidentiary testing: 
(a) He is subject to a civil penalty of two hundred fiEty dollars ($250) for 
r eb ing  to take the test; 
(b) His driver's license will be seized by the peace officer and a temporary 
permit will be issued; provided, however, that no peace officer shall issue a 
temporary permit pursuant to this section to a driver whose driver's license or 
permit has already been and is suspended or revoked because of previous 
violations, and in no instance shall a temporary permit be issued to a driver of a 
commercial vehicle who refuses to submit to or fails to complete an evidentiary 
test; 
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(c) He has the right to request a hearing within seven (7) days to show cause 
why he refused to submit to, or complete evidentiary testing; 
(d) If he does not request a hearing or does not prevail at the hearing, the court 
shall sustain the civil penalty and his driver's license will be suspended absolutely 
for one year if this is his first refusal and two (2) years if this is his second refusal 
within ten (1 0) years; and 
(e) After submitting to evidentiary iesting he may, when practicable, at his own 
expense, have additional tests made by a person of his own choosing. 
Similar provisions are set forth in Idaho Code 5 18-8002A, with additional advisories on 
the consequences of taking an alcohol concentration test, and failing it, but neither statute 
contains language that allows a police office to threaten a suspect with a forced blood draw 
during the implied consent proceeding when a breath test is requested. 
It is clear that the officer has the choice as to what type of test will be given. See, Matter 
of Grtflths, 113 Idaho 364, 744 P.2d 92 (1987) ("Therefore, we hold that the choice as to which 
type of evidentiary test for concentration of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances will 
be requested rest with the police officer, not the defendant." Id. at 113 Idaho 170.) It is also clear 
that Idaho law requires strict adherence of the statutory language of Idaho's implied consent 
statute and the Idaho "Supreme Court has emphatically discountenanced interjection of judicial 
gloss" and the "clear terms of the statute" must be followed. See, Matter of Beern, 1 19 Idaho 
289,895 P.2d 495 (Ct. App. 1991). As so well put by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Matter of 
Virgil, 126 Idaho 946, 985 P.2d 182 (Ct. App. 1995) (pet. rev. denied 1995): 
Idaho law requires strict adherence to the statutory language of I. C. 5 18-8002(3). 
This Court has previously held that the information required by I. C. 5 18-8002 is 
set forth "in no uncertain terms," Beern, 119 Idaho at 291, 805 P.2d at 497, and 
that our supreme court has "emphatically discountenanced interjection of judicial 
gloss upon the legislature's license suspension scheme." Id. at 292, 805 P.2d at 
498. 
Matter of Virgil, 126 Idaho a<947. 
Thus, when LeClercq was questioning her rights concerning the consequences of refusing 
to submit to a breath test are clearly stated in paragraph 4 of the Notice of Suspension, 
Defendant's Exhibit 6, and even if a driver is equivocating on whether or not to take a breath test, 
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it is hproper under Idaho law for a court to allow a police officer to then threaten the suspect 
with a forcible blood draw if they refuse to submit to a breath test. Otherwise, a driver's implied 
consent to submit to evidentiary testing is not properly based upon what the statute requires. 
Quite simply, Idaho Code $5 18-8002 and 18-8002A do not provide the statutory authority to 
pass along such information. It is LeClercq's belief that, if a police officer does that, then the 
breath test is obtained in violation of the statute, the suspect's due process rights, and is obtained 
through coercion. It is only under Idaho Code 18-8002(10) that if a person submits to a breath 
test he may also be requested to submit to a second evidentiary test for blood or urine but only 
upon the satisfaction of certain conditions met by the police officer; i.e., the peace officer must 
have reasonable cause to believe that the person was DUI for a drug or intoxicating substance, or 
combination thereof, with alcohol and the peace officer must state those facts in his report upon 
which that belief is based. That exception does not apply to LeClercq's case. 
This issue being raised by LeClercq is different than the situation that was analyzed in 
State v. Dim, 144 Idaho 300, 160 P.3d 739 (2007, reh 'g denied) where although Diaz initially 
refused to submit to a breath test, the police officer told him that if he continued to r e h e  he 
would be taken to the hospital for a blood draw. Diaz continued to refuse to submit to the breath 
test whereupon he was taken to the hospital for a blood draw. In LeClercq's situation, she did 
not refuse to submit to a breath test: she took it. LeClercq was only asking DeBie during the 
NOS advisory information about her understanding that a person could refuse to submit to a 
breath test. Diaz did not raise the precise issue being raised by LeClercq. 
In response to those questions, even before DeBie started reading the NOS Form, 
LeClercq made a statement, in the form of a question, wondering whether a person could say no 
to a breath test.I2 At 25: 14 DeBie finished reading the NOS Form and at 26:35 DeBie states that 
it has been five minutes and we need to wait another ten minutes. At 26:49 the Defendant states: 
"I thought people could refuse?'At 26:53 DeBie states: "You can refuse but I would take you to 
the hospital and we would do aforced blood draw." At 26:56 DeBie states: "Idaho State Law we 
can forcibly take your blood if you do not submit a sample." Then at 32:20, before the expiration 
12See, timer on media player at 21:OO. 
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of the 15-minute waiting period, LeClercq once again states: "1 thought you could say no I'm not 
taking it?" DeBie responds with: "You know what, you can say no but we will take you to the 
hospital and we will take blood from you." At 32:25 DeBie states: 'But yeah, you can say no but 
it's counted as a refusal and your license will be suspended for a year - that's your decision." At 
37:40 LeClercq submits to the breath test. 
It does not appear that Idaho has addressed who bears the burden of proving, and to what 
degree, a contention that a driver's implied consent became involuntary based upon the 
information conveyed by a police officer. InErdman v. State of Texas, 86 1 S. W.2d 890 
(Tex.Cr.App. 1993) (reh 'g denied) a concurring judge wrote that: "In cases where the defendant 
contends his consent to take the intoxilyzer was involuntary, the state bears the burden of 
proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the consent was voluntary." Id. 861 S.W.2d 895. 
In a recent Idaho case that examined the voluntariness of a consent to search a residence, some 
general guidelines cited in that case may be helpful. See, State v. Ballou, 145 Idaho 840, 186 
P.3d 696 (Ct. App. 2008). In Ballou, the Idaho Court of Appeals found that the state has the 
burden of demonstrating consent by a preponderance of the evidence for the search of a 
residence. Id. The state must show that the consent was not the result of duress or coercion, 
either direct or implied. Id. The voluntariness of an individual's consent is evaluated in light of 
all the circumstances. Id. Whether consent was granted voluntarily, or was the product of 
coercion, is a question of fact to be determined by all of the surrounding circumstances. Id. 
An argument similar to LeClercq's was analyzed by the Colorado Supreme Court in 
Turbyne v. State of Colorado, 1 5 1 P.3d 563 (2007) (reh 'g denied). The Colorado statute is a 
little different, not only in name where it is called an express consent law,I3 but the driver has the 
choice of either a breath test or a blood draw. In Colorado, if a blood test is requested by the 
driver, a blood sample must be obtained within two hours. 
In Turbyne, the driver requested a blood draw but due to the unavailability of a 
phlebotomist and weather conditions, the arresting officer was informed by dispatch that they 
would not be able to provide a blood draw within two hours. So the police officer requested that 
13Colorado had previously referred to it as an implied consent law. 
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Turbyne submit to a breath test: Turbyne continued to insist on a blood test. The mesting officer 
repeated that Turbyne could take a breath test but Turbyne refused. When the officer told 
Turbyne that he could lose his license if he did not submit to a breath test, Turbyne agreed to take 
the breath test. 
Twbyne filed a motion with the county court to suppress the results of the breath test and 
also argued at the motor vehicle license revocation hearing that the revocation proceeding should 
be dismissed because the police officer did not have good cause for not complying with 
Turbyne's selection of the blood test. The hearing officer agreed and dismissed the revocation 
proceeding. 
At the trial court, Turbyne also requested at the evidentiary hearing for a dismissal of the 
charges which the county court agreed to do for the same reason that the hearing officer had 
dismissed because the police officer lacked sufficient cause for not complying with Turbyne's 
selection of a blood test. On appeal before the Colorado Supreme Court, they reversed the order 
of dismissal but agreed that the breath test results should be suppressed "because they resulted 
from an invalid consent to search, due to the arresting officer's erroneous and coercive advice to 
Turbyne that he could lose his license by not submitting to a chemical test he had not selected." 
The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed a number of casesI4 which held that a trial court 
may dismiss a case in appropriate situations where a police officer failed to comply with the 
express consent law. The Colorado Supreme Court, however, recognized that sanctions must be 
tailored to remedy improper police conduct which may include not only a dismissal but also 
suppression of evidence and other  circumstance^.'^ 
As stated by the Turbyne court, "A valid consent to search must be voluntary rather than 
the result of intimidation, coercion, or deception." [Citations omitted.] "The court must first 
determine whether there is 'objective evidence of coercion, duress, deception, promises, threats, 
14People v. GiIIette, 629 P.2d 613 (1981) and Riley v. People, 104 P.3d 218 (2004). 
15See, Dike v. People, 30 P.3d 197 (2001) (stating that a driver is not permitted to change his 
or her initial election of a chemical test) and People v. Shinault, 940 P.2d 380 (1997). 
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intrusive conduct or other undue influence by the police, which critically impaired the 
defendant's judgment.' " (Citations omitted.) 
Another case, more on point, was decided in 1993 by the Court of Criminal Appeals of 
Texas En Banc, entitled fidman v. State ofTexas, 861 S.W.2d 890. Erdman was arrested for 
DWI and filed a motion to suppress the results of a breath test which was denied by the hid 
court. Erdmm pled guilty but reserved the right to appeal the suppression question which first 
went through the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court but then, en banc, the panel 
granted Erdrnan's petition for discretionary review and reversed. 
After being arrested for DWI, Erdman was advised of the Texas implied consent law.16 
However, in addition to that the trooper went beyond the bounds of the Texas implied consent 
statute and also told Erdman that if he failed the test he would be charged with a DWI but also 
"warned" appellant that if he refused to take the test, then (1) evidence of his r e h a 1  would be 
admissible against him in a subsequent prosecution, (2) his driver's license would be suspended 
for 90 days, (3) D.W.I. charges would be filed against him and (4) he would be placed in jail that 
night. 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress before the trial court, defense counsel argued 
that Erdrnan's consent to the intoxilyzer test was involuntary because it was psychologically 
coerced. The state countered that the defendant made the decision to take the breath test without 
coercion from the police and the police officer simply stated the facts. In the trial court's ruling 
on the suppression motion it stated, "I do not think that [the trooper's warning] was coercive in 
nature. I think that [it] was explanatory and reasonably accurate in light of the situation here . . . 
. I will not suppress the breath test." 
Erdman's argument to the en banc Criminal Court of Appeals was that the Texas implied 
consent statute as punishment for refusing, only provided that a motorist's driver's license would 
be suspended for 90 days and that his refusal could be admitted into evidence if subsequently 
prosecuted. The appellant also argued that the statue "implicitly prohibits peace officers from 
16Texas revised civil statutes, Article 6107 1-5, 5 2 . 
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'threaten[ing] motorists with sanctions . . . not permitted by the statute,' " and that the trooper's 
misstatement of the direct consequences of refusing rendered Erhan ' s  previously given implied 
consent, as being involmtary. 
Here is some pertinent language from the Erdman decision: 
. . . A suspect's decision to submit to a breath test must truly be her own, made 
freely and with a correct understanding of the actual statutory consequences 
of refusal. To be '"voluntary" and thus consistent with the statutory scheme, 
a suspect's decision to submit must not be the result of physical or 
psychological pressures brought to bear by law enforcement officials. Forte 
v. State, 759 S.W.2d 128, 138 (Tex.Cr.App. 1988) (consent to breath test 
i n v o l m w  if induced by physical force); Hall v. State, 649 S.W.2d 627,628 
(Tex.Gr.App. 1983) (consent to breath test involuntarily if induced by 
misstatement of direct statutory consequences arising from refusal). If law 
enforcement officials were permitted to "warn" D.W.I. suspects-even 
correctly-that a refusal to submit would result in consequences not 
contemplated by Article 6701 1-5, § 2, then suspects could easily be coerced 
into submission, and the protection afforded by this statutory section would be 
undermined. 
Here, appellant consented to the intoxilyzer test only after the trooper gave 
him warnings, both contemplated and not contemplated by Article 6701 1-5, 
concerning the consequences of refusal. The non-statutory information 
conveyed to appellant (that he would be jailed and charged with D.W.I.) was 
of the type that would normally result in considerable psychological pressure 
upon a D.W.I. suspect to consent to the taking of a breath sample. Given the 
complete absence of any record evidence showing that this non-statutory 
information given to appellant had no bearing on his decision to consent, no 
rational factfinder could conclude that the State carried its burden of showing 
that appellant's consent was voluntary. Thus, appellant's consent to the 
intoxilyzer test was obtained in violation of Article 6701 1-5, 5 2, and, 
therefore, the test results were inadmissible under Article 38.23. The trial 
court abused its discretion in refusing to suppress those test results. 
* * * 
We are holding only that law enforcement officials must take care to warn 
D.W.I. suspects correctly about the actual, direct, statutory consequences of 
refusal. Any other information conveyed to D.W.I. suspects may have the 
effect-either intended or unintended, of undermining their resolve and 
effectively coercing them to consent. 
Id,  861 S.W.2d at 893-894. 
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Although DeBie's statements to LeClercq that he would take LeClercq to the hospital and 
forcibly draw blood were not accompanied with physical violence or verbal harassment, that 
level is not required for the Court to find that LeClercq was coerced through deception and 
intimidation. However, as highlighted by DeBie's statements, noted above, and with the 
incorrect statement that if she refused she would lose her driving privileges for one year,'7 and 
" she agreed to submit to the test. 
Under Diaz, the State is not permitted to conduct a blood draw unless that is the BAC test 
£irst chosen by the police officer, or, the suspect refuses to submit to a breath test. At that point, 
then, the implied consent proceedings are done and then the police can go about obtaining a 
blood draw. The important distinction to note between LeClercq's case and Diaz is that the 
police officer in Diaz did not make the threat to go to a hospital to draw blood until after Diaz 
refused to submit to the test. LeClercq agreed to take the breath test through coercion. Diaz was 
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and exigent circumstances as an exception to a warrant to 
seize blood. The issue in LeClercq is what other information can be conveyed to a driver during 
the implied consent phase of a case. The precise issue being asserted by LeClercq is different 
that the issues that were asserted by the defendant in Diaz. IR 
17DeBie's statement that LeClercq would lose her license for one yearwas absolute and was 
not conditioned, as required by the statute, that she was nevertheless entitled to a show cause hearing 
to show cause why she may have refused to submit to the test which, in this case, LeClercq would 
have won the BAC refusal hearing since she had a Washington driver's license. See, In the Matter 
of Green, Blaine County Case No. CV-08- 160 (this Court's ruling that the NOS Form is ambiguous 
for out-of-state licensed drivers.) 
181n Diaz, the Idaho Supreme Court framed the issues as "(1) whether an involuntary blood 
draw violates federal or state constitutional protections in cases where no death or serious bodily 
injury is involved, and (2) whether Idaho Code 5 18-8002(6)(b) prohibits involuntary BAC testing 
in cases where no death or serious bodily injury is involved." 
111 C O K L  &'Sf ON. 
Based upon the foregoing, LeClercq submits that the Magistrate's Memorandum Decision 
and Order should be reversed and that LeGlercq's breath test results be suppressed based upon 
the officer's erroneous and coercive misstatements of Idaho's concent law. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s 8  day of July, 2009. 
BRIAN E. ELKINS 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of July, 2009, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be delivered to the following in the method marked herein: 
L-" Mailed Jim J. Thomas 
Hand-Delivered Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney 
Faxed to 788-5554 20 1 2"d Avenue S., Ste. 100 
Faxed and mailed Hailey, ID 83333 
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Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney 
20 1 2nd Ave. S., S L & ~  100 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
Telephone: (208) 788-5545 
Fax: (208) 788-5554 
IN TWE: DISTRICT COURT OF THl2 FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANTI FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, Case No. CR-08-0002607 
Plaintiff/ 
Respondent, 1 
VS. 
TONI M. LECLERCQ 
Defendant' > 
Appellant. 
RF3PONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the Magistrate Court of the 
Fiflh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
In and for the County the Blaine 
HONORABLE R. TED I S W L  
Magistrate Judge 
Jim Thomas 
Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney 
20 1 2nd Ave. South, Suite 100 
Hailey, ID 83333 
(208) 788-5545 
Attorney for PlaintifURespondent 
Brian E. Elkins 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 766 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
(208) 726-4338 
Attorney for DefendantRespondent 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE. OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................ 2 
............................................................ I . STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
.......................................................... A . NATURiZOF CASE 3 
B . COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW ....................................... 3 
C . STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ................................................. 4 
D . STANDARD OF REVIEW ....................................................... 5 
A . DEFENDANT W NO LEGAL RIGHT TO REFUSE 
EVIDENTIARY TESTING. AND TROOPER DeBIE'S STATEMENTS 
THAT IF SHE REiFUSED HE WOULD SEEK A BLOOD DRAW. 
DOES NOT AMOUNT TO COERCION OR A THREAT. AND 
THEREFOREi THE DEFWANT'S BREATH-ALCOHOL SAMPLES 
............................................. SHOULD NOT BE SUPPRESSED 5 
TABLE OF AUTHORTTIES 
State Cases 
. Erdman v . State. 86 1 S W.2d 890 (Tx . Cr . App 1993) ......................................... 11 
. . State v . Abeyta. 13 1 Idaho 704. 963 P.2d 387 (Ct App 1998) ............................... 10 
. . State v . Ballou. 145 Idaho 840. 186 P.3d 696 (Ct App 2008) ................................ 10 
. . . ............................ State v DeWjtt. 145 Idaho 709. 184 P.3d 215 (Ct App 2008) 6. 7.8 
. ................................................ State v Diaz. 144 Idaho 300. 160 P.3d 73 (2007) 9 
. . ..................... State v . Hawkins. 13 1 Idaho 396.400. 958 P.2d 22. 26 (Ct App 1998) 5 
. . State v . Nickerson. 132 Idaho 406. 973 P.2d 758 (Ct App 1999) .................... .5.7.8. 9 
State v . WooEery. 1 16 Idaho 368. 775 P.2d 121 0 (1 989) ....................................... 7,8 
Turbyne v . State of Colorado. 1 5 1 P.3 d 5 63 (2007) ............................................ 11 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF . 2 
State Statutes and Rules 
............................................................................ Idaho Code (j 18-8002.. 6 8  
Idaho Code (j 18-8002(1). ............................................................................. 6 
.......................................................................... I&o Code 5 18-8002(3). -7 
Idaho Code (j 1 8-8002(9). .......................................................................... -6 
Idaho Code 18-8002A ............................................................................. -6 
Colo. Rev. Stat. 5 (j 42-4- 130 1.1 (I), (2)(a)(I)(2006). ............................................ 1 1 
Constitutional Authoritv 
........................................ Fourth Amendment to United States Constitution.. 5,7,9 
Other Sources 
...................................... Black's Law Dictionm, 206 (Abridged 7' ed., 2000). 9,10 
I. STATEMENT OF 'IXE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal fiom a criminal case where the DefendantlAppellant, Toni 
LeClercq, is appealing the Magistrate Court's ruling denying the Defendant's Motion in 
LimineMotion to Suppress. Specifically, Defendant argues the Magistrate Court erred in 
ruling that after an arrest of a suspect for DUI, and upon questioning by the Defendant 
regarding refusal of a breath alcohol test, that an officer may inform the Defendant that he 
intends to seek a blood draw. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On or about September 14, 2008, the Defendant ("LeClercq") was charged with 
Driving Under the Influence. The Defendant filed an Amended Motion in Limine andlor 
Motion to Suppress on November 19, 2008, arguing that the Idaho State Police Officer 
Travis DeBie violated Defendant's statutory rights, due process rights, and equal 
protection clauses of the United States and Idaho Constitution by telling the Defendant if 
she refused a breath test, then Trooper DeBie would seek a blood draw. 
The matter was set for an evidentiary hearing on December 3,2008, before Blaine 
County Magistrate Judge Israel. Thereafter, briefs were submitted by both parties, and on 
January 14, 2009, the Judge Israel issued a Memorandum Decision and Order denying 
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Defenht"  motion, 
B e f e n b t  then entered into a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal 
the decision denying her Motion in LimineMotion to Suppress. Execution of the 
sentence was stayed pending appeal. 
Defendant then filed the instant appeal. 
C. S T A E W N T  OF FACTS 
On September 13,2008, Idaho State Police Trooper Travis DeBie @eBie) was on 
patrol duty in Blaine County. At 1 1 : 18 p.m., DeBie was traveling southbound on State 
Highway 75 when he observed a speeding vehicle. He then turned his patrol vehicle 
around, heading northbound on Highway 75, and followed that vehicle. Trooper DeBie 
activated his overhead lights and the vehicle did not immediately pull over. He observed 
the vehicle cross over the double yellow centerline and when Trooper DeBie activated his 
siren, the vehicle finally pulled over. 
Trooper DeBie then exited his patrol vehicle and approached the passenger 
window. Oddly, the sole occupant didn't initially appear to notice DeBie, who had just 
pulled her over. He tapped on the window to get her attention. DeBie testified that the 
driver seemed disoriented and b b l e d  around trying to roll down the passenger window. 
Unable to do so, she opened the passenger door and DeBie smelled a strong odor of 
alcohol coming from inside the vehicle. Trooper DeBie identified the driver as the 
Defendant and observed her eyes to be glassy and bloodshot and her speech was slurred. 
DeBie asked the Defendant whether she had drank anything that night, and she responded 
"not much, I don't drink that much." At that point, while the vehicle was still running, 
DeBie asked for the Defendant's car keys to prevent her from leaving the scene and she 
complied. He then had her exit the vehicle and submit to field sobriety tests. 
Trooper DeBie continued to smell alcohol coming from the Defendant as she 
performed the field sobriety tests. The Defendant failed the HGN test and the one-leg 
stand test. Defendant did not perform the walk and turn test because she reported a leg 
injury that could have interfered with the test. She was then arrested for a DUI. 
Trooper DeBie escorted the Defendant to his patrol vehicle which was equipped 
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with a mobile Alco Sensor III breath testing i n s m e n t .  He began the fifteen minute 
obsewahon period. During this time the D e f e n b t  asked three times about her ability to 
refuse the test. The first time, Trooper DeBie asked the Defendant to wait until she had 
listened to the advisory form. The second time, he responded "you can refuse, but I 
would take you to the hospital and we would do a forced blood draw." The third time the 
Defendant asked about refusing, Trooper DeBie again advised the Defendant that if she 
did not submit to a breath test, he would a e  her to the hospital for a blood draw, she 
would receive a refusal and her license would be suspended for one year. He also told her 
that it was her decision. The Defendant then submitted to a breath test, where her blood 
alcohol content was recorded as .14. 
D. S T M m O F R E V E W  
On review of a decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence, the Court 
employs a spilt standard of review. The Court will defer to the trial court's findings of 
fact unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Hawkins, 13 1 Idaho 396,400,958 P.2d 22, 
26 (Ct. App. 1998). However, the Court exercises fiee review over the application of 
constitutional skndards to those facts. Id. @ 
II. ARGUMENT 
I. THE DEFENDANT HA.D NO LEGAL, RIGHT TO REFUSE EVIDENTIARY 
TESTING, AND TROOPER DeBE'S STATEMENTS INFORMING THE 
DEFENDANT THAT IF SHE REFUSED HE WOULD SEEK A BLOOD 
DRAW, DOES NOT AMOUNT TO COERCION OR A THREAT, AND 
THEREFORE THE DEFENDANT'S BREATH-ALCOHOL SAMPLES 
SHOULD NOT BE SUPPRESSED. 
"The administration of an alcohol concentration test is a seizure of the person and 
a search for evidence within the purview of the Fourth ~mendmgnt o the United States 
Constitution. When a warrantless search or seizure is challenged by the defendant, the 
State bears the burden to show that a recognized exception to the warrant requirement is 
applicable. Such an exception exists when the search or seizure is conducted with proper 
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consent." (internal citations omitted) State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 973 P.2d 758 
(Ct. App. 1999). See also, State v. De Witt, 145 Idaho 709, 184 P.3d 215 (Ct. App. 2008). 
Under Idaho's Implied Consent Statute, 1.C. 5 18-8002(1), anyone driving on 
Idaho roads is deemed to have impliedly consented to evidentiary testing for the presence 
of alcohol or drugs when a police officer has reasonable cause to believe the person was 
driving under the influence. In other words, "ply virtue of this statute, 'anyone who 
accepts the privilege of operating a motor vehicle upon Idaho's highways has consented in 
advance to submit to a BAC test.' " Implied consent to evidentiary testing is not limited 
to a breathalyzer test, but may also include testing the suspect's blood or urine. I.C. 5 18- 
8002(9). The evidentiary test to be employed is of the officer's choosing." (internal 
citations omitted) State v. De Witt, 145 Idaho at 7 12- 13. 
I.C. 5 18-8002, also provides the information to be told to the driver at the 
time of evidentiary testing. It reads: 
(3) At the time evidentiary testing for concentration of alcohol, or for the 
presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances is requested, the person shall be 
informed that if he refuses to submit to or if he fails to complete, evidentiary testing: 
(a) He is subject to a civil penalty of two hundred fifty dollars ($250) for refusing 
to take the test; 
(b) His driver's license will be seized by the peace officer and a temporary permit 
will be issued; provided, however, that no peace officer shall issue a temporary permit 
pursuant to this section to a driver whose driver's license or permit has already been and 
is suspended or revoked because of previous violations, and in no instance shall a 
temporary permit be issued to a driver of a commercial vehicle who refuses to submit to 
or fails to complete an evidentiary test; 
(c) He has the right to request a hearing within seven (7) days to show cause why 
he refused to submit to, or complete evidentiary testing; 
(d) If he does not request a hearing or does not prevail at the hearing, the court 
shall sustain the civil penalty and his driver's license will be suspended absolutely for one 
year if this is his first refusal and two (2) years if this is his second refusal within ten (10) 
years; and 
(e) After submitting to evidentiary testing he may, when practicable, at his own 
expense, have additional tests made by a person of his own choosing. 
I.C. 5 18-8002A provides substantially similar provisions, but includes 
the consequences for taking an evidentiary test and failing it. 
These statutes clearly provide the information the officer is required to provide to 
the driver. However, the statutes are devoted entirely to the administrative or civil 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 6 
suspension of the license of a driver. State v. Woolety, 116 Idaho 368, 775 P.2d 1210 
(1989). The legislame enacted the license suspension statutes to discourage and civilly 
penalize a refusal in r e c o ~ t i o n  that a person may exercise the physical ability to refuse 
to submit. De Witt, 145 Idaho at 7 13. 
"The purpose of a warning of license suspension following a re fusal... is to 
overcome an msmctioned refusal by threat instead of force. It is not to reinstate a right 
to choice, but rather to nonforcibly enforce the driver's previous implied consent." Id. 
"Informing a suspect about the consequences of refusing an evidentiary test is not 
intended to be an opportunity for a defendant to withdraw his consent; rather it is an 
adminimtive tool designed to increase the likelihood that the suspect will peaceably 
submit to testing that he has no legal right to refuse." DeWitt, 145 Idaho at 714. "This 
section does not in any way discuss criminal offenses related to driving under the 
influence of alcohol." Woolery, 1 16 Idaho at 373. "Even if the officer did not notify the 
defendant of the consequences of the refusal as required by I.C. 18-8002(3), the results of 
the evidentiq test are admissible in a criminal prosecution." De Witt, 145 Idaho at 7 14. 
If a Defendant is not properly informed of the consequences of refusiig an 
evidentiq test, the remedy is addressed at the administrative license suspension hearing. 
See, De Witt, 145 Idaho at 714. For purposes of the criminal proceeding, the Court is to 
address the issue under the Fourth Amendment analysis discussed above. The exception 
to the warrant requirement applicable here is consent. 
The Defendant argues that her consent to submit to a breath test was involuntary 
and agreed to only as a result of being coerced by the officer's statements that if she 
refused, he intended to a e  Defendant to the hospital for a blood draw. First, as stated 
above, Defendant had already consented, by driving on Idaho roads. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals addressed the argument that a defendant's consent to 
evidentiq testing was involuntary and a result of coercive comments by law 
enforcement in State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 973 P.2d 758, (Ct, App. 1999). In 
that case, Nickerson was pulled over and the officer suspected he had been drinking. Id. 
at 408, 760. He failed the field sobriety tests and was arrested for DUI and driving 
without privileges. Id. At the police station Nickerson was read an advisory form, 
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c o n e g  the e or mat ion in I.C. 5 18-8002, md was asked to take a breath test. 
Nickerson refused. Another officer became aware that Nickerson was on parole and 
contacted his parole officer who ordered Nickerson to submit to the breath test. The 
arresting officer then told Nickerson that if he refused he would go back to prison. 
Nickmon submitted and his blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit. Id. at 409. 
Nickerson filed a motion to suppress arguing that his consent to the breath test 
was involuntary. His motion was denied, and Nickerson appealed this issue. The Court 
of Appeals stated "Nickerson's s p e n t  that his consent to the BAC at the police station 
was involuntary is of no consequence because he had impliedly consented as a matter of 
law." Id. at 410. The Court concluded "It is thus apparent that the question of 
Nickerson's consent at the police station, whether voluntary or involuntary is 
superfluous, for actual consent at that point is unnecessary to the lawfblness of the 
procedure of the admissibility of the test results." Id. 
The Court of Appeals in State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 184 P.3d 215 (Ct. App. 
2008) addressed the issue of an officer informing a defendant of his consequences of 
refusal under I.C. (j 18-8002. In that case, the Defendant was involved in a single car 
accident rendering him unconscious. Id. at 71 1. Officers suspected that the Defendant 
was under the influence, and despite his unconsciousness, an officer read him the notice 
of suspension fonn. His blood was subsequently drawn and it exceeded the legal limit. 
Id. 
The Defendant filed a motion to suppress arguing that his implied consent was 
nullified because he was unconscious when he was "informed" of the consequences of 
the refusal. The Magistrate Judge agreed and suppressed the evidence and the District 
Court affirmed. The issue was appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court rejected the 
Defendant's theory and noted the purpose of the license suspension statute was to 
overcome an &sanctioned refusal by threat instead of force. Id. at 713. The Court held 
that, even if the officer did not notify the Defendant of the consequences of refusal, "the 
results of the evidentiary test are admissible in a criminal prosecution." Id. at 714. 
Finally, and most recently, in State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 160 P.3d 739 the 
Idaho Supreme Court was confronted with a similar issue as this case. There, the 
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Defendant was arrested for Driving Under the Muence, and was explained the 
consequences of refusing. The Defendant then refused to take a breathalyzer test. The 
officer then informed the Defendant that if he continued to refuse, he would be taken to a 
hospital and blood would be drawn. The Defendant agreed to submit, but then refused to 
cooperate, whereupon he was taken to the hospital for a blood draw. The Defendant's 
BAG was above the legal limit. Id The Court undertook a Fourth Amendment analysis 
and held that the implied consent law was a well-recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement and was reasonable under the circumsknces. The Court found the blood 
draw to be constitutional. Id. LeClercq argues that that the officer must fust choose the 
blood draw as the evidentiary test, or wait until the suspect refuses a breath test before 
informing the driver of a blood draw. However, the Court made no such ruling. The 
Court simply held "because Diaz had already given his implied consent to evidentiary 
testing by driving on an Idaho road, he also gave his consent to a blood draw." Id. 
In this case, this Court must analyze whether the Defendant's submittal to the 
evidentiary testing falls within an exception to the warrant requirement. Clearly, based 
on Idaho's Implied Consent Statute, the Defendant consented to evidentiary testing by 
operating a motor vehicle upon Idaho's roads. As the Court of Appeals stated in 
Nickerson, "It is thus apparent that the question of Defendant's] consent ..., whether 
voluntary or involuntary is superfluous, for actual consent at that point is unnecessary to 
the lawhlness of the procedure or the admissibility of the test results." (emphasis added) 
Nickerson, 132 Idaho at 410, P.2d at 762. Notably, the officer in Nickerson went well 
beyond the language of I.C. 18-8002 when he informed the Defendant that if he didn't 
submit to the breath test, he would go to prison. The Court was unpersuaded, because 
consent had already been given well before he was ordered to submit to the evidentiary 
test, the Court didn't even discuss whether or not the officer's comments were coercive. 
According to Black's Law Dictionary, coercion is defined as "compulsion by 
physical force or threat of physical force." Black's Law Dictionarv, 206, (Abridged 7' 
Ed., 2000). The statements by Trooper DeBie in the present case did not amount to 
coercion. Compare the facts in this case to DeWitt, where the Defendant argued that his 
consent was involuntary due to his unconsciousness, and the Court found the evidentiary 
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testing abissible. DeWitt's unconsciousness physically prevented him from refusing, 
and an officer instructed hospital to p d o m  a blood draw. In DeWitt, the 
Defendant was undoubtedly coerced into submitting to evidentiary testing as he was 
physically forced to submit. 
It is clear that the Defendant impliedly consented to evidentiary testing and the 
question of involuntariness is superfluous. However, even if this court deems it 
necessary to analyze the voluntariness of her consent the breath test should be ruled 
admissible. W l e  this precise issue hasn't been addressed before, Court's have 
addressed a similar issue where an officer threatens to obtain a search warrant unless an 
individual consents to allow officers to enter their residence. State v. Ballou, 145 Idaho 
840, 186 P.3d 696 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 963 P.2d 387 (Ct. 
App. 1998). The difference between these cases and the present case is that in the DUI 
context, a driver has impliedly consented. Although, even if Idaho didn't have an 
implied consent statute, a threat of a search warrant does not necessarily render consent 
involuntary. Id 
Voluntariness of an individual's consent is evaluated in light of all the 
circumstances. Abeyta, 13 1 Idaho at 708, 391. One factor that is important in 
determining the voluntariness of consent when an officer informs a suspect that they will 
obtain a warrant if consent is refused is whether or not an officer has probable cause. 
Ballou, 145 Idaho at 848, 704. "A defendant's consent is more likely to be found 
involuntary if contaminated by officers' false or erroneous statements regarding a warrant 
or the ability to obtain one." Id. In the present case, there is no question that Trooper 
DeBie had probable cause, given the driving pattern, observations of the Defendant, 
admitting drinking alcohol, and failing the field sobriety tests. Therefore, Defendant's 
consent was not involuntary considering Trooper DeBie could have obtained a search 
warrant to get her blood. 
The Defendant cites several cases in her brief supporting the proposition that 
"Idaho law requires strict adherence of the statutory language of Idaho's implied consent 
statute and the Idaho 'Supreme Court has emphatically discountenanced interjection of 
judicial gloss' and the 'clear terms of the statute' must be followed." Appellant's brief 
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p.5. However, the cases cited are appeals from the M ~ i s & a t e  Court's BAC hearing. For 
purposes of these refusal hearings, the import of the implied consent statute is 
sidficantly greater because, if the statute is not complied with, the Defendant's license 
would not be suspended. In a criminal case, as mentioned above, the consequence of 
failing to comply with the implied consent statutes differs considerably. 
The Defendant also cites cases fiom other jurisdictions as support for her position 
that her consent was involuntary. As the Magistrate Court noted in its memorandum 
den*g Defendant's motion, the Colorado and Texas statutes the Defendant attempts to 
compare are significantly different than Idaho. For example, the statute governing 
"express consent" in Colorado, allows a person to choose between a breath test or a 
blood test. Colo. Rev. Stat. $ 8  42-4-1301.1(1), (2)(a)(f)(2006). In Turbyne v. State of 
Colorado, 151 P.3d 563 (2007), a driver requested a blood test, but one was unavailable 
at that time. The officer then requested the driver to submit to a breath test, to which the 
driver was adamant that he wanted a blood test, and refused a breath test. The officer 
then told Tmbyne that if he did not submit to a breath test he would lose his license and 
he submitted. The Colorado Supreme Court ordered the suppression of the breath results 
because the officer did not correctly inform the driver of Colorado law. Id. at 572. 
Defendant cites a Texas case Erdrnan v. State, 861 SW.2d 890 (Tx. Cr. App. 
1993) as persuasive authority for this issue. However, Texas also provides a different 
statutory framework for their implied consent laws. In Texas, if a driver suspected of 
DUI refuses evidentiary testing, none shall be taken. Id. at 893. In sum, Colorado and 
Texas provide a driver options with regard to consent that Idaho does not. In Texas and 
Colorado, a driver can limit his or her consent and still abide by the applicable consent 
statute. In Idaho, the statute is clear that a driver's consent to evidentiary testing is 
implied. Therefore, these cases do not assist this Court in resolving the issue. 
II. CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm the 
Magistrate Court's denial of the Defendant's Motion in Limine andlor Motion to 
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Suppress. Trooper DeBie's statements of his intent to obtain a blood draw in the event of 
LeClercq's refusal did not render her consent involuntary under Idaho's Consent Statute. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5 day of August, 2009. 
Matthew ~ r e d b a c k , - l [ ~ B ~  7262 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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ai!dressctf by the courts. See, It~spondcut's ~ t i c f ,  p. 10. II is pulpably absurd to sct up a stamtoly 
schctne Tor c i t ~  prwtss and then pe~mit llc polico to injcct thruals Tar beyond what is 
c0izte~npl~1lcd by thc xlalutcrtry ~chcmc for due prows, and l11cl1 argue that fuubamental fairncss 
Ilns b c a ~  satisfied in the proms. 
lntcrc.c;tingty, Ulf: State makes rcpoatcd ugummtr that Tx?Clercq hits given her implicd 
consent to alilct11iol testing. But, wgain, the Statc misses thc poinl, or chooses to ignorc thc point, 
being raised by I ,eClercq that if you want to usc hcr impliod consent to extract a blood afcofiol 
s;~mpte, it milst bc doilc in co~npliancc with the statutory scheme that was devised to obtain 
iunplied consettt. 'l'h State w ~ t s  to have it, then they want to ig~ioiw it, 
'1 he Sintc nppcars to plrzce significm t rciiancc on State v. BdFitt, 145 Idaho 709, 184 
11.3d 215 (C'1. App, 2008). Tile Stale's brief, starting on pngo 5, relying on Daflrlrt, rccog~izcs 
thtlt the adnlinis~don of an alcohol eoncelitmtion tcst is a scinvc mri that h e  Statc bcars tho 
burdm to show that thc warrautlcss somch fell within a rccoylimd oxccption to Ole warrat 
requircmcnl. As UI Ue Wllf, fltcrc: are two ex~eptiom that wi apply in DUI cases, migcrit 
cirr;umsbtn~a comfit. Hlowcvet, the Stste ncgtcctcct to include langwge From Dc Witt that 
even if ;1 sca~xh is pcrrnissiblc undcr an exception to tIic wmmt requirement, "tt must still Be 
rc~~.rt~nab/ih in 1khl o J d  uf ilg other .rurrotmding circlrmslance~. " Slake v. De WfIf, 145 at 7 12. 
'Si~us, if'tltc Stub wishos b take advanlngc of IdRho'n iniplird consent statute, to o b t i ~ l  consent, 
Il~cn it must ;l rciis~)nabio, 
It is l,cClercq'r view that the oEccr's actiom in this case during the amlidan of the: 
implicd consclit phase of thc wse were not rcasonablo. Incredibly, the Statc, on pago 9 of its 
brief, cites Mack's Law I3ictlonaty For the dcfiition oTcmrcion its 'tcomposion by physical force 
or thrunl oTphysica1 force." Ihc State gocs on to allcgc that tlic sttiicmmts by the w~cstir\g 
ofllccr "ciid not urvo~~nt to coercion." A threat by Ikoopcr l)&fo to bClwcq ihnt if she rchscd 
to st~b~nil 10 Ihc breath tcst, hc would simply lakc her to tho hospital Ibr a f o d  blood dmw, is  
c~xtainty caecci ve and is sophomoric to suggwt otherwise. 
A1al~l~I,I.AN'f'S REPLY BIillit: - 3 
OCT-01-2009 THU 05: 13 PM RGER &~-+i> CRISTBRI AN ELKINS FAX NO, 
d6-W 4 
* 1 '  X C " - x l  *&IJ 
l,slstty, 1 iko the Nagistratc Court, the S&tc attc:n~pts to distttguish Twbym Q. SMC of 
C'olurrrtln. 151 I"3d 563 (2007) d E~dmrm v. Stnie, 861 S.W.2d 890 (Texas Ct. App. 1983) 
bas& or1 sig,nificmt variances of tho statutes. l'hc importance of U~csc: two caws is that ?he 
appc.llotc: catlrts agreed b strpprcss brwth test rcsults in a criminal prosccu~tion becausc the police 
o n ? a ~  lili1L.J to eomply with thc ~taiutixy impliccttexpress conscnt mtutcs. 
111. (JONCLUSION. 
'I'l~c Stata's Lirguments and authorities cited in its bricf s ~ e  not on point with thc issue 
bcing rctiscd by t,eClr?rcq. It is spccious to suggost that ImClcrcq WAS not c m c d  into submitting 
to n breath tcst when thrcab of a forcible blood draw were made by thc mcsting oEfficcr. Tfio 
~sr~>ccrluncs crnployect by tho amsting oEEiccr in this casc do not salistjt. constitutional protections 
or due prrxcss and thc Magistrsrte Court err4 in concluding otherwise. The magisirate's 
c'fcoision should be rcvcrscd. 
HES13EC~1'FUI.LY SURMI'lI'ED this day of Ootobw. 2009. 
1 WERERY CERTIFY that on the I day o f  Oaobcr, 2009, I muscd a lrue and 
comct copy oftho foregoing document to bc dolivmd to tl~c i'dllowinp in the incthod marked 
~ICIY~II:  
-- -- Mailed Matthcw E. hdback 
I la~d-Uclived Blaine County Deputy Prosecuting Attomcy 
7 1;axcd to 788-5554 201 Avcnuu S., Ste. 100 
.--- 
1:axcul and mailcd Hailey, lL. 83333 
COURT -s
CR-2008-0002607 
State of Idaho vs. Toni M LRclercq 
Wearing type: Oral Argument on Appeal 
Wearing date: 101512009 
Time: 10:35 am 
Judge: Robert J. Elgee 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Susan Israel 
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby 
Tape Number: Dl92 
Defense Attorney: Brim Elkins 
Prosecutor: Jim Thomas, Matthew Fredback 
Counter # 
Court comments to Mr. Elkins that it is the Court understanding that he wishes to 
continue this hearing. 
I 
10.35 
I Counsel stipulates to continuing hearing. I 
Counsel present 
1 
Recess 
10.36 
COURT MINUTES 1 
Court continues Oral Argument on Appeal October 26,2009 at 9:00 am. 
GOmT 
CR-2008-0002607 
State of Idaho vs. Toni M Leclercq 
Hearing type: Oral A r m e n t  on Appeal 
Hawing date: 3 0/26/2009 
' b e :  940 am 
Judge: Robert J. Elgee 
Courtroom: District Courtroom-judicial Bldg 
Court reporter: Susan Israel 
Minutes Clerk: Crystal Rigby 
Tape Number: Dl 93 
Defense Attomy: Brian Elkins 
Prosecutor: Jim Thomas; Matthew Fredback 
COURT h4 lNMES 1 
Counter # 
9.40 Counsel present. 
Court has reviewed the briefs and is prepared for orat argument. 
9.41 
9.46 
Mr. Elkins gives his argument. Reviews that the Def. was arrested and was under the 
influence of alcohol. The anesting officer was an ISP who had a hand held breath 
test. Reviews the emmination, the Def. questioned the officer that she thought she 
could refuse the test, the trooper responds that she can refuse but he can take her to 
the hospital and perform a forced blood test. The Trooper states that she could loose 
her license if she refuses, which is not accurate of the law. The Def. did consent to 
the test and blew over the legal amount. 
Mr. Elkins continues regarding the law that the legislature has put forth. Discusses 
the 15 minute time h e  and the comments made by the law enforcement officer. 
States case law that &es this case different. Reviews the time h e  of the 
investigation of amst, and the officer's additions to the statutes that are not accurate, 
which affects due process. Requests that the Court reverse the decision of the Mag. 
Court, because the breath test should not have been admitted because they were 
> 
COURT rtaNuniS 2 
co&mtional. Reviews whether the officer's conduct was reasonable. Cites case law 
that involves evidentiq testing. Compares a testing regarding Probation and what 
on the cases that Mr. E k  cited, and why the testing was tbrown out and atso that 
these cases are not in the State of Idaho. 
that it needs to be pointed out what the difference is between this case and the other 
cases. The difference is that the officer started to read &om the statute and then when 
he adds to that, it violates the 4& amendment right. Discusses independent testing 
being used to sukress breath test results. Discusses the difference in due process in 
one case and in this case which deals with the implied consent testing. Discusses 
exigent c i r c m c e s  that can be enforced after the implied consent time period is 
It is not clear to the Court that the officer gave wrong legal advice, he was just 
responding, it was that he volmteemi that info, she asked. Her consent was based on 
what the law has to be told to the suspect and the questions that he amwered. Court 
has reviewed Mr. Elkins brief regarding Colorado law, Texas law, and the differences 
10.20 
between those states law and Idaho law. Reviews and comments on the States' brief 
regarding DeWitt case, Nickerson case, Diaz case. Court finds that Judge Israel's 
decision is valid, discusses the p r o p  way an Idaho police officer should hand that 
type of situation. Court upholds Magistrate Couct's decision and df ims the action 
of the lower Court. 
Recess. Court will prepare the Order. 
IN THE DISTIUCT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICLAL DISTMCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BLALNE COUNTY 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, ) Case No.: CR-2008-2607 
VS. 1 
TONI M. LECLERCQ, 
1 
1 ) ORDER ON APPEAL 
Defendant 1 
Defendant's appeal came before this court on October 26,2009. Matt Fredback, Blaine 
County Prosecutor's Office, represented the State of Idaho. Brian Elkins, Attorney at 
Law, represented Toni LeClercq. The court has read and considered the briefs and 
authorities cited, and considered the arguments of each party. The Magistrate Court is 
AFFIRMED for the reasons stated on the record by the court. 
27 day of October, 2009 Dated this 
District ~udge  
CERTIFICATE OF SERmCE 
I mREBY GERm'Y that on this day of October, 2009, I caused to be 
served a true copy of the foregoing ORDER, docment by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to each of the following: 
Brian Elkins 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 766 
Ketchm, ID 83340 
Matthew Fredback 
20 1 2nd Avenue S, Suite 100 
Wailey, Idaho 83333 
4 U.S. Mail, Postage Repaid 
- Hand Delivered 
- Overnight Mail 
- FAX 
- U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
&Hand Delivered 
- Overnight Mail 
- FAX: 
Deputy Clerk 
IN FIFTH J l I D I C m  DISTFUCT OF 
'I'm STATE OF IDAHO, IN FOR T'Hl3 C O W  OF BLAINE 
S T A E  OF I D m O ,  1 
) CASE NO. CR-2008-0002607 
Pl ahtiff-Respondent, ) 
) FtEirnTTIrn 
VS. ) 
) 
TON M. LECLERCQ, ) 
Defendant- Appellant. 
1 
TO: HON. R TED ISRAEL 
Pursuant to the Order on Appeal filed by the District Court on October 
27,2009. 
IT IS HEmBY ORDEMD that this case is remanded to the 
Magistrate Court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 29 day of October, 2009. 
JOLYNN DRAGE 
Clerk the District Court, Blaine County pfce=. 
cc: Jim Thomas 
Brian E. Elkins 
BRIAN E. ELKINS, P.C. 
Attorney at Law 
208 Spruce Avenue North 
P. 0. Box 766 
Kekhm, Idaho 83340 
Telephone (208) 726-4338 
Facsimile (208) 726-9328 
E-mail: beelkins@cox.net 
ISB No. 3 150 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT C0UR.T 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLADE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 Case No. CR-2008-0002607 
PIaintifVRespondent, 1 
1 APPELLANT'S OBJECTION 
v. 1 TO F t E M I ~ ~  
1 
TONI M. LeCLERCQ 1 
1 
DefendantIAppellant. 1 
COMES NOW, the above named Appellant, Toni M. LeClercq, by and through her 
attorney of record, Brian E. E W ,  and hereby files her objection to the Remittitur filed in this 
matter on October 29,2009 since the District Court's Order on Appeal has not become final. 
The Remittitur purports to order that the case be remanded to the Magistrate Court for M e r  
proceedings, but a remand would not be proper while the Appellant has the right to appeal the 
District Court's Order on Appeal and has 42 days to do so. 
Before the District Court, there is not a specific appellate rule on remittiturs and therefore 
the Idaho Appellate Rules would apply. See, Idaho Criminal Rule 54.1 8. The District Court's 
Order on Appeal is an appealable order under Idaho Appellate Rule 1 l(c)(d). Under I.A.R. 14(a) 
4p~db+ 
the Appellanl: has 42 days to file an appeal. Accordingly, the District Court's Order on Appeal 
has not become final and a remitGtor should not have been issued. C '  I.A.R. 38 on the finality of 
opinions and remittitms. Accordingly, the Appellant requests that the District Court vacate and 
withdraw the Remiaim while the Appellant's time for appeal is pending. In the event the 
District Court fails to do that, or the Magistrate Court decides to take any action on this matter 
while the AppeUmt's right to appeal is pending, then oral argument is requested. 
This motion is based upon the entire record in this matter and the authorities cited herein. 
DATED this 3 day of November, 2009. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3 day of November, 2009, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be delivered to the following in the method marked 
herein: 
J' Mailed Jim J. Thomas 
Hand-Delivered Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney 
Faxed to 788-5554 201 2nd Avenue South, Suite 100 
Faxed and mailed Hailey, ID 83333 
BRIAN E. ELKINS, P.C. 
Attorney at Law 
208 Spruce Avenue North 
P. 0. Box 766 
Ketchurn, Idaho 83340 
Telephone (208) 726-43 3 8 
Facsimile (208) 726-9328 
E-mail: beeW@cox.net 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
IN TEE DISTRICT COURT OF TEE FFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIE  COUNTY OF BLAINE 
S T A E  OF IDAHO, 1 
1 Case No. CR-08-2607 
Plainti~espondent, 1 
1 NOTICE OF APPEAL 
v. 1 
1 
TONI M. LeCLERCQ, 1 
TO: The Respondent, State of Idaho and its attorney, Jim J. Thomas, Blaine County 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Blaine County Clerk of the Court 
NOTICE IS E E B Y  GIVEN THAT: 
1. Under Idaho Appellate Rule ("IAR") 17, the above named Appellant, Toni M. 
LeClercq, appeals against the above named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme 
Court fiom the Order on Appeal filed October 27,2009, the Honorable Robert J. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -\ 
Elgee, District Judge, presiding. 
2. That the Appellmt has a ri@t to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the order 
described in p w w p h  (1) above is an appealable order p m m t  to IAR 
1 1 (6)(10). 
3. A preliminary sbtement of the issues on appeal which the Appellant intends to 
assert in the appeal; provided, my such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent 
the Appellant from assehng other issues on appeal. 
(a) Whether the district court erred in affirming the magistrate's 
M e m o m d m  Decision and Order filed January 14,2009 denying the 
Appellant's Amended Motion to In Limilze andlor Motion to Suppress; 
(b) 'Whether the district court erred when it based its decision on matters not 
in the record; 
(c) Wether the magistrate erred when it found that a police officer, during a 
DUI (Driving While Under the Muence of Alcohol in violation of I.C. $ 
18-8004) investigation, can threaten a driver/suspect with a forcible blood 
draw, after requesting the Appellant to submit to a breath test to determine 
alcohol concentration, during Idaho's Implied Consent Procedure as set 
forth in I. C. $ 18-8002; 
(d) Wether the Appellant's Constitutional (Due Process) and statutory rights 
were violated when the police officer threatened to forcibly draw blood 
fiom the Appellant, after requesting Appellant to submit to a breath test to 
determine blood alcohol content, during Idaho's Implied Consent 
Procedure as provided in I.C. $1 8-8002; 
(e) Whether Appellant's breath test results should be suppressed from 
evidence; 
(9 Any other issues properly asserted once a complete review of the record 
and transcript is conducted. 
4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? If so, what 
portion? 
Response: No. 
5. (a) Is a Reporter's Transcript requested? 
Response: Yes. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -a 
(b) The Appellmt requests the preparation of the following portions of the 
Reporter" Trmscript: The reporter's standard transcript as defined in IAR 
25 (c) supplmented with the district court's comments, colloqies, decision 
from the bench on October 26,2009, ng the magistrate's 
Memomdm Decision and Order; the reporter has already prepared a 
Trmsc~f l  on Appeal from Magistrate Division regarding the Appellant's 
h e n d e d  Motion In Airnine andfor Motion to Suppress, and the Appellant 
requests that Tmscript be part of the record on appeal. 
6. The Appellant requests a standard record pursuant to IA.R 28 (b) plus any exhibits 
offered into evidence at the Defendant/Appellant's motion in limine a d o r  
motion to suppress held on December 3,2008, before the Honorable R. Ted Israel. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named beiow at the address set 
out below. 
(b) (1) The Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the Reporter's Transcript in the amount of $1 00. 
(2) The estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's record has been 
paid in the amount of $1 00. 
(c) Under IAR 23(a)(8), no filing fee is required. 
(d) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20. 
DATED this 5 day of December, 2009. 
BafAN E. ELIUNS 
A T T O W Y  FOR APPELLANT TONI M. LeCLERCQ 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -3 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3 day of December, 2009, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be delivered to the following in the method marked 
herein: 
Mailed Jim J. Thomas 
7Hand-Delivered Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney 
Faxed to 208-788-5554 20 1 2nd Avenue South, Suite 1 00 
Faxed to 208-788-5554 Hailey, ID 83333 
and mailed 
Mailed 
J Hand-Delivered 
Faxed to 
Faxed to 
and mailed 
Susan Israel 
Blaine County Court Reporter 
P. 0. Box 1379 
Ketautn, ID 83340 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 
EXHIBIT LIST 
Exhibits from Motion to Suppress and/or Motion in Lirnine held 
December 3,2008: 
STATE'S EXHIBITS : 
1. DVD of incident. 
DEFENDANTS EXIaBITS: 
1. Instrument Operations Log. 
2. Copy of citation issued 9-13-08. 
3. Trooper DeBie's Affidavit of Probable Cause dated 9- 14-08. 
4. Idaho State Police Incident Report dated 9- 13-08. 
5. Trooper DeBie's Affidavit of Probable Cause dated 9- 14-08. 
6. Notice of Suspension dated 9-14-08. 
EXHIBIT SmMITTED BY CLERK: 
1. Transcript of Appeal from Magistrate Division, hearing held on 
December 3,2008, filed 6-8-09. 
EXHIBIT LIST 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 Supreme Court No. 371 91-2009 
1 
PlaintifflRespondent, 1 CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
1 
VS. 1 
1 
TONI M. LECLERCQ, ) 
1 
DefendantlAppellant. 1 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
) ss. 
County of Blaine 1 
I, Andrea Logan, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
Clerk's Record was compiled and bound under my direction, and is a true, full and correct Record 
of the pleadings and documents requested by the Appellant and included under Rule 28, I.A.R. 
I do further certify that the court reporter's transcript will be duly lodged with the 
Clerk of the Supreme as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
said Court at Hailey, Idaho, this f l  day of , 2010. 
JOLYNN DRAGE, Clerk of the Court 
Andrea Logan, Deputy Clerk 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 Supreme Court No. 371 91 -2009 
) 
PlaintiWRespondent, 1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 
VS. 1 
) 
TONI M. LECLERCQ, ) 
1 
DefendantlAppeIlant. 1 
I, Andrea Logan, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Blaine, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record and 
Court Reporter's Transcript to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
Brian Elkins, Esq. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P.O. Box 766 
Ketchum, ldaho 83340 
Attorney General's Office 
CRIMINAL APPEALS 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ldaho 83720-001 0 
Attorney for DefendantlAppellant Attorney for PlaintifflRespondent 
WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal 
of the said Court this dayof T i ~ v \ v & q  , 2010. 
JOLYNN DRAGE, Clerk of the Court 
Andrea Logan, Deputy CI@ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - 1 
